Hacker News new | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submit login

Interestingly, the researchers used a Xilinx FPGA, not just an off-the-shelf AMD or Intel PC.

Why not?

If the attack can only be reproduced by custom hardware, why should anyone care?

Also, precise patterns of access to DRAM would require disabling the L1 and L2 caches. Doesn't that sort of thing require privileged instructions?

With caching in place, memory accesses are indirect. You have to be able to reproduce the attack using only patterns of cache line loads and spills.




No, they reproduced on "Intel (Sandy Bridge, Ivy Bridge, and Haswell) and AMD (Piledriver) systems using a 2GB DDR3 module." (see Section 4)

They evict cache lines using the CLFLUSH x86 instruction, which I believe is unprivileged.


CLFLUSH is definitely unprivileged - I made use of it on a recent project (evicting outbound messages from a core's cache cut cash misses meaningfully).




Guidelines | FAQ | Support | API | Security | Lists | Bookmarklet | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: