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People here seem to have a strongly misplaced expectations about what bug bounties pay. Vulnerabilities in web apps/servers tend to be worth less than vulnerabilities in client computers for a few reasons

First, web app vulns are usually specific to a single site. (Unless obviously you find an issue in a common underlining framework, say, a session fixation attack in how PHP or ASP.NET handles sessions).

Second, and much more importantly, the vast majority of site's don't have financially actionably information. Unless you handle banking/credit card info, I am limited in what I can do to extract value from the server (compared to a compromised client). There aren't that many vectors to extract value.

-Dump their list of usernames/passwords? Ok, maybe some of those will also be used on other banking or commerce sites, but I have challenges/risks actually getting money out. And if I want stolen credit card numbers I can just buy them in card forums.

-Serve sleazy advertising? Ok, possible, but ad's are a crappy business to be in and its definitely a high volume/long time approach (ask how well Huffpo pays its writers). You can try affiliate spamming/stuffing, but again, not huge value. Both ads and affiliate approaches are dependent on how much traffic the server you hacked gets. Low traffic, you make no money. The more traffic, the larger the site, the smarter/better equipped the IT/security team. How long do you really think an Alexa top 10 or top 100 site won't notice an IFRAME pointing to .ru or .cn?

-Mining cryptocurrency? Not financially viable

What usually happens when a server is compromised is that an exploit kit is installed and it's used to attack the visitors (specifically exploit a vulnerability in the client). And so we are back to attacking clients to extract value over attacking (most) websites. Why do this? Simple:

- There are orders of magnitude more desktops/browsers than web servers. - They are running tons of diverse plugins and software so the attack surface is much larger. - Most of that software will be out of date and have known vulnerabilities. - Very few of these clients are "managed" by a personal IT person like a web server. The user is far less likely to notice anything bad.

All of that mean I can reach more targets, compromise a larger number of them, and hold them for longer. Why is this better than pwning a server? Because lots of scenarios to extract value that don't work on a handful of web servers do work when I have thousands and thousands of compromised clients:

-Show them ads -Stuff affiliate links -Changing their DNS settings and MitM all their traffic (bank.com? Why that's right over here!) -Keylog them to actually steal financial data, credits cards, bank logins, etc -Use them to send spam -Use them as a botnet to DDoS people and get paid protection money -Mining? perhaps?

To put this in prospective, very smart hackers doing crazy stuff to break out of Chrome's sandbox and exploit clients are getting $50-$100k in public contests like Pwn2Own. Getting $35,000 for a RCE is pretty awesome

Completely agree. To add, IMO the most valuable application of this exploit would have been to deliver drive-by malware. There are some groups that pay $0.5-3 CPM to get their Javascript onto much less targeted web sites. The Yahoo malware would have cost nearly double that.

Getting drive-by traffic is one of the most expensive pieces of the puzzle for malware groups. Last time I checked the forums, a thousand visitors was selling for around a dollar, and that isn't even well qualified traffic.

Having access to Facebook and over a billion pageviews per hour would be worth millions to any group who is capable of handling that type of volume. If they were smart about it, they could probably get away with it for up to a day (the Yahoo malware was active for a day and they didn't obfuscate it much).

Back of the envelope value is around $1M per hour, and that doesn't include the premium for the higher quality of traffic, but does assume you find a way to inject across all the servers and somehow not display it to Facebook internal IPs.

A big group with some fresh browser 0day would have loved to get their hands on this.

Considering Facebook's good security team (and Yahoo's notoriously poor one), I suspect that they'd probably catch the malware and perform some sort of emergency action in under an hour.

A much more devious attack would be modifying some of the code to silently siphon off login credentials, and grabbing the user database. Then once they were satisfied with that they could go with the malware route.

Facebook must be one of the only large sites that hasn't been hit directly with serving malware, closest I can recall are incidents like this:


Exactly. Pivoting from the server immediately to the clients by serving malware against the visiting browsers/plugins. Even if large site detects what you are doing quickly and shuts you down, you've leveraged that into controlling thousands of desktop machines

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