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Why not ditch the ordinal voting and go with a cardinal system? People have seen and understood the system used in judging competitions such as figure skating, diving and gymnastics for many years. Wouldn't it be completely straightforward for them to see it on a ballot? Range voting is the name of that system and, unlike Condorcet methods, it is not subject to Arrow's impossibility theorem.



Because range voting devolves to approval voting. Why rate a candidate 4/10 if you don't want them to win? You insincerely rate them 0/10. Why rate a candidate 8/10 if you want them to win? You insincerely bump them to 10/10.

On top of that, you then have to consider the potentially lower popularity of your favourite choice against that of the current lead contenders. Do you reduce your vote for the better of two evils so that your sincere preference has a better chance? Ugh.

I'm not trying to suggest tactical voting doesn't exist in other systems, but to suggest that it doesn't in Range voting is either misinformed or disingenuous.


Now suppose there's a candidate I like pretty well, not as much as my favorite, but better than several others. Do I vote 10/10 or 0/10? Which is more tactical? It's a little hard to say.

With approval voting I have to make that decision, setting some kind of threshold of approval. With range voting it might be easier to just vote honestly.

At worst, everybody votes tactically and you get approval voting, which is still a good system. But sometimes the tactical decision is difficult, in which case range voting gives you the option of just voting honestly.


but to suggest that it doesn't in Range voting is either misinformed or disingenuous.

It's a good thing I didn't suggest it, then.


Because range voting embraces the property of valuing votes differently per voter. Implicitly, range voting gives more weight to voters who are aware of the top two candidates and can strategically rate one much lower than the other, even if their opinions of them are approximately the same.

Valuing one voter over the others like that is a dangerous road to travel down.


> Why not ditch the ordinal voting and go with a cardinal system?

Because whereas ordinal rankings at least arguably mean the same thing when different voters give them, cardinal scores don't have a consistent meaning, making all cardinal voting systems subject to GIGO problems in addition to any other issues.

> Range voting is the name of that system and, unlike Condorcet methods, it is not subject to Arrow's impossibility theorem.

No system that is not a form of ranked ballot system is "subject to Arrow's impossibility theorem", nevertheless, range voting is, beyond the GIGO problem faced by all cardinal methods, demonstrably subject to the same classes of tactical voting as approval voting, which means that while it is not in the class of of systems to which Arrow's theorem applies, it has flaws (from the perspective of the Arrow criteria) of the type that Arrow's theorem states that all the systems to which it applies must have. So the fact that Arrow's theorem doesn't apply to it doesn't actually make it any better.




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