You are 10,000x more likely to get busted up by a flaw in how you use a cipher than you are by a flaw in what your cipher is. You could use TEA, and it would still be overwhelmingly likely that your code would fail before the algorithm did.
In fact, anything you did to react to news like this would probably make you less secure. That's because AES has overwhelming library support, and whatever "stronger" cipher you might think of adopting won't. That means you'll have more DIY code, and more poorly reviewed library code, all with a bunch of implementation flaws lurking under the surface.
I skimmed the paper and they don't mention AES-128, and I assume that if it worked on AES-128 they would have mentioned it, but they don't. So maybe. Probably would need to email the authors and ask.
I'm guessing that they don't mention AES-128 because the attack simply doesn't work against the 128 bit key schedule for reasons related to the increased difficulty of attacking AES-192 with this technique.