> Jonathon Riley served in Bosnia and Iraq, where he was the general officer commanding British forces.
A British officer who doesn't think highly of Napoleon? This is my surprised face.
> This is implicit in Karl von Clausewitz’s celebrated but often misquoted (and still more often misunderstood) remark that ‘war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.’
Can this guy read German? Because that seems like an over-translation of the simple „Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln“ (title of section 24, chapter 1, book I of Vom Kriege).
I would also note that Napoleon failed in the end, but that he did quite well in the meanwhile. He continued the Revolutionary Wars, and so was doomed to face the forces of reaction, who would never ally with him with any kind of sincerity. It's possible that his military successes blinded him to the possibility of stability through diplomacy, but could he really have allied with the Habsburgs?
He also had to contend with an ascendant Britain, willing to exploit her insular position to its full advantage through her renewed Navy and her economic strength. But just a few years before the French Revolution, Britain had come close to losing it all; with no allies on the continent to distract France, she might have lost not just her colonies, but her dominant naval position, which was so essential in Napoleon's defeat.
Napoleon had many of the same advantages as with the War of Independence, once France and Spain were allied he had a naval numerical advantage and at many points an isolated Britain. Even the revolutionary French and Spanish Navies had shown a marked lack of interest in the kind of daring fighting that marked British admirals (partially due to the esprit de corps created after Byng's shooting). Nelson's breaking the line was not a new tactical invention, it was just something that most shied away from.
Perhaps we British officers (I'm RN) appreciate our heroes a little more because they fought outnumbered yet achieved crushing victories, and they achieved their ultimate strategic objectives. Despite being aristocrats dealing with men who were often "scum" seemed to care far more their lives than the supposedly revolutionary Napoleon.
Wellington was not only a great general but fought peace as a diplomat in Paris, and later as a Prime Minister. Wellington even sought out Napoleon's former mistresses and seduced them in Paris.
I can never understand why Wellington would call soldiers 'scum of the earth'. Soldiers don't get anything whether 'His Majesty' wins the war or not. No wonder Scotland wants independence. They sent soldiers to Wellington's expedition. Scots Grays were the ones who charged French line and batteries at Waterloo which avoid disaster. And yet they are 'nothing but beggars and scoundrel' to Wellington.
History is written by winners. Had Napoleon not gone to Russia, European feudal system would have fallen much earlier, and we'd be writing this in French.
Napoleon's contribution to history is not military feat. It's the civil code, education, equal opportunity, emancipation of jews, tearing down of ancien régime and giving birth to idea of nation states.
A longer quote rather puts the "scum of the Earth" thing in context:
A French army is composed very differently from ours. The conscription calls out a share of every class — no matter whether your son or my son — all must march; but our friends — I may say it in this room — are the very scum of the earth. People talk of their enlisting from their fine military feeling — all stuff — no such thing. Some of our men enlist from having got bastard children — some for minor offences — many more for drink; but you can hardly conceive such a set brought together, and it really is wonderful that we should have made them the fine fellows they are.
He said that many times throughout the war. At a formal settings obvious he'll say it a little nicer. British soldiers get paid only one shilling per day and are constantly short on supply and had to plunder to survive. There is even a book on why soldiers are not 'scum of the Earth'
Much less so than the french who lived of the land - which means you cannot as easily concetrate force at the schwerpunkt (the key point of the battle field)
Napoleon didn't tear down the ancien regime, he was still a very junior officer when that happened. If anything he turned a Republic back into an Empire.
He overthrew many monarchies in Europe, and installed French civil system to the newly occupied regions. Although he did assign his relatives to be monarchies in those areas, the reforms are real and the difference weren't felt until he was defeat and old monarchies came back. His military conscriptions certainly offset his reforms in popularity. Italians vied for independence from Austrian Empire after Napoleon was defeated. Interestingly, it was Napoleon III (Napoleon I's naphew) who helped eventually Italian won independence.
well,
- religious toleration: french revolution basically wants to kill off the Catholic priests. Napoleon brought back Catholicism since there were still a lot of catholics in france but stripped its privileges. He was the first to emancipate the jews.
