I found this article on the impact on super-sized ships on logistical infrastructure useful and fascinating. It describes how the creation of ships too big to fit in the Panama canal (post-PANAMAX ships) was received by 1) Panamanians 2) East Coast / Gulf Coast ports 3) West Coast ports. The Panamanians spent billions expanding their channel to bring port fees and promote attendant value-add services. Ports across the East and Gulf coasts overinvested in trying to make their port the preferred one for these new ships. Clearly, not every port can recoup investments in higher cranes and deeper harbors. There was an irrational optimism on the East Coast, as they sought to take business away from West Coast transhippers (dock in Southern California and ship to the east by train.) In response, the West Coast logistics industry sought and received a series of infrastructure improvements to make transshipment from their ports viable. So, just a few shipping companies are able to increase the size of their ships (for economies of scale) and end up having a major impact on billions of investment dollars in more than a dozen cities. Policy makers in the US aren't able to pick just a few cities to focus investment in. How can you tell a city that they aren't going to get those jobs? Perhaps the US should set a maximum ship size to prevent this wastage of resources; but one could argue the efficiencies for consumers could be worth it.
The size of these ships keeps increasing at an astonishing rate. See the chart in this excellent talk: https://youtu.be/gdkvAXcZD7U?t=892
Moreover, the hydrodynamic effects of these large ships in relatively shallow and narrow canals is underappreciated. We're liable to see more such incidents as ships get bigger and bigger.
I'm really surprised I haven't seen this mentioned. A long time ago, I was trained as a merchant ship's navigation officer. One of the things we were taught (but unfortunately had few opportunities to practice), was using "bank cushion" or "bank suction" to use the hydraulic interaction between the hull and a narrow body of water like a river to navigate tight curves. These days, there are simulations that I'm sure capture these effects to it's easier to get some experience with them.
Of course, in the case of the Ever Given it seems that the grounding was mainly due to not compensating for the strong cross winds.
Juan Brown/Blancolirio channel has a good overview and he touches on hydronic interactions you reference too: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=5iyn2q6s1Sk
It is pretty funny though. I have to imagine the captain realizing his track had been discovered is every developer who ever put a comment like /* this is stupid but I'm doing it because my boss is also stupid */ somewhere in a million lines of code, thinking it would never come up in an audit.
Not compensating or not being able to compensate? One implies negligence, the other unavoidable.
Not really, weather forecasts are readily available and windage calculations are a thing.
Or could it be that navigating a 400mx60m, 220,000 tonne, 60m tall ship through a canal that is barely double the width with only 4m clearance is just a tad more difficult than that?
But the crew of the ship never do close quarters manoeuvring anyway it is the job of the local pilot to get the ship to near to the dock and tug crews who berth it. Maybe in the future the canal will change their risk assessment to hold ships this large when the weather conditions are unfavourable. Or maybe this is at the pilot's discretion already, but there was a 'human factors' issue as there is a post elsewhere suggesting that there might have been some friction with the pilot who was meant to be giving helm orders but was refusing to do so? Who knows?
Vessel has a schedule. Has to arrive at a certain berth at a certain time and is expected to only stay there for a certain maximum number of hours because another vessel will be arriving to take its place. Especially if they're already running late, there will be a lot of pressure to keep that schedule and that can lead to doing things that are usually safe, right up until they aren't.
The history of transportation, hell, the history of Mankind, is full of examples.
That doesn't contradict the 'going too fast' though. Just like we don't drive 55 mph in a residential neighborhood, thinking 'if a kid runs into the street that is not my fault, it was unforeseeable'.
Policy makers in the US aren't even able to repeal Jones Act, with its disastrous consequences for US shipping industry. You can't expect much from them.
Are there any estimates as to the actual cost of this "mishap", due to e.g. spoilage, financial/contractual repercussions of late deliveries, personnel/fuel costs?
How do you even try to calculate and reveal the cost associated with say a manufacturer in the middle of a supply chain deciding to source their parts from a different vendor for this run because their usual source was delayed due to the Suez blockage and they didn't want to leave their factory idle?
1) The scale and depth of the disruption makes it impractical to figure in any kind of accurate way and
2) The disruption will have introduced hypotheticals that nay spiral out themselves (butterfly effect style) e.g. some retailer may have lost a customer who went elsewhere, some supplier may have lost a retailer who went elsewhere, etc
In general, temporary disruption has some long-term positive economic effects (which is directly why 'disruption' is valued in Silicon Valley).
For example, during London Tube Strikes, commuters find different and more efficient routes and 5% ended up permanently changing their route on public transport: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tube-strike...
I used to take the access road parallel to the bridge and avoid a lot of traffic that was south bound. When the bridge collapsed and I-85 was blocked off, everyone learned about the parallel access road, and it now became a cluster of a traffic hot zone too.
Prior to that, a lot of people were not aware of the alternate route.
Unless the bridge collapse resulted in increased traffic levels afterwards, the same traffic that used to go over I85 is now distributed over 2 routes.
While there's a net negative to you, it's likely that a lot of people ended up saving time on their routes.
It's theoretically possible this describes a Braess paradox, whereby everybody loses: https://image.slideserve.com/280060/braess-s-paradox-l.jpg
Also in the big picture with covid not being as deadly as it could have been, could serve as a nice dress rehearsal for a captain trips.
1. How did they decide that the benefits would continue over the course of 4 years?
2. How did they determine what "time lost" was? I imagine it's greater than just extra time waiting at the station. People probably also got lost trying to find a new way around, and were late to things important to them. Unexpectedly being late to a job interview is a very different kind of time lost than saving 3 minutes on your regular daily commute.
However... that is no excuse to shrug this off. We were very, very lucky that it was only a week. The ship could easily have broken in two, which would have been a catastrophe of the first order and likely shut the canal down for a year. The world dodged a major bullet here.
This has a rather odd diagram, and I'm not sure if it supports your comment or not.
It shows Suezmax as having "unlimited length", while Chinamax is given as 360 meters, which I think is smaller than Ever Given.
Obviously unlimited length can't be literal, if the Suez isn't perfectly straight, right?
On the other hand the Chinamax diagram says "unlimited air draft" which again, can't be literal since at some point it would be impossible to keep upright?
The Chinamax designation seems to imply a greater draft, which does make sense, but it's only 20% greater than the greatest stated for Suezmax.
It looks to me from the map like the tightest turns in the canal are the southern exit near Suez, and the turns between Timsah Lake and El Qantara el Sharqiya (depending on which channel you're in, and whether you're allowed to use both channels in your turning maneuvers).
It would be a fun problem to find a good way to figure this out exactly, but it looks to me like a ship 3000 to 4000 meters long would not be able to complete those turns even in principle without running aground. (Presumably the actual practical limit is a lot lower.)
The longest ship ever built (which exceeded the draft limits for Suezmax, so it was out for a different reason) was 458 meters long
... so there might still be an order of magnitude to play with if you were making a ship that was ideally small and maneuverable in other regards.
The Suez Canal doesn't have locks, so in principle the length isn't limited. In reality it of course is limited by the harbours you intend to use. Apparently ships longer than 400m also require permission from the Suez Canal Authority.
More important for the claim that Chinamax is bigger is the tonnage. Chinamax can carry 400,000 tonnes, while Suezmax is typically under 200,000 tonnes.
Smit is now part of Boskalis, which is a big marine engineering firm. They have dredgers, heavy lift ships, tugs, and barges, which are useful both for marine construction and for salvage. So the fleet can do other things between crises.
Obviously an extreme example, but the situation with this ship is likely similar. The damages probably far exceed the $15m/day in revenue (though I suspect they are far lower than $7b per day).
If you're going to run an extortion racket, you need the power to secure yourself against the inevitable challenges to your station. Egypt is in no position to handle and armed threat from the US, China, or even most European nations. Their government would be toppled and a sympathetic one would be installed who would lower shipping prices to something on the cheap side of fair.
A little history https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis
The Israel, British, and French insurrection completely dominated the Egyptians. The US wanted to carry favors with Egypt to prevent them to falling into the communist sphere, so it applied a pressure campaign against the British and French that completely wrecked the European economies (and from which they never really recovered). It didn't work, Egypt did not become an American ally in any meaningful way, and instead the West lost control over one of the most important shipping lanes in the world, turning it into a corrupt mess where you have to pay for passage in cigarette boxes and bribes.
It was one of the biggest foreign policy fuck-ups of the USA, in my opinion.
Oh, wait, water's already a monopoly: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_monopoly
2. This isn't like a monopoly on water supply, because the ships don't have to go this way. To make the analogy work you'd have to add something like "everybody already has a well, but supplying tap water is cheaper than using a well". In such a situation, a water company that's maximizing profits would charge just a little bit less than using a well, and while it would annoy people it wouldn't harm them.
