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The Italian city-states as a distant mirror (wyclif.substack.com)
41 points by dash2 on March 4, 2023 | hide | past | favorite | 55 comments



- Italian city-states had a level of antagonism towards each other that is not found in 2020 Europe. The amount of freedom europeans have today to travel and work and do business in the EU is incomparable

- Armies in those times in Italy were mainly composed of mercenaries. Again, incomparable to the state of european ones. There was no such thing back then like the joint exercise and shared equipment and tactics between NATO countries.

- Comparing the role of the podesta` or signorie with central banks or, I suppose, the bureaucracy of the EU does not make much sense.

I believe this article to be very poorly thought out and the author just wants to force a parallel because he might have read an interesting book about the subject.


Yeah, I'm really trying to figure out what the parallels are - especially since the biggest take away stated (the dynamism created by having competing smaller states has a downside of being relative vulnerable to external pressure from large unified blocs) clearly doesn't quite hold.

Modern Europe has two-ish major (EU and NATO-ish) supra-national systems that are notionally designed specifically to bind European states together to help resist and compete against these external pressures (though obviously NATO comes at the cost of binding together along with one of the large external forces to buffer against others).

I guess the message might be that the EU is important for Europe? I dunno. Like it's not exactly wrong, but I don't think it's a particularly interesting point... I guess it's probably interesting to consider that the title (and article ending) is referencing a Tuchman book from 1978.


You're right about the antagonism - though the long run history of Europe shows plenty of that. I don't believe you're correct that because of it, citizens could not travel between Italian states. Plenty of famous artists did so.

I do point out that NATO and the EU are two key differences between then and now.

I also compare the signorie with "elected autocrats", in that they take real power while preserving the façade of democratic or republican institutions. Does that make more sense?


> (Paradoxically, Russia’s woes at the hands of Ukraine might be bad news for democracy, because they suggest that this trend has strengthened: so far, Russia’s advantage in numbers has been offset by Ukraine’s more advanced doctrine and NATO’s better kit.) In the long run, maybe the material basis for representative democracy has fallen away.

I find this claim to not make much sense. A technological power + more people would be stronger than just a technological power.


Technological advantage + barely enough people overpowered lack of relevant technology + lots of people many times in history. Cortez in Mexico and Pizarro in Peru are two best-known examples.


I'm not arguing that. Technology can make smaller forces stronger. But it can also make larger forces stronger.

Technology + people loses to the same technology + more people. If Ukraine had more people, the war would be going much more favorably, for example.


The "+" is doing a lot of heavy lifting in your argument. It is not trivial to transfer technology, especially on a large scale and in warfare conditions.

The Russians probably have all the necessary know-how to create something like HIMARS. But they cannot design and manufacture such a weapon quickly enough, much less deploy it.

The same probably applied to the Nazis and the atomic bomb. Their physics was up to par, but their entire industrial complex wasn't.


Russia has a lot MLRS artillery in Ukraine and are using it heavily. Ukraine has MLRS too but used most of their stocks and slowly building locally.

The difference isn’t HIMARS but the guided rockets, GMLRS and GLSDB, that US has been giving Ukraine. This changes HIMARS from something that can destroy an area to something that hit small targets. It means that can use $100k rocket instead of air attack to destroy supply dumps, command posts, and bridges.


> It is not trivial to transfer technology, especially on a large scale and in warfare conditions.

Sure it is. There are countless examples of this throughout history. We're doing this transfer of technology RIGHT NOW en masse to Ukraine.

> The Russians probably have all the necessary know-how to create something like HIMARS. But they cannot design and manufacture such a weapon quickly enough, much less deploy it.

Not sure how this is relevant at all. Logistics is a different problem. In any case, the russians still control massive regions of Ukraine. While their overextension is a failure, the war is a long way from over, and Russia has always historically been able to grind opponents down.

> The same probably applied to the Nazis and the atomic bomb. Their physics was up to par, but their entire industrial complex wasn't.

Of course - late in the war their cities were being firebombed, factories under constant bombing raids. This isn't a technological problem. The US was able to build without any threat whatsoever, thus, irrelevant to our debate here.


Roughly, if you have much more people than guns, these people, however brave, don't have any more guns to man, and making them fight with spears is pointless.

A technology makes more people stronger only if it can be scaled; Ukraine in particular is strained more by things like the number of 155 mm shells, HIMARS rockets, advanced tanks than by the number of willing infantrymen, as far as I can tell from reporting.

A small group with an advanced coercion tech subduing a larger group that lack it is just a very common scenario, sadly. Modern technology though becomes more and more affordable and scalable, potentially empowering the oppressed: say, off-the-shelf "big toy" drones made some difference in the Ukraine war.


> Roughly, if you have much more people than guns, these people, however brave, don't have any more guns to man, and making them fight with spears is pointless.

Russia has thrown tons of ill-equipped troops at a more technologically advanced Ukraine. Clearly, it isn't pointess. Infantrymen storm machine gun positions quite often. Technologically they're at a disadvantage. But the hill still needs taken. That isnt' "pointless."

> A small group with an advanced coercion tech subduing a larger group that lack it is just a very common scenario, sadly. Modern technology though becomes more and more affordable and scalable, potentially empowering the oppressed: say, off-the-shelf "big toy" drones made some difference in the Ukraine war.

As that technology becomes more scalable and affordable, large nations are able to adopt it at a larger scale. The higher your population, the more potential users of that technology. Again, the point is clear: technology + small population, in general, loses to technology + large population. The point the article made is flawed. You still need manpower. Look at Iraq, Afghanistan. Billions in tech. Failures.


> Roughly, if you have much more people than guns, these people, however brave, don't have any more guns to man, and making them fight with spears is pointless.

Russia's experience in WW2 is a counter-example: have a line of 5+ guys, the first guy gets the gun, and the entire group charge forward. When the front man is inevitably shot the second guy picks up the gun and the group continues forward.

Having more men allows one to wage a war of attrition.

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attrition_warfare

Works best when one doesn't care about casualty numbers.


The argument is not about which side is stronger. Instead, the argument is that democratic institutions are ultimately supported because states need citizen armies to fight, and that may not be true any more. See the Ticchi and Vindigni paper that I link to for evidence on that score.


yes, specially because NATO outnumbers Russia. So you have a giant supporting Ukraine, which isn't exactly a small country.


This assuming that NATO won't turn their back to Ukraine one day. Russia is forced to continue this war to a favorable point, because any withdrawal that is not accompanied by a significant territorial acquisition that can be trumpeted by internal and external propaganda would result in Putin's political demise and possibly his death too. Russia's tactics of weakening Ukrainian people support for their government through civilian objectives bombings and war crimes might unfortunately work if NATO doesn't hurry and give Ukraine the weapons and assistance they need ASAP instead of wasting time bouncing responsibilities. There's people dying over there each day, and I find revolting that seeing that it takes them months to even decide to send tanks or not.


By now, NATO is so deep in that if it abandons the battlefield, American and British credibility will be annihilated. No one would trust an ally which sticks with you for a year in the most massive European land war since 1945, only to go away later and leave you hanging.


I hope so much you're right.


Russia isn’t forced to pursue the war. They could withdraw and that would be a good thing.


Yes, but today Russia does what Putin says, unless they overthrow him. If we accept the fact that Putin is a dictator, then, like every other dictator, he could have only two choices: winning or dying.


It's an interesting piece. It fails to mention the North-Western side of Italy, with the duchy of Piedmont/Savoia and then Kingdom of Sardinia. Pretty strong and wealthy region altogether.


Don't quote me on it but I don't think it was that important at the time the author is looking at


The entire "historical" preamble is cherry-picked.

Which means we can't expect what follows to be exactly a balanced view either.


Serendipitously I’m reading Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror. It’s a frustrating book, very knowing, referencing many historical figures without any sort of introduction. I’m not sure I’d recommend and I hope there’s a better book written. France is its main focal point, though it discusses French relations with the Italian city states at length.

