I feel like it would be a really valuable endeavor to try and make this all much more simple to understand. Right now it just reads like gibberish to anyone other than the sufficiently technical.
If people who advocated for the web explained the entire networking stack every time they tried to get people to use it they'd miss how it helps them.
Who is "public"? People with technical background or without technical background?
Let's first restrict our scope to people with technical background and assume people already have a degree of understanding on how blockchain is used. Then if a developer tells you the README doesn't convey the message clearly, take note of that and appreciate the feedback. Don't say "just trust me it works."
If this is to the general public, you better hire someone who can actually explain to user how it works from a high level giving analogy is always good.
In fact, you should never assume there are two groups of audience. This is not writing API documentation. A README should be really clear to user how to get started (understand what it does and how to start using it). Think about working with a manual. You can't assume everyone know what certain nail is called by nickname. You need to write the actual name with an actual picture. Don't assume. Be general.
"Trust me it works and it's secure" is the worst thing you can sell to anyone today. Of course I will never know how Dropbox handles my files on their server securely, but at least I can understand when my file is transferred over HTTPS it's encrypted in the communication and when they say they are over the cloud I know I can access it anywhere at anytime as long as I have an Internet access and the data center still exist.
And if I don't understand what the software does how can I trust you to deploy this on my own term? How do I even begin debugging problem during installation or configuring my service?
"Trust me" is not an option, especially when someone is trying to get people to use a software. The one thing we need to change is to teach people enough computer so they can make a judgement whether they should trust something or not ("trust me this photo tool is awesome and is free ... minus the free ad program install alongside with it) or trust me this version of browser is nice come to https://evil.com instead of https://mozilla or chrome
Want to send a message ? There once was (and still is) SMTP and IMAP, but now you also have XMPP and all its variants, the Skype protocol, something baked on top of HTTP, ... Who cares what's the technology, as long as the service is there.
Want to watch a movie/listen to a song? There were all those containers and formats, but as long as your movie player works mainstream doesn't care. You can use Napster, KaZaa, eMule, Bittorrent, USENET, direct download, and now there are those proprietary streaming things... Again, as long as the service is fulfilled, "Mainstream" doesn't care.
Same with HTTP and DNS. Very few people know how it works, as long as it works. And the goal of dnschain is actually in line with this: The goal is to use your existing software that already work, and migrate from old-style DNS to DNS-through-namecoin. All transparent from a user point of view.
Understanding how ethereum apps work has network effects, in the sense that once you understand ethereum, you understand every ethereum app.
What you're describing as "good censorship" doesn't actually require any censorship at all. All you need is a mechanism to notify users (or their client software) that a name is designated as malicious. Then the user or the user's client can decide what to do with that information, including ignoring the designation and connecting to the address anyway. That way it can't be used for censorship but it can be used to put ye olde red screen of malware alert in front of the user.
I won't describe the really good ones, because I don't want to proliferate them.
I want an invite:
akr has an invitation available
If you know akr, you can ask them for an invitation to Keybase.
C&C over Tor has gotten some coverage in the last year, as an example.
It's not worth it.
Best use-case, to me: put your TLS certificates with DANE structures, and you can be sure they aren't spoofed by anyone when someone gets your records. No need for the heavy and centralized DNSSEC.