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Dempster–Shafer theory (wikipedia.org)
42 points by luu on March 20, 2015 | hide | past | favorite | 13 comments



In practice, one of the main issues with DST is the computational complexity inherent in its reasoning approach. Here are two classic meta-studies devoted to approximation algorithms that try to tackle this problem:

[1] Tessem, B., Approximations for efficient computation in the theory of evidence, Artificial Intelligence 61,315-329, 1993.

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/00043702939... (behind Elsevier paywall)

[2] Bauer, M., Approximation Algorithms and Decision Making in the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence--An Empirical study. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, Volume 17, Issues 2–3, August–October 1997, Pages 217–237

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0888613X97...

The first one focuses on quantitative deviations while the second paper considers the qualitaty of a decision.


Of course, probabilistic reasoning has similar computational problems, especially related to numerical evaluation of integrals in the denominator of Bayes' Rule. This is why there's a lot of research into how to make variational and Markov-Chain Monte Carlo methods run faster.


For anyone interested in applying Dempster-Shafer Theory, I suggest checking out Subjective Logic [1] as well. One of the issues that pops up in DS-Theory is that the traditional method of belief combination tends to assign lots of mass to uncertainty, and thus highly opposed beliefs end up with sometimes counter-intuitive results. Subjective Logic offers an extensive battery of operators for combining beliefs: from cumulative and averaging fusion, to belief constraining, to consensus. I did my Master's thesis on implementing and analyzing the various SL operators, and for many situations, working with SL is very pleasant.

[1] http://folk.uio.no/josang/sl/


DST's obvious problem is precise computation with imprecise numbers - I saw some cases where people threw belief/plausibility numbers out of thin air to get whichever outcome they favored (all you need to do is to find a (preferably single) value where solution flips to the one you selected). A perfect rational framework for politics...


Very much the same thing happens with Bayesian probabilities, with their notorious problems of reference class and prior. Witness the theologians who claim Bayes's Theory proves the resurrection, or the competing group who claim that BT proves Jesus didn't exist at all. When theologians start using your math, you know it is well tuned for GIGO.


A lot of people seem to be confused about the problem here, so I'll try to demonstrate your exampe with a very simple form to show the problem.

Let's say that you want to figure out the chance of the resurrection happening based on the evidence that a period book (the Bible) says it happens and a straighforward application of Bayes' Theorem. Let's temporarily ignore any uncertainty about when the Bible was actually written. I'm not actually trying to argue either of these cases here, so it's immaterial.

On the one hand, you could decide that the prior is 50% (we don't have any other evidence, and people come back from what at the time would be thought "dead" with some frequency in the modern world). You could sample the frequency of books purporting to be historical that mention resurrections (low) to get the background frequency of these books, and that if its central figure did rise from death, the Bible would almost certainly mention it. From this, you get a rather high probability that the resurrection occurred.

On the other hand, you could set a very low prior (because people don't seem to come back from death), sample the proportion of magical events in period literature (substantial) to get the background frequency, and agree that the Bible would mention a resurrection if it happened, and conclude a rather low probability.

The problem is the same as in the Drake equation: all of these probabilities are basically just guesses, as there is no good way to measure them in this case. The result is therefore based more on how you guess than on the math. Any framework of reasoning that is based on probability will have this problem when dealing with real world events.


I agree.

There are at least six intractable problems, I can see.

* Defining the thing you're looking for (in your example you say 'what at the time would be thought "dead"' - that opens up the whole problem of excluding the middle, are the options only resurrection vs non-resurrection?)

* Calculating any particular probability without a direct frequentist correlate (the probability that the bible would mention a genuine resurrection, in your example).

* Choosing a frequentist correlate when they are available (the reference class problem).

* Determining the prior.

* Determining which posterior probabilities to include (to be accurate you have to include all relevant probabilities, but that's impossible in practice, there could be an almost infinite number of contributing factors, so the choice of what to include begs the question).

* For probabilities after the first, removing the correlation with previous probabilities (BT assumes that the influence of previous information is excluding from new information, because of the conditional probability, in practice this is almost possible to do).

Then there's the problem that, for small inputs, the error in BT is very large. If your calculations ever drop to low probabilities (unless you can put tight bounds on the error of everything you've done), you effectively lose all information in the calculation.


All Bayesian statistics textbooks really should include Jaynes' remarks: probability is about information. This is why maximum-entropy priors exist, and it's also why Bayesian probability can assign large probabilities to strange hypotheses: if you come up with evidence that Jesus came back from the dead (which is certainly a valid counterfactual), then Bayes theorem should assign high probability to that hypothesis. The question is of your evidence!


The problem in these cases tends to be that there is no evidence. So you take as complex a form or BT as possible, then put in numbers that 'sound reasonable', end up with a conclusion that supports your prior beliefs and claim it is mathematically correct, because BT has been proven, don't you know!

The problem with your point about BT 'should assign a high probability' is that when you're reasoning about messy real world situations, lacking objective, quantitative data, it isn't clear how you go about generating probabilities for most kinds of evidence. It is no coincidence that the cited examples tend to be somewhat frequentist. When you start having probabilities like "the probability the disciples would have lied about seeing Jesus" you're doomed already. Not to mention the fact that BT assumes you can exclude the middle, which runs up against problems of definition in real situations: what exactly does "Jesus didn't exist" mean? You can hide a lot of rabbits in that hat.

But anyway, this is getting way off the track for the OP, sorry for the derailing. tl;dr - it is hard to model the real world in mathematical models of epistemology.


What pure mathematics is tuned to stop GIGO?


[flagged]


Did you get that from my comment? Wow. I've no idea how.


Putting numbers on something doesn't guarantee correctness but it means there are fewer ways you can cheat. See e.g. http://slatestarcodex.com/2013/05/02/if-its-worth-doing-its-...


I think the biggest problem is the conflation of true and provable that DST tends to lead to (Gödel says hi). [This is also mentioned under "Criticism" in the Wiki article]




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