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> Most people remember when the FBI wanted a backdoor into iPhones and Tim Cook refused.

Fewer people remember when the CCP wanted a backdoor into iCloud and Apple said yes, for fear of losing its largest growth market. Presently, all iCloud users in China are hosted by a Chinese company, in China, to which the CCP by law has full access.

There is also a claim that Apple cancelled a plan to e2e encrypt iCloud phone backups, which would mean that Apple/FBI could no longer decrypt your phone’s backup. All iPhones logged in to iCloud are backing up to iCloud by default with encryption that Apple/FBI can read. The claim is that the FBI specifically requested that they not further secure this, which would prevent their current methods of easily accessing these backups.

Note that your backups generally contain your complete iMessage and SMS history, including all attached images and videos.

There’s little practical point in denying a backdoor into a seized phone if Apple/FBI already have a copy of everything on it that they can decrypt and read because your backups are encrypted to Apple, not you.

(They do this because many, many people lose their device, and have forgotten their Apple ID password which then needs to be reset. The naïve solution to this is to simply encrypt the backups to an Apple key, which is always decryptable by Apple as required for restore after resetting your password via alternate ID verification. Unfortunately it puts every single user of iCloud backup at risk of bulk surveillance.)

The whole thing is rather performative, like they are showing off for the market. Indeed, people well respected (such as the author of TFA) are repeating this meme without any of the associated caveats.

Make sure you tell your family and friends to disable iCloud and more specifically, iCloud device backups if they value their privacy.

This is an article about securing the boot process on various platforms. Whatever your thoughts on Apple's cloud security practices (I'm not a fan either), it gets tedious to have this brought up every time an article is in any way related to Apple and security. Boot security matters, regardless of whether your cloud backups are end-to-end encrypted or not. I find calling it "rather performative" disingenuous.

Yes, my comment is orthogonal to the topic of the article. I’m just so incredibly tired of seeing people trot out this commonplace and false Tim Cook vs the FBI narrative entirely uncritically, which is precisely what TFA does.

Yes, iCloud is not really private.

You can use iTunes backup to your own computer. But then, that must be securely full-disk encrypted. And then it's you who'll be holding the password and/or key.

iTunes backups support encryption without your computer needing FDE.

There is also the idevicebackup2 commandline tool from the libimobiledevice suite for doing those backups on linux, mac, or windows hosts. Supports the iOS protocols, including the native backup encryption.


Having a secure iOS device is possible: disable iCloud backups, probably disable messages and photos too, and use a custom numeric pin >10 digits (a lot more if you are using it as T9 input). The secure enclave's kdf is only configured for 100ms of stretching IIRC, but it's sufficient with a long pin code.

It would be great if idevicebackup2 supported WiFi sync and not just usb. Being able to do scheduled backups without user intervention means iCloud wins by quite some margin on convenience otherwise.

I'd still rather have FDE, as well. For me, LUKS.

I have both, but if I could only have one I'd rely on the native iOS backup encryption.

I trust Apple's implementation more than I trust myself accidentally leaving my disk unlocked in public. And I do trust myself not to leave my disk unlocked in public.

(I know this is a digression from the topic but we're nicely tucked away at the bottom of the comments)

That's how they got DFS. Two agents pretended to have a lovers' argument at the library, to distract him, and the third grabbed his laptop.

I don't use laptops anymore. Just host machines for VMs. And I always shut them all down, whenever I leave the building. I have a commercial UPS, with a deadman circuit. So I just cabled that line with the CAT6, and there are motorcycle-style kill switches in key places (desk, bathroom, kitchen and bed).

I admire your diligence, although I wonder about your threat model if you are bragging about a drug-kingpin-level setup on a forum.

I've been writing about privacy, anonymity, etc for many years, as Mirimir. And I can't write honestly unless I test stuff.

I don't do anything iffier than many who write using their meatspace identity. But for many years, I wanted to keep that segregated from my professional life. That doesn't matter so much now, but it's Mirimir who I am. So hey.

I didn't take it as bragging; to me it looks like it comes from a position of wanting to teach. Security is basically a collection of things you ought not to forget, so I think exposure is important for people to a hold of it.

I don't do anything cool, at least as of right now, but I still check my locks and I'm happy to impart my knowledge like this. Privacy is a human right! I hope journalists, Uighurs, and whoever else can find their way to decent security information because of mirimir's efforts.

I'd go as far as to say LUKS in plain mode, rather than ever so popular container LUKS.

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