I said 'Not sure how valid that still is' for a reason :). I just found it extremely interesting and 'out of the box'. After reading up a bit on modern defences, I think you're right that it's irrelevant nowadays. (Unless you're in legacy hell, doubtful for the target user demographic)
But the parent comment is still valid, there's nothing to stop Moxie registering another domain even note-crypt.com or notecrypt.org or anything like that and the average user will be complacent with that. (same applies for appspot, note-crypt.appspot.com vs notecrypt.appspot.com vs notecrypto.appspot.com)
It only takes a single lapse in checking the domain and they've lost their login details and encryption key to the attacker.
Point is, the JS crypto does not add anything to the situation. All the security is provided by SSL, and once it goes, the JS doesn't help. It just gives the users a fake sense of an additional layer of security, which is dangerous.
Moxie broke the current SSL usage, and therefore, he broke the JS crypto (as he controls the communication channel). He beat the current state of the challenge.
To me it seems far too pedantic to give an award for pointing out, based on a forum post that blocks links (ask HN posts), that if you incorrectly use the partial url you are at risk.
That's a valid point, but I can't see it being an impossibility that the user will never accidentally stumble sending a http request rather than https. Whether that is user input, or a maliciously placed link.
My understanding is that the HTST header would make this attack less useful. But it's still a concern if you used Private Browsing/Incognito. The initial request will still hit a 301 (vulnerable to interception by MITM). I've just verified this with Facebook.com on my machine (Chrome 26, OSX).
I think it's quite fair to expect a user using this kind of site is likely to use Incognito.
I'm actually kind of surprised as I thought Chrome had a standard list of sites that use https only such as Facebook. (Woah.. seems the preload list is TINY http://www.chromium.org/sts )
Some day maybe we'll see browser-enforced secure DNS that has the ability to include certificates or set HTST. Maybe the same day ipv6 finally takes over in a few centuries.
I like the kind of pinning and preloading that chrome does but it's such a tiny gesture compared to the size of the internet, and nobody else seems to be trying to deploy better security.
Perhaps there could be open whitelists where sites could nominate their sites as 'https only'. Wouldn't even need to be built into the browsers, could just be a thing people do when they launch a clean browser install, hit up https://blahsitelist.com and click a button that fires off https requests to all of those sites which would cache the HTST header? (I've only stumbled on HTST headers today, so I may be overly flamboyant as to their usefulness)
Although, come to think of it, isn't that just basically what the HttpsEverywhere extension does?
But the parent comment is still valid, there's nothing to stop Moxie registering another domain even note-crypt.com or notecrypt.org or anything like that and the average user will be complacent with that. (same applies for appspot, note-crypt.appspot.com vs notecrypt.appspot.com vs notecrypto.appspot.com)
It only takes a single lapse in checking the domain and they've lost their login details and encryption key to the attacker.
Point is, the JS crypto does not add anything to the situation. All the security is provided by SSL, and once it goes, the JS doesn't help. It just gives the users a fake sense of an additional layer of security, which is dangerous.
Moxie broke the current SSL usage, and therefore, he broke the JS crypto (as he controls the communication channel). He beat the current state of the challenge.