Your argument falls apart where you claim something is abundantly clear, when you can't even clearly describe what you think is abundantly clear.
You're claiming red light isn't the perception of red. I can be on board with those semantics, but they are just semantics. In that case, I'd say the phenomenon described by the terms is that red light is the electromagnetic radiation in the long range of the visible spectrum, and the perception of red is the chemical cascade starting with the stimulation of L-cones and ending with the firing of neurons in the visual cortex.
You keep saying that red light and the perception of red are "highly correlated" with red, but I'm saying, there's no evidence for anything besides red light and the perception of red. You're saying that the brain and the mind are made up of qualitatively different material, but I'm saying, "qualitative" implies "observable", and you've yet to present an observable phenomenon that is clearly the mind.
Either the mind is indistinguishable from the brain, in which case we don't need a second term for it, or it's a distinguishable phenomenon that you've failed to actually demonstrate exists. It's not clear which is the case, because you haven't made it clear what observable phenomena you are calling "the mind".
Do you agree that orange light isn't the same as the perception of orange? After all, the perception of orange can exist without orange light, as demonstrated by the RGB monitor you are most likely using to look at the header at the top of this web page.
The mind is a distinguishable phenomenon from the brain because I can observe other people's brains (although I hope I never actually do) but I can't observe other people's minds.
Is it not abundantly clear that a photon is just a photon? What else could it be?
> the perception of red is the chemical cascade starting with the stimulation of L-cones and ending with the firing of neurons in the visual cortex.
So this quote illustrates the gist of your thinking, but I think you've got some muddled terms. For you there is "red light" and "the perception of red". So for you:
"red light" is the photon &
"the perception of red" is the chemical cascade.
Whereas, I would break it down as follows:
"red light" is the photon as well - ie a photon with wavelength between 620-750nm (though I'd caution that despite calling this photon "red light", there is in fact no "red" associated with it - except that it can cause the perception of red if it hits and excites specific cone cells at back our eyes, but it is still just a photon, albiet with a specific energy level but the point is this photon has no quality "red")
Where we differ is I believe:
The chemical cascade is the chemical cascade &
"the perception of red" is "the perception of red"
So I think the real problem with your understanding of this is your confusing the chemical cascade caused by a 620-750nm photon to be "the perception of red".
In a sense, you are claiming that this chemical cascade is 2 things: 1: a chemical cascade and 2: the perception of red (i.e. the subjective sensation of looking at red); whereas, I would say the chemical cascade is just a chemical cascade... that's all it is, because of course chemicals can't be chemicals AND sense perceptions - that's the real incorrect leap of faith in your argument.
I believe it makes much more sense to consider sense perceptions to be a separate distinct phenomenon. You say that I have yet to present an observable phenomenon that is clearly in the mind, but just imagine a red triangle, boom there you have it - that red triangle only exists in the mind. Sure, in the brain there's electrochemical activity within the visual cortex, but you won't find a red triangle in there, because the red triangle is made up of fundamentally different material - i.e. the sense-perception of red in the shape of a triangle. Now, I have no idea what red actually is, except that I know it is a qualitatively different material than the brain and is fundamentally irreducible.
If you still disagree with this, tell me where is the red triangle? Because I think it's patently absurd to say the red triangle IS a chemical cascade in your brain. No, it's not. It's highly correlated with a chemical cascade in your brain, but it is an objectively distinct and separate entity/object; it's simply made of qualitatively different material than the brain. Ultimately, as I said before, I believe you're confusing 2 correlated processes/things for a single process/thing: the chemical cascade and the sense-perception.
> Is it not abundantly clear that a photon is just a photon? What else could it be?
Well, light can be modeled as either a wave or a particle[1]. When talking about colors, it makes more sense to talk about light using the wave model of light than the particle model of light--not that either way of talking about it is wrong, it's just that the particle model is way more complicated for modeling this particular phenomena.
> "red light" is the photon as well - ie a photon with wavelength between 620-750nm
No. If you're talking about wavelength you should be using the wave model. It absolutely makes sense to say "red light" when you're talking about a wave.
There's no such thing as a red photon because photons don't have color by themselves--red light is made up of many photons, which have a frequency.
It sounds like your argument is basically that you don't know how to represent color with the particle model of light, so you assume the answer is "the mind". Not only can you go learn how to represent color using the particle model, but even if that weren't possible, assuming that anything you don't understand is "the mind" is pretty premature.
> In a sense, you are claiming that this chemical cascade is 2 things: 1: a chemical cascade and 2: the perception of red (i.e. the subjective sensation of looking at red); whereas, I would say the chemical cascade is just a chemical cascade... that's all it is, because of course chemicals can't be chemicals AND sense perceptions - that's the real incorrect leap of faith in your argument.
People who have the chemical cascade experience red. People who don't, don't--even if red light is there (i.e. if they are colorblind). Do you have any reason for believing these are different phenomena?
> You say that I have yet to present an observable phenomenon that is clearly in the mind, but just imagine a red triangle, boom there you have it - that red triangle only exists in the mind. [...]
> If you still disagree with this, tell me where is the red triangle?
It's also in the brain, because the mind is just the brain.
This isn't hypothetical. We can read (very) fuzzy images from people's brains using neural-imaging[2]. I'm not aware of any experiments that specifically has read a red triangle, but I don't see any reason to believe that this image is uniquely in the mind and not the brain.
Again, it seems like you're just defining "the mind" as anything that happens in the brain where you don't know how it happens. And again I'll say, even if we didn't already know how it happens, concluding that this is "the mind" rather than some physical process we haven't yet discovered, is premature.