- His military conquest speeded up the abolition of feudalism across europe. Civil code is put in place in occupied regions.
"Wellington even sought out Napoleon's former mistresses and seduced them in Paris."
Wow, you can get more British than suggesting your country's prowess by how your general allegedly defeated his enemy in the battlefield and in bed, but I'm guessing it would require your doing that while drinking tea on the top of the Big Ben, with a chorus singing "God Save the Queen" in the background.
The French Navy after the Revolution was a shadow of its former self; most of its aristocratic officers had deserted. Since the country was in a state of almost-constant land war after 1792, a real rebuilding of the navy could never be a priority. Ships are nice, but, as you rightly remark, trained crews and experienced officer are needed for them to make a difference.
Britain was the only country that could afford to keep fighting with an XVIIth century style professional army, of a necessarily limited size (and kept doing so until WWI). The other belligerents went to French-style conscript armies, which made Napoleon's advantage much smaller over time.
It didn't help the French navy that the revolution executed and exiled quite a few of its officers.
As for "fought outnumbered yet achieved crushing victories", it's worth remembering that Britain had allies nearly throughout the war: Portuguese and Spanish during most of the Peninsular War; Germans (and Dutch) at Waterloo, and most of the time the Russians and Austrians fighting the French with whatever success to the east.
Napoleon complained of "Pitt's gold" that Britain sent to the continental states in the coalitions. But there were 7 coalitions in total - Napoleon kept defeating them on land, so Britain couldn't rely on them.
I'm just getting stuck into Robert's "Napoleon the Great", my Christmas present to myself!
British gold bought distractions. Britain has the best navy but on land it couldn't even compete with France. If the French were able to cross the channel from Boulogne, then it'd be the end of the empire.
At Austerlitz, Britain paid money for each dead Russian soldier. English agents were busy counting the dead making sure his majestry's money is well spent while French medics trying to save wounded from both side. Austrian emperor Francis allegedly said 'English are merchants of human flesh.
> At Austerlitz, Britain paid money for each dead Russian soldier. English agents were busy counting the dead making sure his majestry's money is well spent
Also, Britain routinely paid other monarchies to have them send their soldiers. They hired Germans to fight against American independence. George Washington's famous first victory was crossing the Delaware river and surprise attacked what were actual German legions.
At what point did the French navy isolate Britain? Britain blockaded French ports from 1803 onwards and the French were demolished in 1805.
As for being outnumbered, the British paid lots of other people to fight Napoleon, and they outnumbered him substantially. (It's a bit like the US claiming to be fighting long odds today.)
It was the same thing that won the battle on land. Napoleon, a artillery officer by training, was ultimately defeated by Wellington's infantry firing fast enough to destroy the French columns. The allies at Waterloo were willing to stand and die against French artillery, the French infantry in column would not stand under the fire of the thin red line.
What exactly do you mean 'fought peace'? France was defeated. The allies were simply there to divide up the land. And why is 'sought out Napoleon's former mistresses and seduced them' something to be proud of?
Royal Navy even lost ships to Argentina At Falklands Wars. That would never happen to American Navy.
The most valuable thing about the article, in my opinion, is its teasing out of the difference between strategy (considering all means and all goals) and tactics, something that -- for example -- the US military might learn from (which defines the difference by the number of soldiers involved -- I am not making this up).
Napoleon was very good at tactics, grand tactics ("strategy" in the US), and even logistics, but he was not good enough at strategy to win. As many have pointed out, the odds were stacked against him because he represented the Devil in terms of the ideas he and the French Empire espoused, and despite his defeat the ideas won.
Ideology aside, most importantly, Napoleon represented a dominant power in Europe which Britain -- at the time the world's only real superpower -- implacably opposed for strategic reasons (unified Europe means Britain no longer top nation).