3. The government stops water companies from gouging for the good of the citizens, which isn't a factor here.
If we want to go with "everyone has suitable access to rainwater for important household use", then it changes the impact of the water company overcharging. It goes from despicable to mundane.
This is where someone steps in and says something to the tune of "Whatever price you're willing to pay is by definition reasonable" and completely ignore the ethical/moral issues with essentially holding someone's life for ransom by charging the maximum price they can get for something they need to survive.
It's a huge mistake to regard any international trade in the middle east as regulated by simple supply and demand curves. This is a site of world geostrategic focus, usually at the expense of the people that live there.
(Interestingly, both have been practiced towards Israel at different times, as the countries have gone from bitter enemies to cautiously aligned against both Iran and Sunni Islamism of the Brotherhood/Hamas flavor.)
You'd be wrong there! They actually have a rebate system based on a number of factors including origin and destination. Basically, they try to make it so that its always cheaper to go through the canal, rather than sail around.
The cost here was for the interruption to the schedules, not the daily cost of operations normally.
End of the day, the big shippers can price in the two week delay to round Africa, and higher tolls could make a competing railway feasible. As it is China will probably have built a rail corridor in a few decades.
And some retailers and suppliers may have gained customers
But then that also created profits for another supplier!
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parable_of_the_broken_window
(Increasing economic outputs by breaking all canals is the perfect example of why I'm always worried about gradient descent)
We lost $100 millions, so it does not matter if it was $10k or $20k more or less because that is less than 1% of the total. There is no meaningful decision you can make based on that 1% difference.
Political instability is definitely a contributing factor to the fragility of the southern corridor.
That plan was frozen after the Egypt-Israel peace agreement.
As an alternative (and ignoring the obviously substantial geopolitical concerns), is there a geographic reason not to dig a canal on the other side of the Sinai from, say, Aqaba to Rafah? If you had to dig that far, it would seem to be the next best option.
I can't see Egypt approving an alternate canal that Israel would have any control over, but I could absolutely see Israel going in on a chance to a) take business from Egypt and b) add a defensive feature along that border.
An underappreciated fact of Israeli and Palestinian geography is its mountains and hills; any major transportation project  requires extensive tunnel and bridge work.
 Examples: the TLV/Jerusalem high speed rail, the Haifa highway bypass, or a proposed transportation corridor connecting the main West Bank population centers along the ridge of the Judean and Samarian mountain ranges.
A Bloomberg article (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-27/how-a-des...) says the speed limit was 7.6 to 8.6 knots but the Ever Given was traveling at 13.5 knots. So maybe they need to start enforcing that limit.
Reportedly this was during high winds, so they could also reduce the speed limit even further in those conditions.
Or they could have Suez specialists be the ones piloting large ships through the canal rather than the ship's normal crew. (As I understand it, that's pretty standard for harbors. Not sure if the Suez already does that.)
Or maybe there's a technology solution, something like stability control for cars, except it's for ships in narrow canals.
Because the boat is longer than the canal is wide, for any nonzero perpendicular wind speed there is a minimum boat speed below which it would not be able to avoid running aground. The solution is to either not permit such large ships to transit the canal during high wind events or to send them with enough tugboats to counteract the force of the wind.
Pilot was on board, but there seems to have been some kind of conflict between Master and Pilot that resulted in high tension environment on the bridge.
Ever Given Master’s statement is published here, and has been circulating among the crews for a few days: http://www.maritimebulletin.net/2021/03/28/ever-given-latest...
So, some weird drama. If this is true, however, this would be a gross misconduct of behalf of the Pilot.
Last line before the report
>Read this Statement and ask yourself – can such incident lead to accident like grounding or collision?
If the professionals are not doing their job and even causing issues on the bridge;
>As soon as the master picked up the VHF and called Ismalia Port Control on Ch8, the pilot raised his volume high, started shouting, snatched the VHF from the master’s hand (which also resulted in advertently pushing the Master) and threatened that if same was reported “It will not be good for the vessel”.
>At that very moment, in his raised volume he called for fwd and aft stations and for both anchors to be lowered to water level, as he insisted on stopping the vessel and arresting vessel for faulty steering. He said vessel will be held at Bitter lake until sea trials were carried out.
Fwd station was immediately manned however anchors were not lowered as ship was doing 9 knots speed.
Then it could lead to accidents.
The linked article is a hodgepodge of random factoids and hearsay. It even confused the poster into thinking the report was from the Ever Given. Doesn't look like a good source to me.
