Thank you for pointing that out. "I am not a lawyer" and all that, but I do enjoy, oddly enough, reading judicial decisions.
That one says:
> We do not embrace the government's sweeping position that 18 U.S.C. 912 extends to anything that has value to the defendant. Such a broad reading of "value" negates any limitation the word could imply. By the same token, we cannot accept Sheker's suggestion that 18 U.S.C. 912 covers only things having commercial value. Information can be a thing of value. Whaley v. U. S., 324 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1963). In normal English usage commercial worth is not the exclusive measure of value. For instance, state secrets might trade hands without cash consideration. Information obtained for political advantage might have value apart from its worth in dollars. In each case the information sought would have value to others, in addition to the seeker. Such is the case here. Stokes would see value in keeping his whereabouts unknown to Sheker. The criminal justice system, concerned with the safety of witnesses, has a similar interest.
(In Whaley, Whaley impersonated an agent of the F.B.I and got information which he later paid paid $9, if I interpreted it correctly. Thus the information definitely has commercial value. In Sheker, the judge extends that to value other than commercial value.)
The information sought here is "is Sell (or Sell's company) willing to provide a back-door to the FBI?" This is just after Sell stated publicly that the "service wouldn't have a backdoor for anyone."
I honestly can't tell if this is a "thing of value."
If the answer is "yes", then I think that's a thing of value. That information might be revealed later to embarrass or otherwise affect Sell's company.
If the answer is "no", then there's no value. The statement to the public is the same as the statement to the alleged impersonator.
Given the context, it seems very likely that most people would have expected Sell to say "no." Thus, the overall value is very low.
It can't be that asking a question where the answer isn't already 100% known is illegal. The judge says that the law doesn't '[extend] to anything that has value to the defendant'.
The line is essentially going to be drawn pragmatically in most cases, because the precedent is so vague. Judges generally don't take kindly to people impersonating agents, so i would expect a bit of stretch to find an issue.
For example, if you look, the judge says "We do not embrace the government's sweeping position", but then in practice, did exactly this. They went to great pains to find some way to ascribe "value" to the location of another human being.
Yes, which is why I can't figure out how to interpret that case. It seems the judge says you can't ask any questions, since any information has some value.
A police officer can ask questions of anyone, including "can I search this bag?" The legal theory is that an officer is also a citizen, and any citizen can ask that question, even of strangers.
Apparently the uniform and knowledge that it's a police officer isn't supposed to make people feel any extra obligation towards the officer, compared to a stranger.
But there has to be a limit to that, yes? Can the officer for money? Strangers do that.
Anyway, were I to judge this matter, I would say that if a person would reasonably give the same answer to a stranger as to an imposter, then there's nothing of value.
Yeah, and I'm sure as Sunday that most judges won't agree with me.
That one says:
> We do not embrace the government's sweeping position that 18 U.S.C. 912 extends to anything that has value to the defendant. Such a broad reading of "value" negates any limitation the word could imply. By the same token, we cannot accept Sheker's suggestion that 18 U.S.C. 912 covers only things having commercial value. Information can be a thing of value. Whaley v. U. S., 324 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1963). In normal English usage commercial worth is not the exclusive measure of value. For instance, state secrets might trade hands without cash consideration. Information obtained for political advantage might have value apart from its worth in dollars. In each case the information sought would have value to others, in addition to the seeker. Such is the case here. Stokes would see value in keeping his whereabouts unknown to Sheker. The criminal justice system, concerned with the safety of witnesses, has a similar interest.
(In Whaley, Whaley impersonated an agent of the F.B.I and got information which he later paid paid $9, if I interpreted it correctly. Thus the information definitely has commercial value. In Sheker, the judge extends that to value other than commercial value.)
The information sought here is "is Sell (or Sell's company) willing to provide a back-door to the FBI?" This is just after Sell stated publicly that the "service wouldn't have a backdoor for anyone."
I honestly can't tell if this is a "thing of value."
If the answer is "yes", then I think that's a thing of value. That information might be revealed later to embarrass or otherwise affect Sell's company.
If the answer is "no", then there's no value. The statement to the public is the same as the statement to the alleged impersonator.
Given the context, it seems very likely that most people would have expected Sell to say "no." Thus, the overall value is very low.
It can't be that asking a question where the answer isn't already 100% known is illegal. The judge says that the law doesn't '[extend] to anything that has value to the defendant'.
But I don't know how that line is drawn.