Impersonating a federal employee, as itself, is not a felony. Otherwise David Duchovny should have been arrested for impersonating an FBI agent in The X-Files and John Ratzenberger for impersonating a postal service employee in Cheers.
The law is in 18 U.S. Code sec. 912: Officer or employee of the United States:
> Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
That is, 1) impersonating a federal employee, and 2) using that impersonation to get or demand something of value.
This account does not have the person actually getting information, nor demanding access, so does not appear to be felonious.
For example, suppose it was private citizen X impersonating an FBI agent to test Sell's resolve. The query was "if she'd be willing to install a backdoor into Wickr that would allow the FBI to retrieve information", not if citizen X (impersonating an FBI agent) can get that information.
That doesn't seem to be illegal according to the impersonation law.
Note that the "something of value" does not have to be tangible.
Information has been held sufficient.
See United States v. Sheker, 618 F.2d 607, where all that was done was ask about someone's location.
If this was done to ascertain information about the company, and their willingness to participate in government surveillance, it is likely to be held "a thing of value" under such precedent (which explicitly holds that things with value in the broader senses of the word count under the statute)
As a pragmatic approach, it is unlikely you are going to be find judges willing to let you slide on this kind of thing :)
Thank you for pointing that out. "I am not a lawyer" and all that, but I do enjoy, oddly enough, reading judicial decisions.
That one says:
> We do not embrace the government's sweeping position that 18 U.S.C. 912 extends to anything that has value to the defendant. Such a broad reading of "value" negates any limitation the word could imply. By the same token, we cannot accept Sheker's suggestion that 18 U.S.C. 912 covers only things having commercial value. Information can be a thing of value. Whaley v. U. S., 324 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1963). In normal English usage commercial worth is not the exclusive measure of value. For instance, state secrets might trade hands without cash consideration. Information obtained for political advantage might have value apart from its worth in dollars. In each case the information sought would have value to others, in addition to the seeker. Such is the case here. Stokes would see value in keeping his whereabouts unknown to Sheker. The criminal justice system, concerned with the safety of witnesses, has a similar interest.
(In Whaley, Whaley impersonated an agent of the F.B.I and got information which he later paid paid $9, if I interpreted it correctly. Thus the information definitely has commercial value. In Sheker, the judge extends that to value other than commercial value.)
The information sought here is "is Sell (or Sell's company) willing to provide a back-door to the FBI?" This is just after Sell stated publicly that the "service wouldn't have a backdoor for anyone."
I honestly can't tell if this is a "thing of value."
If the answer is "yes", then I think that's a thing of value. That information might be revealed later to embarrass or otherwise affect Sell's company.
If the answer is "no", then there's no value. The statement to the public is the same as the statement to the alleged impersonator.
Given the context, it seems very likely that most people would have expected Sell to say "no." Thus, the overall value is very low.
It can't be that asking a question where the answer isn't already 100% known is illegal. The judge says that the law doesn't '[extend] to anything that has value to the defendant'.
The line is essentially going to be drawn pragmatically in most cases, because the precedent is so vague. Judges generally don't take kindly to people impersonating agents, so i would expect a bit of stretch to find an issue.
For example, if you look, the judge says "We do not embrace the government's sweeping position", but then in practice, did exactly this. They went to great pains to find some way to ascribe "value" to the location of another human being.
Yes, which is why I can't figure out how to interpret that case. It seems the judge says you can't ask any questions, since any information has some value.
A police officer can ask questions of anyone, including "can I search this bag?" The legal theory is that an officer is also a citizen, and any citizen can ask that question, even of strangers.
Apparently the uniform and knowledge that it's a police officer isn't supposed to make people feel any extra obligation towards the officer, compared to a stranger.
But there has to be a limit to that, yes? Can the officer for money? Strangers do that.
Anyway, were I to judge this matter, I would say that if a person would reasonably give the same answer to a stranger as to an imposter, then there's nothing of value.
Yeah, and I'm sure as Sunday that most judges won't agree with me.
Many of the people at those conferences aren't afraid to 'color outside the lines,' and impersonating an FBI agent could fall under the umbrella of social engineering, which is another hot topic at security conferences.
I would not view it as outside the realm of possibility.