The Black Death came to Genoa in 1348 and decimated Europe’s population over the next two years. Smaller waves of the plague occurred every decade or two as population immunity waned (due to children not having been exposed). The decrease in the labor forced caused a spike in inflation. So I kind of think there’s a closer parallel to ~1400 than 1500…


What's even more important, antagonism and competition between European states is a main driving factor of European success. China destroyed itself and faced a century of humiliation (in fact at last 1.5 centuries, it's been a pathetic shithole by 1835 and still was in 1985), exactly because it had none of that, but a strong centralised government with nothing that could seriously threaten it. Preserving the status quo has become a lot more important than progress, and they found themselves at the very bottom of global food chain before they realised. In the Western world, we have a very acute perception of importance of all kinds of competition, and regularly get examples of how ugly things turn if it is thwarted. So, our disunity is our strength and our defining factor, not our weakness.


Funny because at corporation level competition is almost gone, and too big to fail makes most of the behemoths immune to consequences for bad decisions.

And yet any time people want to enforce antitrust we get astroturfing about too much regulation.


And yet top rich lists are almost entirely made of new names. Few people are rich because they were born into it - fewer than ever before. Which suggests competition is still very much alive, we are further from "feudal" society than ever before.


Maybe it's more accurate to say "few super rich people were born super rich". Competition seems healthy in the upper 10% of society. For those having less than that it looks a lot less egalitarian though.


"For those having less than that it looks a lot less egalitarian though."

Does it still hold when you look outside the US?

Wealth relations have certainly changed a lot in Europe since the Iron Curtain fell. I remember Poland suffering from shortage of pretty much everything (in 1989, the shops were empty and your only recourse was the black market), nowadays they seem to be building more skyscrapers than the rest of the continent together.


There is nobody in the top 20 list of billionaires that did not come from the top 5% or 1%


That's right, thank God. I'd hate to be (economically) ruled by "rags to riches" kind of people.


History may not repeat, but it rhymes. Great empires all eventually fall because its citizens started to see each other as enemies more than allies.

That being said, the narrative is also written by victors in the eyes of the ruling class. So take them with a grain of salt. For example, America was only a symbol of freedom for those fled Europe, not much for those who were here before or shipped from Africa.


> written by victors in the eyes of the ruling class

One interesting artefact of growing up in the European … what word do you use for a nation ruled by a foreign upper-class from 800 AD to 1991 (Slovenia)? … is that you get a strongly ingrained cultural instinct that ”The government or ruling class is not for you, they are for themselves”. Until very recently, and some would argue even now, our rulers never had our best interests at heart.

For most of our history we were peasants to be exploited. Our great history lessons aren’t about conquest, they are about peasant revolts seeking basic human rights. We weren’t even allowed school in our native language until the 1800’s.

And you learn that governments change, the name of your province and the country it belongs to comes and goes, but the people stay.

edit: Since 1800 my city has been part of - Austrian Empire, Illyrian Provinces (Napoleon), Austro-Hungary, State of Slovenes Croats and Serbs, Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslavia 1, Italy, Germany, Yugoslavia 2, Slovenia. That’s 10 countries in 223 years.


> Great empires all eventually fall because its citizens started to see each other as enemies more than allies.

This has proved true countless times along with the age of an empire spanning roughly 250 years. Other signs also include glorification of entertainers (lack of heroes who actually improve the culture), political infighting, and desecration of the empires history/heroes.

> For example, America was only a symbol of freedom for those fled Europe, not much for those who were here before or shipped from Africa.

America’s 250th birthday is fast approaching.


Empires stay empires in the original sense only when there is a core where people are privileged, and colonies where people are exploited and lack rights. Roman Empire stayed like that for a long time (even Latin rights were introduced relatively late), Russian Empire had a lot of that, and British Empire was practically an epitome of that.

I don't see how the modern US is comparable: equality is formally enshrined in the Constitution, and whatever inequality exists is delineated more by ethnic / cultural lines than by geography of birth or living, driven by private xenophobia, not institutions.


The USA have extreme amounts of influence all over the globe. They have performed countless invasions and over 100 regime-changes in the past century.

The power relations in global capitalism between the US and its tributaries is not dissimilar to the relations between e.g. Rome and its provinces. Hence calling America an empire.


US has done much better than previous empires.

Despite starting off with genocide of natives and slavery, it slowly improved over time in terms of addressing internal strife, which is probably a major contributor to its longevity as a global power.


For a big power, the US is relatively young. As a country, it has been around for 250 years, but as a world power, mere 100. That is on the young side when compared to other historic empires.