> it's simply made of qualitatively different material than the brain.
If it's qualitatively different, what are the qualitative differences?
As for the parts of your post I didn't respond to directly: declaring things irreducible, patently absurd, and declaring that you know things, all ex nihilo, is not a persuasive argument.
A lot of what you say is irrelevant. I get the feeling you aren't aware of the hard problem of consciousness, so I'll leave this here for you to read up on: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness. Are you familiar with concepts like qualia? I recommend reading that wiki too.
The problem for you is that you still fail to draw a distinction between 2 highly correlated phenomena: the chemical cascade & the perception of red. You even get close to admitting the distinction yourself. E.g.:
> People who have the chemical cascade experience red. People who don't, don't--even if red light is there (i.e. if they are colorblind). Do you have any reason for believing these are different phenomena?
So yes, many reasons - some of which have already been explained and inadequately responded to, but here's another example that should prove it to you: We can put someone under anesthesia, shine red light into their eyes & they will still have the chemical cascade, but will not experience or perceive red. How do you square this circle? I suspect you'll insist they must also experience it and simply not know, but I'll be interested in hearing your mental gymnastics.
> It's also in the brain, because the mind is just the brain.
> This isn't hypothetical. We can read (very) fuzzy images from people's brains using neural-imaging[2]. I'm not aware of any experiments that specifically has read a red triangle, but I don't see any reason to believe that this image is uniquely in the mind and not the brain.
I've looked at brains under the microscope... never once have I seen a red triangle, or green square, or blue circle, yet here they are in my mind. Again your confusing correlation for the thing itself.
Yes I'm sure we'll get to the point where if I imagine a red triangle, then we'll be able to "read" it from my brain, but this doesn't mean that the red triangle is in my brain, just that a certain activity of neurons in the brain is correlated with a red triangle... those neural imaging techniques are all largely about correlation, which is my point exactly.
> If it's qualitatively different, what are the qualitative differences?
The brain is made of traditional matter we're familiar with (e.g. atoms and their constituent parts, amongst others), but the mind is made up of things like sense-perceptions (e.g. the colour red or the smell of lemons, which are fundamentally irreducible - by which I mean you cannot say the perception of a red triangle is made up of traditional matter. Instead a red triangle is simply made up of red; in essence, if a red triangle is made up of atoms, those atoms would have the quality red, which is a property traditional matter does not possess, hence the mind being made up of qualitatively different matter than the brain.
I know it's probably hard for someone who refuses to believe consciousness exists to admit that consciousness does in fact exist as a separate distinct phenomenon, so I won't try too hard to convince you. I'm sure with time you'll make that distinction too.
> I get the feeling you aren't aware of the hard problem of consciousness, so I'll leave this here for you to read up on: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness. Are you familiar with concepts like qualia? I recommend reading that wiki too.
This is, again, saying a problem is hard, and then concluding that since we can't solve it, the solution is mind! Which again remains a premature conclusion.
> The problem for you is that you still fail to draw a distinction between 2 highly correlated phenomena: the chemical cascade & the perception of red.
No, that's not a failure. That's my entire point. There aren't two phenomena: they are the same thing.
> We can put someone under anesthesia, shine red light into their eyes & they will still have the chemical cascade, but will not experience or perceive red. How do you square this circle?
Surely you can see how inserting a chemical into the brain might change or interfere with the chemical cascade? If you assume that the chemical cascade IS the perception of red, then interfering with the chemical cascade preventing the perception of red makes perfect sense.
> I've looked at brains under the microscope... never once have I seen a red triangle, or green square, or blue circle, yet here they are in my mind. Again your confusing correlation for the thing itself.
I must admit I got a chuckle out of this. Is this what you think I'm claiming? This is definitely not what I'm claiming. I'm just going to quote this so you can't retract it.
> those neural imaging techniques are all largely about correlation, which is my point exactly.
Neural imaging is done with physical machines, which can only detect physical phenomena. "Correlating" means to take two things and show them to be related. So if you're correlating two phenomenon with machinery that can only detect physical phenomena, you can only correlate physical phenomena. If you're claiming that neural imaging shows the correlation between a chemical cascade and the processes of the mind, then the processes of the mind must be a physical phenomenon--which is my point.
> I know it's probably hard for someone who refuses to believe consciousness exists to admit that consciousness does in fact exist as a separate distinct phenomenon, so I won't try too hard to convince you.
I don't refuse to believe in consciousness--consciousness certainly exists, as electrical and chemical processes in the brain. And I wouldn't refuse to believe in consciousness as distinct from electrical and chemical reactions in the brain, if you presented any evidence for that assertion, instead of just repeating it and adding new unfounded claims.
> I'm sure with time you'll make that distinction too.
You're claiming red light isn't the perception of red. I can be on board with those semantics, but they are just semantics. In that case, I'd say the phenomenon described by the terms is that red light is the electromagnetic radiation in the long range of the visible spectrum, and the perception of red is the chemical cascade starting with the stimulation of L-cones and ending with the firing of neurons in the visual cortex.
You keep saying that red light and the perception of red are "highly correlated" with red, but I'm saying, there's no evidence for anything besides red light and the perception of red. You're saying that the brain and the mind are made up of qualitatively different material, but I'm saying, "qualitative" implies "observable", and you've yet to present an observable phenomenon that is clearly the mind.
Either the mind is indistinguishable from the brain, in which case we don't need a second term for it, or it's a distinguishable phenomenon that you've failed to actually demonstrate exists. It's not clear which is the case, because you haven't made it clear what observable phenomena you are calling "the mind".