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So your argument in favour of PNaCl is a completely incidental feature of it that could be (probably quite easily) added to regular javascript and is really just a workaround for the fact that the PKI trust model for SSL is totally broken?

That's a pretty odd way to end up lumped with a technology.




I need to verify that not only does the JS I received behave correctly (i.e. it will be appropriately sandboxed), but also that the JS I received from the server is the one that the developer intended to serve me. This is because even with perfectly secure transport, a compromised server can always give me JS that is valid and stays sandboxed, but does bad things (such as generating weak keys).

I need to perform an integrity check on the JS to satisfy the second requirement, and the integrity check should not depend on the server that served the JS (since a compromised server could lie about its hash, for example). Moreover, the check needs to be automatic, and trustworthy. One solution is to check the hash of the JS against known-good hashes from the developers (i.e. get the JS from the website, and get the hash from a CA), and then cache the JS locally until I determine that a new version of the JS exists (I want to avoid re-downloading it over and over--that only gives MITM and MITS attackers more chances to serve me bad JS, and it's slow). Not an easy problem; otherwise we'd be doing it already :)

PNaCl offers the infrastructure to do this. I would use asm.js if it did so as well.




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