The Roman empire in the 1st century AD looked remarkably stable and rich. You wouldn't be able to prophesize the crisis of the 3rd century from the status quo in Hadrian's times.


Which post-medieval states had a much longer tenure as a comparable world power? Spain kept for about two centuries, and Britain maybe for somehow more. Can't readily tell about China, but it did dominate its vicinity both culturally, economically, and militarily for quite some time, before a long and miserable decline that lasted until late 20th century.


France, the UK, Spain, Portugal, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, I would say. All clocked at 250+.

Of course, we may split a lot of hairs discussing what "comparable" means. Certainly all of those were great powers, controlling distant shores and distant nations for long generations.


> for those fled Europe

And happened to be male, and own land


Not necessarily, some of my distant relatives went to the US to work in mines and/or be domestic servants (M/F), which wasn't exactly high prestige and yet they considered the US to be freer and more friendly towards random people than their country of origin (back then, Austria-Hungary).

You may underestimate the seriousness of the remaining vestiges of feudalism in pre-WWI Europe, including, say, rampant anti-Semitism in the Russian empire. It was probably better to be a schnorer in New York than a Jewish doctor in Odessa (with its tradition of deadly pogroms).


Are you sure that people from Europe who don't fall into that group also didn't see America as a symbol of freedom relative to what they knew at home? It's possible, but it also seems possible, even likely, that the opposite would be true, given the degree of entrenched social stratification in post-medieval Europe.


The first paragraph of this article is not very convincing. The history of Europe over the past couple centuries is mostly about the rise and fall of industrial-based global empires - the French and British imperial agenda in particular dominated much of the 19th century, often in competition with Russia, and the rise German imperial ambitions in the early 20th century (in particular, I'd say, German plans to move in on the Middle East oil zones where Britain and France had been established for some times) set the stage for World Wars One and Two. With the destruction of Europe at the end of World War II, and the downfall of the Japanese imperial dream in the Pacific, the stage was set for two new great imperial powers to stuggle to divide up the world between them - American vs. the Soviet Union. By 1954 the last remnants of the British and French Empire had mostly been consigned to the dustbins of history, and although remnants persisted for decades afterwards, as in Vietnam, Algeria, etc., it was clear the struggle for control of global resources (such as Middle Eastern oil) now was dominated by Soviet-American conflict (with Vietnam in the 1960s and Afghanistan in the 1980s involving American and Soviet soldiers fighting proxy forces supplied by the opposing side). While there was a lull after the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the fact that NATO persisted to encroach eastward up towards Russian borders then set the stage for the new outbreak of war between these aging 'great powers' in Ukraine (which is quite like 80's Afghanistan/ 60's Vietam, only in Europe).

Anyone claiming the primary motivation in this record conflict had anything to do with fighting for democracy or promoting socialism should be laughed out of the room. This was all about control of mineral, oil, agricultural and similar resources and, often underappreciated, of the cash flows arising from those resources (aka petrodollar recycling on the American side). The propagandists would like to promote a story of good vs. evil but it's really just a story of two greedy thugs fighting over terriotory, not so different than the organized crime cartels portrayed in The Godfather and similar popular Hollywood movies.

As far as Ukraine today, any informed observer can see that the real prize in this conflict is control of access to the lucrative European energy market, a fight dating back to 2003 or so when Putin broke with Wall Street on petrodollar recycling, instituting his own local oligarchy of oil wealth. If he hadn't done that, this war in Ukraine would be treated the same as the Saudi war on Yemen's separatist tribal groups (who started off fighting for parliamentary democracy, in fact) - the NYT and WaPo would have wagged on about the necessity of suppressing the violent neo-Nazi militias in the region, as they did with 'Al Qaeda in Yemen' as the justification for Saudi military intervention there. This doesn't fit the desired simplistic morality play story, even if it is accurate.

This of brings us to the Italian city-states, though in something of a different light. Here Machiavelli can be seen as the original tutor of the organized crime cartels, and of the rise of the 'stationary bandits' who came to dominate political life in the region.

https://broadstreet.blog/2021/04/05/the-rise-of-the-stationa...