The thing that really riles up the British about Napoleon is that his influence and fame are so wide relative to that of Wellington, who was if anything a better tactician. Even in this article the emphasis on the Russian campaign for Napoleon's defeat probably irks those who follow Wellington. Wellington defeated the French in India, securing Britain's economic advantages, and then turned Spain into a bloody quagmire. He won every battle he fought, usually with few casualties on his side.
Oh, and he is the one who finally beat Napoleon, despite being outnumbered.
Britain was the only real superpower? France had been disputing that claim for about a hundred years at that point. In point of fact between the time of Charlemagne, and Waterloo, there are few periods in which France was not the dominant power. France was generally larger, richer, more populous, and more powerful than the rest of Europe.
I am sure that Wellington was a good guy, but that "article" is garbage. Some information is useful despite being obviously biased, but this is just dreck. Wellington was physically fit, and Napoleon wasn't? This must obviously have been a decisive factor; it's good the right man won. I am surprised not to read a discussion of their favorite colors.
I am sure that you can pick apart a global conflict spanning (at least) two decades, with many reverses and triumphs by both sides, to show that one side and one hero was destined to win, the other side's defeat inevitable. I am less convinced that this is a good thing to do, and more skeptical that your hero does not have the reputation he deserves.
> I am sure that you can pick apart a global conflict spanning (at least) two decades, with many reverses and triumphs by both sides, to show that one side and one hero was destined to win, the other side's defeat inevitable.
I agree completely. Napoleon's defeat seems much less inevitable than, say, the Confederacy's or Imperial Japan's in their respective wars. The point is, however, that if one wants to claim Napoleon was great, one needs to make the challenges he faced seem larger, not smaller, and so his strategic "genius" must rest on the proposition that his strategic problem was insurmountable. I am willing to concede that it may have been, but even so, I think Wellington was the more effective battlefield commander (that said, Napoleon was running an army and an empire, and doing a lot of delegation; Wellington not so much).
I've seen quite a few accounts of Waterloo where Wellington is accused of being too passive and only being saved from defeat by the resilience of his troops and by the quick response of the Prussians, especially Gneisenau. I remember a quote where the author was speculating based on their personalities that had Napoleon attacked the Prussians first, they would have been crushed before the more cautious Wellington would have interfered.
I doubt that a victory at Waterloo would have changes the outcome of the war, though.
I'm hardly an expert on the matter, but there are plenty of conflicting opinions. The fact remains Wellington was essentially undefeated as a general, in India, Spain, and finally Belgium. He was a defensive specialist, whereas Napoleon was an offensive specialist, and when they came head-to-head, Wellington defeated Napoleon's "immortal" guard unit using the same tactics he had used against everyone else.
Napoleon was indeed a very good general, rightfully considered as one of the greatest of all time. This very well written and insightful article takes his legend down a peg or two, which is certainly justified. The invasion of Russia was one of history's greatest follies, The Little Corporal was cavalier with the lives of his men and his strategic brilliance was inconsistent at best. But his strengths often made up for his short comings and he was better than almost all of the comparable generals of his day.
His victory at Austerlitz stands as one of the great military achievements and best executed battles in history. Literally a textbook example of movement, timing and coordination. The common perception is that after Napoleon returned from Elba he lost much of his strategic and tactical flair, throwing his men into meat grinders. This is mostly true, but most of the opposing generals also had very high casualty rates. Napoleonic warfare was dominated by the Fog of War, they had no satellites or drones to help them plan and maneuver. Napoleon had a sixth sense for visualizing a battle that unfortunately came and went. On his good days he was better than many who have ever lived. On most days, he was simply average. That's as much as most of us could ask for, and it was enough to dominate a continent at the time.
History is filled with intelligent and technically capable generals, but only a few who had a style that set them apart. Hannibal and Robert E. Lee come easily to mind, along with others. Napoleon's genius of movement and logistics were groundbreaking, and the lessons apply to more than warfare. He was the original "Move fast and break things". He taught military history that being faster and better organized was enough to build a seemingly unstoppable snow ball effect of victories. His downfall instructs that even the best preparation cannot defeat a dangerous and unpredictable shifting landscape.