Friends scientific boat had a same thing in Kiel canal, but only 22 meter boat and under and hour.
Like doing nothing, and sailing around Africa in the extremely rare case there's a problem.
Makes me think of:
A many weeks long shutdown (in case they had to unload the Ever Given) would be many orders of magnitude more expensive.
Factories will know enough in advance of this problem. They can fly over some supplies to keep the factory running. It's entirely normal to do this. They usually do _not_ idle or shutdown the factory. Who pays is for lawyers and so on.
A shipping company will know about these clients and prioritize that cargo.
Is it just me, but hasn't the mainstream financial news over the years taken on the feel of reality television? The talking heads are usually pushing some sort of narrative. Occasionally, reality overwhelms their ability to spin things, and they have to readjust and do damage control, as sometimes happens to the producers in a reality TV show. The aim of their manipulation and spin seems to be mainly to keep up the level of drama, just as in a reality TV show.
You're not wrong, but you could replace "economics" with almost anything and it would still be a valid (and usually meaningful, although context matters) statement.
> Real engineering includes game-theoretic incentives to distort reality and craft narratives, including framing what is allowed to [be] considered "real engineering"
I mean how else are you going to push back against the clueless PMs who can't be bothered to learn how to code?
> Real art includes game-theoretic incentives to distort reality and craft narratives, including framing what is allowed to be considered "real art"
Of course, how else do you expect to create value for something unique that is not easily priced by the market?
> Real science includes game-theoretic incentives to distort reality and craft narratives, including framing what is allowed to be considered "real science"
I'd say this accurately describes academia. Honestly this last one is eerily insightful.
Those aren't arbitrary. They are often pre-decided by higher ups in the company, or pre-decided as the prevailing groupthink in some forum or mailing list. People have been calling this stuff out online for years! Funnily enough, it stays out of the consciousness of normal people, because it's never covered in the mainstream news. Invariably, the people doing the exposing are then labeled something unsavory, so very few people bother to look into it. Some of this stuff is bunk. However, some of it is clearly real, and kinda disgusting.
Stuff like this has even been going on since the 80's: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manufacturing_Consent
What I'm saying is that even if one corrects for ideological motives, obsequiousness to power, etc., one is still left with an independent incentive towards maximizing eyeballs, and therefore torturing complex realities into digestible narratives, and that can be a problem in and of itself.
Early on it was reported that it could take weeks to reopen the passage, with a cost of billions to the world trade. Now, just one week later it's open again, barely enough time to make the alternate route a good idea.
These rather unrealistic projections seem to have started with the Coronavirus reporting and is an interesting phenomenon in itself.
And honestly, had the ship still been stuck on wed, tide would not be as high for another moon cycle; further complicating.
That's true - it could have taken weeks and the cost of spoiled or delayed cargo could have reached billions.
After a day of tugs unsuccessfully trying to free the ship, there was no reason to assume it would be a fast recovery.
But the same news that said "it could take weeks" also reported on the ongoing efforts.
- Good if you care about mostly business in the developed world (Europe and US).
- Really, really, really good features, solid visualisation, and a fairly wide breath of writers in terms of opinions.
- Very opinionated, but extremely diverse coverage of lots of different parts of the world (I've never come across a better English language source on Africa, for example).
- Weekly, so if you only want to read news occasionally, it may work for you
- Pretty good coverage overall, the US business/tech coverage is much better (in depth) than the FT's
- Their opinion section is like the NYT in bizarro-world.
In terms of price FT > Economist > WSJ.
It really depends on what you're looking for, but the FT works for me as a daily driver (I ended my subscription to the Economist, and only signed up for the WSJ about a month ago).
I like to look at the bright side: The world has caught up with Egyptian geography. :)
I've since turned more cynical and believe that greed is as essential to humanness as empathy, if not more, and without a strong moral code (and fear of being ostracized for breaking it), selfishness wins.
The pandemic has violently dispelled any remaining expectation I had for a future cosmopolitan society.
What gives me hope is the fact that our species has altruism at all, even if it isn't as widespread as we would like; it's evidence that cooperation is at least sometimes a competitive advantage. Looking at nature, we see both symbiosis and predation as successful survival strategies. The tension between Good and Evil we will have with us always; the bad news is that Good will never definitively win, but the good news is that neither will Evil.
It's not the baker empathy that brings you bread, but his greed
> The pandemic has violently dispelled any remaining expectation I had for a future cosmopolitan society.
