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But that's metallurgical failure, not software, and it's something that's showing up in use almost decades later.

I'm saying this to highlight that what you're pointing out, while not desired, is kinda expected. That's the point of the routine inspection and maintenance - to catch these.

It's not the same as the conversation we're having under the OP: catastrophic failure due to bad assumptions in software (in this case, memory safety)




> I'm saying this to highlight that what you're pointing out, while not desired, is kinda expected.

If it was expected, it wouldn't be newsworthy. And metallurgical issues in Boeing planes can be as critical as software issues:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IaWdEtANi-0&t=36m16s


It's not newsworthy. That's why the recent metallurgical stress topic regarding Ryanair's jets rapidly died from the news cycle - because to some extent, it's expected, and it's why maintenance processes exist. A quick search on Google News yielded exactly one recent result, and that was about Ryanair's response to the Guardian article: https://www.irishtimes.com/business/transport-and-tourism/ry...

> And metallurgical issues in Boeing planes can be as critical as software issues:

This much is obvious, and it's exactly why the maintenance exists. Crashes happen; the precursors are baked right into new processes and procedures. When said processes pick up on similar symptoms in the future, it might be in the news for a day or two, and then it disappears because it's expected.

The precise problem with the MAX is that there's an entire body of knowledge around the MCAS and other automation included with the plane that was never shared, which meant that unlike metallurgical issues which in many cases are largely unforeseen, Boeing's problems here were entirely preventable.

Items that stay in the news for a while tend to be the novel things.


> This much is obvious, and it's exactly why the maintenance exists. Crashes happen; the precursors are baked right into new processes and procedures. When said processes pick up on similar symptoms in the future, it might be in the news for a day or two, and then it disappears because it's expected.

At least on three occasions, multiple people have died or were injured because 737 NG planes developed serious cracks after exactly 8 years in service. Nothing like this is expected or considered to be normal. Therefore, when 50 planes of the same type are urgently grounded by multiple airlines in a very short period of time, it's considered to be newsworthy.

> The precise problem with the MAX is that there's an entire body of knowledge around the MCAS and other automation included with the plane that was never shared, which meant that unlike metallurgical issues which in many cases are largely unforeseen, Boeing's problems here were entirely preventable.

The previous metallurgical issues in 737 NG were also entirely preventable:

https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2010/12/...

That makes the real source of any new issues with 737 NG questionable.

My point is, that MAX and MCAS is not the first instance of Boeing's negligence. And new things that went wrong with 737 NG might still be discovered.




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