Yep I dont have my reference works at work as one of the early musilm gererals probaly should be in the list but he got written out of history some what.
BTW Carthage was a Colony so not realy non european in that sense.
Some others, often overlooked from a Western viewpoint, would be Subutai, Timur the Lame (Tamerlane), Belisarius, Zhukov, and Suleiman I. There are more.
Arguably Marius and Sulla were the equal, if not better than, Caesar. And Pompey was no slouch either. And another great Roman general was Scipio.
Some more modern generals not mentioned are Fredrick the Great and Gustavus Adolphus, plus Rommel.
Speaking of which are the greatest generals, according to Livy Hannibal and Scipio Africanus met at a dinner 10 years after Scipio definitively beat Hannibal and that's what their conversation was about. Scipio asked Hannibal, who are the greatest generals of all time? Hannibal said, Alexander, Pyrrhus and myself. Annoyed that he wasn't on the list Scipio said okay, what then if I hadn't beat you at Zama? Hannibal said, I'd have put myself ahead of both Alexander and Pyrrhus.
That was the guy however to be a great captain you need to be a bit more than a brilliant general in a one or two campaigns which rules peopel liek rommel, monty and patton out
I'm no historian or geographer but I never thought of considering the north African cultures of the time as not European, since Mediterranean at a time seemed a uniting force and not a dividing one like now. Perhaps my European-centric vision talking.
Yeah, that list rather sucks. At a minimum you need to add in Robert Lee and Ulysses Grant. Also Genghis Khan was no slouch on the battlefield, and most people feel like Sun Tzu knew a thing or two about fighting battles...
huh. If we're talking about the "general consensus" You are perhaps the only person I've heard of who would put both lee and grant on the list.
Some would add Lee (though personally, I think that is for political/tribal reasons more than anything else... but I do acknowledge than many have a high opinion of the man, especially when it came to cavalry.) - but even those of us who sympathize with the north generally don't rate Grant much above 'competent enough' - he got the job done, but nobody is going to compare him to Caesar or Napoleon.
It was short because the north had massive manpower and industrial production advantages. AFAIK the northern leadership made it much harder then it should have been, if anything (or Lee made it harder, or both).
Grant won that campaign. A campaign that had been attempted and lost by three of his predecessors. Tactically the guy was no genius, but strategically he was brilliant.
From a literary perspective, Tolstoy's War and Peace has volumes of text dedicated to examining Napoleon and the impact of "great men" on history. He also doesn't create a very flattering portrayal, it's a great read. Of course there's more to that book than just war. Dumas, who named a chapter "The Corsican Ogre" after Napoleon in The Count of Monte Cristo is also not very kind to his legacy. Napoleon's lasting impact beyond just the destruction and desecration of monarchies across Europe probably includes the Napoleonic Code[1] which has probably influenced laws everywhere.
Another great read is Rifleman Dodd, also known as Death to the French, the story of a single British rifleman causing havoc to french forces in Spain[2]. It gives you an interesting perspective how much the french were hated outside of France.
It's the fictional accounts of a dashing and arrogant cavalry officer in Napoleon's army. You can tell Doyle enjoys lampooning some French military stereotypes but there's also some great adventures along the way. I think it would make a great movie with the right director and cast.
Criticising Napoleon without mentioning Austerlitz[1] is.. pretty stupid. Probably only Cannae is as famous as a textbook example of brilliant command.
Even if there are some decent points made it will take a lot more than that to argue that he wasn't one of the great battlefield commanders.
This is from a real general. You can tell. He talks about logistics before he talks about battles. Napoleon's military funded the development of the tin can. That wasn't enough to get his army to Moscow. Here's a view of that logistic disaster: http://www.indiana.edu/~psource/PDF/Archive%20Articles/Sprin...
