>Duration of the MCAS command is a function of AOA and airspeed. At higher airspeeds,
flight control surfaces are more effective than at lower airspeeds. Therefore, a smaller
MCAS command at higher airspeed has the same effect as a larger MCAS command at low
speeds. Without MCAS, the 737 MAX would not meet FAA’s regulatory requirements.
>Without MCAS, the 737 MAX would not meet FAA’s regulatory requirements.
First, called it.
Secondly, how in the hell did a system on which certification of compliance with all regulations governing it's primary intended use case not get vetted more thoroughly?
This determination casts a rather large pall of doubt over why the FAA accepted pilot'
s as a satisfactory failsafe for an MCAS failure if the failure of MCAS should have constituted an emergency requiring immediate landing and removal from passenger service of the aircraft.
Even though the report says the development process was essentially followed to the letter, we ended up with an aircraft which is leagues away from what I would call a reasonably sound civilian transport aircraft.
So it sounds to me like someone is either pulling punches, or specifically avoiding asking the hard Or uncomfortable questions.
How is the process not to blame when following it led to a sub-par implementation?
Or if you really insist the process as it stands is sufficient, why was Boeing capable of following the process yet still delivering a dangerous product"