> "Mancur Olson famously argues that if rulers expect to stay in power for a long time, they will promote economic growth so they have something to steal in the future. These rulers become stationary bandits, which distinguishes them from the roving bandits who simply plunder and maximize short-term gains."

That seems to fit the current political trajectory in the USA over the past decade, with the rise of the robber barons aided by government bailouts and handouts over the past two decades or so. The Iraq War was a profitable adventure for some, the 2008 economic crash and bailouts for others, the Covid CARES act and now the billions being recycled through Ukraine and the boost in oil prices flowing into the trough.


> As far as Ukraine today, any informed observer can see that the real prize in this conflict is control of access to the lucrative European energy market, a fight dating back to 2003 or so when Putin broke with Wall Street on petrodollar recycling, instituting his own local oligarchy of oil wealth. If he hadn't done that, this war in Ukraine would be treated the same as the Saudi war on Yemen's separatist tribal groups (who started off fighting for parliamentary democracy, in fact) - the NYT and WaPo would have wagged on about the necessity of suppressing the violent neo-Nazi militias in the region, as they did with 'Al Qaeda in Yemen' as the justification for Saudi military intervention there. This doesn't fit the desired simplistic morality play story, even if it is accurate.

None of this makes sense; the oligarchs stored as much wealth as possible outside Russia, where it was less likely to be seized (until the war flipped that!). The Saudi situation is a proxy war with Iran, who are arming the Houthi factions. That undoubtedly _is_ about maintaining easy flow of oil.

The simpler solution to Ukraine would indeed have been to look the other way, as we did to the airliner shootdown and the use of chemical weapons in the UK. It's kind of remarkable how effective the Ukranian "propaganda" has been at rallying support for them.


The struggle over who controls the cash flows arising from fossil fuels sales to Europe dates back to 2003, when Putin rejected an Exxon bid for 51% control in what was then Russia's primary oil center, Yukos. This would have meant Russia would have lost control of decisions over production levels, and much of the oil money from Europe would then have been recycled into the New York - London banking system. Putin's persecution of the London/New York affiliated oligarchs - Khodorkovsky, Berezinsky, etc. - dates to this era. It's no coincidence that the wave of US-sponsored 'Color Revolutions' then began in 2004, with an attempted instigation of something like the current Ukraine conflict in Georgia in 2008 being pushed hard by none other than Condi Rice (Chevron named an oil tanker after her for awhile).

This dynamic also played out in Syria, where the Obama Administration was pushing Assad to take a proposed Qatar-Saudi-Israeli pipeline offer (2009-2010), which Assad rejected in favor of a Russia-Iran pipeline offer. We can be pretty sure if he'd taken the former there'd have been no massive CIA funding of Syrian rebel groups and Assad's domestic repression would have been viewed no differently than Saudi Arabia or Bahrain's by Washington.

Indeed even Trump strongly opposed the Nordstream pipeline and its expansion, and promoted LNG exports to Europe as much as Biden has (although the destruction of the Nordstream pipeline with explosive charges seems to be quite the reckless escalation of that agenda). Oil stocks in the USA are up 50% since fall 2021...

Again there are no 'good guys' in these conflicts, it's just organized crime cartels fighting over control of markets and resources. They do spend a lot of on PR budgets to hide this reality from the public as much as possible. Not sure whether this view would be characterized or 'misinformation' or 'disinformation', however. (They used to classify propaganda as black, grey and white, incidentally).


Amazing comment. I disagree with some minor points but the overall message is spot-on.


"Anyone claiming the primary motivation in this record conflict had anything to do with fighting for democracy or promoting socialism should be laughed out of the room."

Sort of, but primary motivation may not matter in the long run. Institutions still spread, even as an accident, when people settle elsewhere. Portuguese and Spanish colonies are mostly Catholic now. Former Arab / Turkish territories are Islamic. Former British colonies are usually at least acquainted with the notion of a Parliament, even though suffrage back in the times of the Empire was far from universal. Europe still uses Roman law and Roman alphabet, though the main interest of the Roman empire wasn't to spread its legal norms and its way of writing.

Democracy, for all its flaws, is kinda contagious. The idea of having a word in political topics may be weird for peasants, but is attractive for the educated middle class. If Helmut from BRD gets to vote for his representatives, Zbigniew from Poland would like to, as well.