As is usual with the conquer-the-world types, not knowing when to stop was Napoleon's downfall. Hitler made the same mistake - taking on both Britain and Russia at the same time.
Its an oft repeated point that Hitler made the same mistake as Napoleon, but the situations were actually very different. In particular, there was the actual threat of Stalinist Russia getting completely industrialized and then attacking Germany first. And so its often debated among historians whether the German invasion was inevitable.
At the end of this article, he starts to touch on some of the things that William Lind has been writing about for years - how state actors can fight against non-state actors.
He talks a lot about the different levels of war (strategic, operational, tactical) but more, talks about how war evolved over time. In particular how maneuver doctrine is superior to firepower doctrine is superior to manpower doctrine. These all are, to a certain extent, trumped by guerrilla warfare by non-state forces. Lind calls this fourth generation warfare.
Here's an archive of some of his essays (chronological from the bottom up):
I suppose we should estimate Napoleon's greatness by the size of the mess he left behind. Considering that a Napoleon III intervened to disaster in ... Mexico, that's quite a mess.
Napoleon was sufficient to resuscitate the Spanish Inquisition. It is a Napoleon-sized mess in itself, but "Goya's Ghosts" at least brushes onto this - complete with a demonstration of the use of the garotte.
Blücher's Prussian army arrived to save Wellington's ass despite Wellington not saving theirs at Battle of Ligny. Can we please give Germans some credit.
There is no 'order', only verbal agreement that they will come to each other's aid in case they run into Napoleon's army. Wellington rode to Blücher and promised to aid him at Ligny but he didn't which resulted in Prussian defeat at Battle of Ligny. Blücher himself was incapacitated. Chief of Staff Gneisenau didn't want to come to Wellington's aid because he didn't trust the British. Had Blücher not insisted marching onto Waterloo, Wellington would be crush like Alexander in Austerlitz.
Wellington couldn't come to Blücher's aid as Napoleon blocked him with his left wing under Ney at Quatre Bras.
Your argument seems to be coming from the historical revisionism that Hofschröer puts forward, about how Waterloo was somehow a German victory and Wellington simply took the credit.
It was neither, it was a coalition victory by both Wellington and Blücher in close cooperation. Close cooperation by the standards of the day that is, in personal meetings and messages conveyed on horse-back.
Neither knew from which direction Napoleon would attack, and when he did he took both Blücher and Wellington by surprise. Moving from the south-west he defeated Blücher at Ligny, whilst pushing his left wing under Ney to block Wellington to the north at Quatre Bras. Arguably Napoleon's biggest mistake was not to make sure he had decisively beaten Blücher at Ligny.
Blücher withdrew to reorganise, and Wellington pulled back north along the Brussels road to Waterloo. Crucially Blücher also withdrew northwards, parallel to the French advance, and Wellington was well aware of this, the French not.
The rest is history. Wellington's army held the field all day, the Prussians arrived on the French right in the late afternoon, and with Napoleon's attacks exhausted, the French army routed.
To quote Wellington himself written immediately after the battle "I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them"
Whether or not Wellington promised to come to Blücher's aid at Ligny is debatable. Hofschröer claims he did. You can't call it revisionism because he was simply stating his view. Ask 10 people today who defeated Napoleon at Waterloo, 9 wouldn't even know Prussians were there.
Wellington has always reserved the option to retreat from the sea. That's why he left 10000+ reserve to cover the retreat path in case things go wrong at Waterloo. From Prussian point of view 1) they just lost a battle badly at Ligny 2) Wellington said he'd come but he didn't 3) Wellington could escape from sea in which case Prussians will surely be crushed facing French alone. Wellington does deserve credit but I would say Blücher's courage to trust his teammate and meet Wellington at Waterloo is more respectable. It's not a overstatement that it's a German victory.
