The key is that the soliders are set to a strategem, not a specific x-y-z position, and have to try to keep in that cadence, so to speak. Yoon Ha Lee's writing is incredibly strange and open to interpertation here, so if this sounds strange, it's somewhat meant to be (Calendrical Rot, corpselight, amputation guns, etc.). Reading the early chapters is better than me trying to explain it.
That said, trying to manage battle is fruitless and attempting to impose order into something that intentionally random and chaotic is not going to go well. Col. Boyd's OODA loop is pertienet here. If your enemy knows that they have been looped, then putting random noise into the system can alievate that and get them back into the war.
It's a great little sequence, worth a read if you're into that sort of thing.
To a first approximation, implementing - lets call it machine automation and optimization - into how we do what we call F3EAD (Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate) will effectively do what we do now, only faster and more precisely.
Beyond that, it's pretty open as to what kind of novel planning capabilities will emerge from implementing DRL and other combined optimization strategies within kinetic and non-kinetic conflicts.
Note also, that the state space for force on force conflict, even small unit tactics are orders of magnitude more complex than something like GO because they are neither fully-observable nor deterministic (and can't easily be approximated as such).
A related idea I had would be to try to create and popularize tools that distribute holistic and objective information about what's actually happening in the world. There are two broad categories: GIS-type information such as military deployment, resource production, transportation, and consumption, and first-hand political reporting.
I'm going to interject here my own theory about war which is that it is almost always about power in general, territorial control, and resource control, but is almost never sold that way. Because it involves mass killing, war must be sold on a moral basis. However, as I said, war is not about morals, its about power and control. So it is necessary to find a moral justification for war. This is usually fabricated to one degree or another and promoted as propaganda.
But anyway back to this tool. I think we need a decentralized platform for reporting and aggregating resource information. Ideally there could also be a nice 3d interface like a globe displaying the information. Of course this would be a monumental effort. And also it would be nice to have a neutral ground for first-hand reporting that would give the perspectives of people in all different areas and groups simultaneously.
Edit - sorry, should say Victoria, not Victory.
From what I've gathered of the community thus far, there's a sort of expectation that you do your time in "logi" and those who do are held in high regard.
We use VBS3 in the Irish Defence Forces (and I know many other militaries are using it also) and its capabilities are just incredible in terms of realism. It lets you build and run so many different scenarios and they have done a great job of getting minor details to work very well. It will never replace full live training but at the same time it lets you practice over and over again to maximise your time in the field (and also do things that costs, equipment etc would not allow for.)
The fact that Picture-In-Picture scopes are so rare even within the game's assets shows a certain contempt for realism. I've never had to load bullets into my magazine one by one in Arma before. I've had to do that plenty of times in Escape from Tarkov. Red Orchestra also has more realistic scopes and gun mechanics.
The really advanced bits are the range of equipment, combined operations and realistic scenarios you can create for it. Wanna recreate a local village, throw in realistic civilians and adversaries, match your convoy and run drills with multiple land, sea and air assets? No problem, easily done.
What reads as authentic to consumers is the moment-to-moment aesthetics like how guns handle or whether there's a percievable "stat" being modeled. The actual scenarios can be implausible or eliminate an inconvenient-but-important element, but if the overall experience repeatedly hits on the belief structure, it gets the "realism" moniker.
As a training tool, what matters is the big picture of how it supports key skills, conveys specific technical information, and enables new kinds of exercises to take place. A lot of consumer boardgames are great at developing strategic thinking even though their material is unrelated to any specific warfighting skill and the technical detail has been streamlined out; the reduction pushes the players to grapple with the consequences of every single move and play as far ahead as possible, often resorting to diplomatic options(deception or coalition-building) to get an advantage. Likewise most simulation tools do not require total simulation at fidelity, they need only the elements relevant to the training, so they can be incomplete as a portrayed experience of the scenario.
I beg to differ!
He doesn't get 5 minutes in without getting into logistics.
Talking to Ho Chi Minh when he asked for US assistance against French Colonialism would (in clear sense) have saved many lives, and much materiel.
amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics. Henry Kissinger undermines everything.
It didn’t stop North Vietnam from invading the South with an army.
Congress forbid the US from intervening:
Militarily speaking, the US was holding back the Viet Cong just fine, though not without controversy or casualties.
