The one actual concrete attempt to test this I've seen shows it, in the tested scenario, more vulnerable to strategic voting than plurality (or any other tested method.)
 http://rangevoting.org/ElectionByMajorityJudgmentExptEvidenc... [The method is referred to as "point summing" rather than "range voting".]
I think that paper is misguided and incorrect as an attack on range voting. Here's the page where that link occurs:
Here's the anchor: http://www.rangevoting.org/MeasTheory.html#numbersallowed
Finally, if you sum the scores, you are NOT doing range voting as is generally suggested. The idea of range voting is to average the scores. That is a totally different thing, especially when you (as you should) allow for no-opinion votes.
I can only conclude that the paper in question is not addressing actual range-voting as proposed. That said, I did not read it completely (nor am I especially interested in doing so, although someone could summarize the issues perhaps if any exist I have not addressed here)