The pandemic makes me hope more people will see governments for what they are: restricting their freedoms for no good reasons, so it's better to starve the beast.
Imagine a toy example: 2 bakers in a street. John and Jill. John has a heart attack and his bakery is closed for the week.
- John gets nothing that week, from his perspective you could say he lost a week of sales
- The people in the street lose Johns cakes that week, but most are ok with going to Jill, as they are close enough. 50% go to jill, and the other 50 decide to save the money.
- Jill gains 50% of johns customers for the week.
How would would you even assess the "global damage" in such an example for 1 street. Let alone the global economy.
The money is there to drive things, pulling it out from one perspective is like looking at one weight in a neural network.
There will probably be some additional flow of customers as people realise they're too lazy to walk to Jill's/John's, Jill's was only better when they were doing the extra trade (freshness), or that Jill's is back to being quicker service (and then you have a chaotic effect as more people drift back the wait time gets longer).
The potential complexities of such simple systems are fascinating.
The freight costs are in the range of 0.6%-3% of the cost of the goods transported on average. This is for the amortized cost of purchasing the ships, maintenance, the labor and fuel costs. If you estimate the value of the delayed goods at $10b, and the freight costs at an extra 2% that's $200m in damages.
Most food transported this way wouldn't be spoiled by a delay of a week. If 10% of the goods were food by value, and 15% of them were perishable, and they were worth half as much after being delayed delayed a week that is another $75m lost to spoilage. But it isn't always a one week delay, many ships are delayed less to start, and there will be increased congestion in the ports and ground transport for many of these ships.
And re-routes around Africa don't count as spare capacity for the canal itself.
Of course there may be some *literal* spare capacity, that could be realized by violating processes. But the canal is in fact run at maximum capacity according to the maximum that official process allows.
We have to stop doing this with all of our critical systems, it causes hiccups to be so costly.
Regarding penalties re late delivery, I'm less worried about that. Cargo ships always have language about loss and force majeure. I think a stuck ship would qualify as force majeure. And a week shouldn't affect most perishables e.g. grain, that go into containers.
I'd strongly suspect that the costs for spoilage and knock-on effects from late delivery etc would outstrip crew and fuel costs by a large margin.
I'm certain s/he was talking about juniors on the ships.
Also - rude.
> If the canal does reopen quickly, vessels waiting now should be able to make up time without too much disruption to the supply chain, which is already weighed down by port congestion and inland transportation delays.
(On rare occasions the curve is inverted)
It won't tell you how much it costs this tanker to delay delivery by a week but it will tell you on average how much "the market" values a week's delay.
It is still a chore to go through and tally all the goods but I think a few main goods (oil, wheat, coffee etc) would account for a large chunk of it and if the carrying costs as a whole would give a sense of the order-of-magnitude of the economic loss.
The loss itself may be distributed between various risk sharing parties like insurance companies and so forth.
But it could be a pretty good proxy: to some approximation, everything in the supply chain would be set up to work with the 9.6 Bn daily flow of value - everybody's financing payments, payroll, working capital, etc. The time is gone. Just like if you had to take two weeks off (unpaid) because you were sick, you could work more later to get that money back, and recover some of it if you work overtime, but you still missed that window to make money.
For example, if there is a total of X shipping capacity a year, and no reasonably priced alternatives (or extra capacity available via rail/air/etc), then disrupting $Y worth of goods for D days reduces the total amount of goods that can be traded that year by $Y*D.
Or is there something I'm missing here?
But there's definitely discontinuities that emerge when the option is taken away -- oil refineries lose supply, which increases the cost of fuel, which makes the long way more expensive.
Whoa, bad time to be in IoT then, since they're pretty much entirely plastic and a few (also probably short) components!
Most businesses can’t just skip a week and then process twice as much raw goods to catch up.
Source: friend who is a merchant marine officer
I expect commodity prices and spot shipping will jump short term but long term disaster avoided.
Odd, the Sun has a great article on this floating job
Personally, I've always been surprised by the amount of fruit, flowers, and other perishables that do economically come in via air.
Landing here in Seattle, I've seen planes unload huge amounts of fruit and produce, probably bound for asian groceries stores.
I've seen high-value WA apples travel by air to India. I was a bit surprised by this one too.
Whether that trade is humane is a separate question.
There are also containers that are maintained at a fixed temperature/humidity for transporting "fresh" items. They still have a limited transport time.
The other part is that they may have intentionally shifted ballast or fuel to induce a port list to assist the salvage.