Napoleon's biggest mistake is giving his marshals wrong tasks. He left his best marshal Davout in Paris while hoping Grouchy who just got promoted marshal to carry the weight to chase down Blücher. Grouchy is OK with carrying out orders but not so great at reacting to situation. Despite Gérard repeated asking to 'march to the sound of the guns', he decided to follow previous order and chase Prussians in the wrong direction. Although he didn't have too much of a choice, Davout is the only one whose loyalty is questionable. He didn't want what happened at Fontainebleau to repeat so he had to keep Davout at home. And then he used Soult for staff work who did a very sloppy job. The lack of information and misinformation may have well cost the battle.
mm if the British king was as obsesed about recoveing America as he was anti cotholic the war of 1812 would have ended very diferently.
The American army in 1812 would have been no match for Wellington (plus a coalition of european states who wanted ther american colonys back) even the very high quality but small US navy would have not helped that much.
I don't want to get into an argument with Americans, but I'd agree that the outcome could have been different. It would make a good counterfactual historical novel at least :-)
That's like running Andrew Wyeth[1] through a Bob Ross app. [0] Writing is art, it doesn't always need to be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator or bereft of its voice.
[0] I loved Bob Ross.
[1] I originally had "Picasso" but the styles were too disparate for the point. Still, props to @krapp for the ERB link.
I understand your point, but I strongly disagree. First, you're saying that the author of this piece -- a military general and historian -- used hard-to-read passive voice throughout because of his extreme demonstrated mastery of the art of writing. He truly considered and wrestled with each sentence.
I don't believe that one bit.
Also, I disagree with your assertion that artisans should avoid learning the fundamentals of their craft, or that doing so somehow robs the work of its "voice".
It reminds me of a fourteen-year-old guitarist who doesn't see the need to learn scales or music theory. "I'm not going to be some cookie-cutter musician, man. My music is going to be original and unique!"
This article would be much better if it had gone through an editing phase or two.
Why are there so many people who pick up poorly founded superstitions about language and then insist and sneer how right they are? Folk don't go about making hilariously arrogant and and ignorant claims about say, maths, but with language all bets are off. Maybe they think that because they can speak English they are an expert?
There was nothing wrong with the article as regards the "passive voice" and like most people who moan about the passive voice you likely don't understand what it is: http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=2922
Mentioning that hilariously bad app Hemingway makes it worse. Running Hemingway through hemingway is fun - it gets mutilated.
>It reminds me of a fourteen-year-old guitarist who doesn't see the need to learn scales or music theory.
>music theory
Scales can almost be self-learned and a good chunk of rock musicians don't know anything about music theory, and can't read music. Many excellent musicians and artists are autodidacts.
I enjoyed the article. Maybe the author doesn't care about writing as much as the content of the article? I certainly don't care to edit this post to your aesthetic standards, or even posts on my blog. In fact, most of what I write is awful. But does it make my points any less true?
You still haven't demonstrated that you understand what "passive voice" even is. I think you'll find this article doesn't make particularly frequent use of it.
The writing could be improved and made more forceful, but I don't see much passive voice in there. Are you sure that word means what you think it means?
(And the hemingway app is pretty crappy as far as natural language processing goes.)
A British officer who doesn't think highly of Napoleon? This is my surprised face.
> This is implicit in Karl von Clausewitz’s celebrated but often misquoted (and still more often misunderstood) remark that ‘war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.’
Can this guy read German? Because that seems like an over-translation of the simple „Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln“ (title of section 24, chapter 1, book I of Vom Kriege).
I would also note that Napoleon failed in the end, but that he did quite well in the meanwhile. He continued the Revolutionary Wars, and so was doomed to face the forces of reaction, who would never ally with him with any kind of sincerity. It's possible that his military successes blinded him to the possibility of stability through diplomacy, but could he really have allied with the Habsburgs?
He also had to contend with an ascendant Britain, willing to exploit her insular position to its full advantage through her renewed Navy and her economic strength. But just a few years before the French Revolution, Britain had come close to losing it all; with no allies on the continent to distract France, she might have lost not just her colonies, but her dominant naval position, which was so essential in Napoleon's defeat.