One cannot reasonably say that "what is a probability?" doesn't have a good answer without having read at least the first two chapters of "Probability Theory: the Logic of Science".
I don't want to enter a Frequentist/Bayesian debate, where I'm right and the Frequentists are insane. But the views presented on this book didn't really surprise or enlighten me¹. Instead, I was more like "of course, why the fuss?" Many of the claims in this book really did felt obvious.
"What is a probability?" does have a good answer. Anyone saying otherwise should probably look at it, and explain why it's not good. I personally don't expect strong counter-arguments. (And if one throws me the problem of priors again, I'll crush him under the sheer weight of the hidden priors we can find in Frequentist methods.)
[1] With one big exception: the consistency proofs. I didn't know we could derive Probability Theory from so few axioms.
One cannot reasonably say that "what is a probability?" doesn't have a good answer without having read at least the first two chapters of "Probability Theory: the Logic of Science".
I don't want to enter a Frequentist/Bayesian debate, where I'm right and the Frequentists are insane. But the views presented on this book didn't really surprise or enlighten me¹. Instead, I was more like "of course, why the fuss?" Many of the claims in this book really did felt obvious.
"What is a probability?" does have a good answer. Anyone saying otherwise should probably look at it, and explain why it's not good. I personally don't expect strong counter-arguments. (And if one throws me the problem of priors again, I'll crush him under the sheer weight of the hidden priors we can find in Frequentist methods.)
[1] With one big exception: the consistency proofs. I didn't know we could derive Probability Theory from so few axioms.