- without destroying or imposing significant additional damage to any of the cargo
- without destroying or imposing significant additional damage to the ship
- without taking multiple weeks
- without needing to ship a trillion dollars'+ worth of equipment halfway around the world
It's refreshing to see high-end engineering performed so competently.
P.S. it isn’t exactly clear what you mean by mariner, but plenty of sailors in the Mediterranean don’t really need to care about tides as they don’t really get them there. Indeed, you shouldn’t trust any of the early modern Greek or Italian treatises attempting to explain tides as their authors didn’t really know how tides actually behaved outside the Med.
That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that after the ship got stuck, they certainly incorporated the tides into their plan for how to unstick it. If the tides had been less amenable, they would have come up with a different plan.
So their plan didn't get "lucky", their plan was predicated on the tides being part of the solution.
That’s the point and the absolute bit of luck. Without the high tides they likely wouldn’t have been able to get it unstuck as quickly. Search for slope/fill volume calculation charts - the amount of fill required to be removed as you go deeper is logarithmic, NOT linear.
It was VERY lucky they had the highest tides possible.
Luckily it wasn’t nearly as high when it beached itself - but if it had beached itself on the downslope of the peak tide instead of the upslope it very likely would still be stuck!
Tide when it crashed was not nearly as significant as when it got free.
Imagine getting stuck during spring tide vs low tide hich is more than 2m lower and would have decelerated the ever given earlier
Ship captains who sail on open ocean are well aware of tides. It is not too difficult to imagine somebody did 2+2 and figured out the tides are getting higher so in couple of days there is going to be better chance of freeing it.
Obviously they did not plan it. It is just an opportunity they used.
You do realize the canal operates during all tides?
So yes, it was absolute luck this accident happed right before the highest tides of the month.
It would have been a mistake to throw expensive, complicated solutions at a problem that had a relatively simple solution.
And I'm guessing that the operation was overseen by the Suez Canal administration, not Boskalis. Not saying that there wasn't delegation, but I'm guessing a joint management operation between the canal, the ship's management, the salvage operator and the local ship captains.
It's easy for me to throw together a small house, shed or bridge, but chances are whatever I build -- if it doesn't immediately collapse -- is horribly overbuilt for its purpose, because I don't know how to calculate and analyze the various stresses and material capacities well enough to size everything to a proper margin. So when I build a bridge I use lumber that is bigger than I think I need and use more of it than I think I need until it feels quite solid, but if I were a proper engineer I could figure out the exact right amount to use.
In contract salvage the owner of the property and salvor enter into a salvage contract prior to the commencement of salvage operations and the amount that the salvor is paid is determined by the contract. This can be a fixed amount, based on a "time and materials" basis, or any other terms that both parties agree to. The contract may also state that payment is only due if the salvage operation is successful (a.k.a. "No Cure, No Pay"), or that payment is due even if the operation is not successful. By far the commonest single form of salvage contract internationally is Lloyd's Standard Form of Salvage Agreement (2011), an English law arbitration agreement administered by the Council of Lloyd's, London.
That Lloyd’s contract (https://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/the%20market/tools%20an...) is concise (2 pages).
It may incorporate the SCOPIC clause (https://www.lloyds.com/resources-and-services/lloyds-agency/...), but that doesn’t seem long, either, even including its appendices.
But good news for sure!
This sounds slow at first, but, since you can drive pretty much 24/7, that's still 720km per day. If you're literally going halfway around the world (20.000km), you'll be there in 28 days. Since you drive on water, you'll do few small detours (I assume), so you can actually get those 700km a day.
EU<->China even appears to be "only" 7000 km , so if you could drive in a straight line you could get there in 10 days. 14 with usual delays and detours, maybe. That's a reasonable time span for a lot of perishable goods. With the blockage doubling that time, I can easily see how this would affect quite a few goods.
Also crew change is likely because of on-going investigations, and that will be tricky with the on-going mariner crunch. There's not a lot who are qualified to run a ULCV, especially one straight out of an accident.
Over time as the political situation cleared up a bit most of the crew members were repatriated with just a periodically rotated skeleton crew watching over the ships staying behind.
- A sunken super container ship in the canal, rather than a floating one. Removing the wreckage would be at least an order of magnitude more work than floating the thing away.
- Thousands of containers floating / sunk in the canal. How much damage can one of those do to the propeller of a ship?
if you destroy the ship, it sinks. And since its blocking shallow canal, you just made problem 10x worse.