> the rise German imperial ambitions in the early 20th century (in particular, I'd say, German plans to move in on the Middle East oil zones where Britain and France had been established for some times) set the stage for World Wars One and Two.

This is an interesting statement in how many historical inaccuracies it can engender in such a short amount of text.

First off, the great Middle Eastern oil fields were not discovered until the interwar period, and were not seriously exploited until after WWII. Imperial ambitions for natural resources in the region prior to WWI make no sense because no one knows they exist.

Secondly, if we're looking in the run-up to WWI, oil is not a critical strategic resource yet. Some navies are beginning to transition from coal- to oil-powered ships, but Germany is not on the vanguard of this transition for obvious reasons. No, Germany is more worried about coal, especially because it's largely stuck with shitty lignite coal as opposed to the Welsh anthracite the British can rely on.

Thirdly, the Middle East pre-WWI can be divided into the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and small polities on the Arabian peninsula. The latter's sole relevance to geopolitics is an interest from major mercantile powers that piracy not be seen as a lucrative career opportunity. Persia is basically the grand prize of the Anglo-Russian Great Game (and has the sole major oil field in the region to be discovered before WWI, near the Ottoman border, in 1909), and as a result of Anglo-Russian Entente, was effectively partitioned between the two countries.

Fourthly, as you'll notice, the French had no territorial holdings here before the partition of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI. The closest it had were some economic advantages in certain ports, and an official kind of suzerainty over some minorities in the empire... along with every power in Europe (the lack of the modifier "major" is intentional).

Fifthly, the British were largely aligned with the Germans on Ottoman policy. They both wanted a strong, modernized Ottoman Empire. Especially one that would buy their weapons (the British exported naval armaments to the Ottomans, while the Germans exported land armaments). In particular, all three were also pretty adamant that the Ottomans, and not the Russians, control the straits between the Black and Mediterranean seas.

So while enmity between Britain is largely driven by German imperial ambitions, this has less to do with any specific German imperial designs, and more to do with Britain's overriding foreign policy aim being to avoid having any European power capable of marshaling the entire continent (à la Napoleon). After the unification of Germany, Germany becomes the power on the continent most capable of doing that (and thus Britain's natural enemy), but Bismarck is able to use skillful diplomacy to settle itself as a nonexpansionist power, which can mollify Britain. It's after Bismarck's dismissal, and Kaiser Wilhelm's seemingly natural status as a walking diplomatic disaster area, that Britain starts seeking entente with other major European powers to act as a check on German expansionism. The events of WWI do indicate that Britain's fears of German control of the continent were probably correct.


Look up the Berlin-to-Baghdad railroad, and see British oil holdings in Persia:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_campaign_(World_War_I)

Clearly the transition of global navies from coal to oil around 1906 meant that dominating the world's oceans would require secure sources of oil. Read Daniel Yergin's "The Prize".


I did acknowledge the discovery and exploitation of Persian oil holdings in 1906, which is of course three years after the start of the Berlin-Baghdad railway. That makes it still impossible for the Germans to be interested in the Middle East for its oil, since the start of the German interest predates any knowledge by anybody of oil resources.

Trying to turn every war into being ultimately based on a war for control over resources is already a task that often overruns available evidence. In trying to turn WWI into a war over Middle Eastern oil, however, you sail so far that you need to invoke time travel.


I really don't understand what is going on with the top page of HN.

At the time of this message, this link is in third position with only 5 points.

It is an philosophical economic/historical éditorial piece. Probably not too bad as a thesis, and a little bit of interesting for curiosity, but a long a little bit boring post with nothing particularly thrilling, or related to hacker news main interests.

Looks like a lot like long NY posts, not so interesting, that we see posted regularly.


There's been connections between this community and the history of Italy since before HN was a thing. You may be interested in pg's Hackers and Painters.


I don't particularly agree with that article, but I find it more interesting than many others that landed up on the top page. The hacker community is defined, amongst others, by its very diverse field of interests.


"Quirky" things tend to happen on weekends.

In this case I will guess that the upvotes / time were more positive than anything else; there being few people reading through /newest early this morning.


It's matter of taste. I prefer this kind of article that those about "how to make your product annoying through gamification to guarantee eternal growth to your company"




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