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> 2. A passing look at the docs would reveal that we do not use IGE that way, and instead use SHA1 for integrity check (see 'message key' here: https://core.telegram.org/mtproto/description). The problems you mentioned as endemic to IGE used for integrity verification, are therefore irrelevant in this case.

The consensus seems to be that you're doing encrypt-and-mac, where the mac is just a sha1? If that's true, then you're relying on broken properties of IGE (not provably UF-CMA), and your protocol does not provide provable integrity. That's an essential part of any secure protocol.

> As for KDF, going for slower provable algorithms used for each incoming\outgoing packet may be a preferred solution for projects aimed at the relatively small security crowd. But we don't really compete in this area, our competition is WhatsApp and other mass market messengers.

That's interesting, because the thing you've made up is actually slower than a provably secure KDF.




> The consensus seems to be that you're doing..

Now, again, could I somehow direct your attention away from speculations and to what we are ACTUALLY doing (as, again, documented here [0], and now here as well [1]).

1. We are not doing plain encrypt-and-mac.

2. The SHA1 in question is for raw unencrypted data.

3. The message key is SHA1-dependent.

4. Note that the AES key and iv depends on that SHA1.

This can be described as a generic composition of cipher with ciphertext, encrypted by a MAC. The resulting data-dependant variable key denies all common attacks.

As for KDF, what particular solution do you have in mind? And even then — certainly, alternative solutions exist, but we do not see how changing this point would affect our system as whole. [1] As stated before, we'd welcome any information on attacks that could in reality threaten the actual setup.

[0] - http://core.telegram.org/mtproto/description [1] - https://core.telegram.org/img/mtproto_encryption.png




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