The below link emphasizes the success of the Strategic Hamlet program, and notes continuing reductions in Vietcong strength.
I consider the entirety of Western historiography on this matter to be incorrect for the sole purpose of demoralizing the west.
The NVA were doing much of the fighting after that.
Regardless, the supply of military aircraft too complex for local maintenance and the refusal to allow any air support after ‘73 by Congress meant the outcome was already decided.
It's an important area of focus, but it requires, just like tactics, certain gifts which many neither possess nor appreciate.
Also the US emerged from the 20th century as a logistics superstar, so there is a certain bias. This can negatively impact areas like innovation; logistics is not generally a friend to novelty.
Tanker plan: https://i.imgur.com/06n3jjb.jpg Backstory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Black_Buck
Two of the books cited in that Wikipedia article are well worth reading as a pair, as apart from both being very enjoyable, they offer opposing takes of the Vulcan raids: Sharkey Ward's Sea Harrier over the Falklands and Rowland White's Vulcan 607.
I don't see why not. Any advance in transportation or communication has an impact. If drones could deliver everything that would be major for example. And obviously gps, computer path/packing optimization, and warehouse automation have been big.
However, the last km to the infantryman has more impact for innovation, whether by drone or robot mule.
The business model for drones has been innovative. The bases are often not in the combat zone, so companies can offer Surveillance-as-a-Service to the military.
Similarly, Amazon-ian supply-chain management and automated logistics warehouses have also pushed towards the front, and often remain under commercial control. New equipment deliveries are now often contracted to be in-theatre, not to the 'Purple Gate' military distribution system starting in the home country.
Also, imagine that your supreme leader is a logistician by psychology, and is presented with a choice: Cast the solution to the current problem as a logistics and force stabilization issue, or cast the solution as novel strategy. Human trait psychology shows us that they will tend to err on the side of logistics and sameness (sameness preserves logistics efficiency and is its friend). This gives their enemy the upper hand to the degree that the enemy can nurture broad and dynamic conflict while tricking the logistically-advanced side into wasting logistics resources and getting comfortable. The enemy ends up forcing short-lived novelty onto the logistical opponent in order to cause paralysis.
The internal programming language is a lisp, btw.
John Churchill, aka Duke of Marlborough, was a master of logistics in when it was a rare skill. It was a key component in his many victories.  I'm sure there are counterexamples but good logistics underlay most of the great allied victories of WW II as well as the near German victory at the start of WW I.
Logistics is a vital component of modern military doctrine but it's still just a component.
Class 3 - fuel, petroleum, and lubricants
Class 5 - ammunition
Class 8 - medical supplies
Class 9 - repair parts for equipment
Without logistics, the warfighters who employ tactics will not get very far or do very much.
Classes of supply: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classes_of_supply
However I concede that this and many of the other posts here are essentially a bit of wordplay. That being said, I am very interested in this topic of discussion which you've brought up, because war is a spectre of human nature which is not palatable to anyone. So even if your fight is a good one, it's going to look bad on TV, which is exactly the thing that gets weaponized by your political opponents in furtherance of their own goals.
HOI IV leans more towards combat (being set around WW2), but one still have to manage logistics and directing R&D a lot.
- The specific tactics should be kept secret
- logistics has a huge role in a WW2-era thinking that still dominates western military thinking
- logistics likely needs a lot of peacetime attention and investment
To your second point, logistics has a huge role in any war. See Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Mahan, Herodotus, Thucydides, etc. If you're intent was to set up a construct where the US military is woefully behind the 8 ball in modern military something-or-other, I would disagree. So, I don't disagree with your thesis that WW2 affects western military thinking, but I disagree with using that as the basis for any argument about the preparedness of western military thinking or modern war planning. Keep in mind we just exited the intermediate ballistic missile treaty with Russia and are developing hypersonics partially to manage the expanding threat of nuclear weapons, where whole-of-civilization war may be won or lost in minutes. We deploy drones at operational and tactical levels. We invest more in medical collaborations (a soft power move) than most countries spend on their own road systems. We fight at every level all the damn time.
To your third point, yes logistics needs a lot of peacetime attention and investment. The inevitable problem is managing the OODA loop between conflicts. As your time between operations increases, the hypothetical space of new possibilities increases and you can't invest in all of them.
The battle of Thermopylae is an even more extreme example of this.
They also had pretty good strategy of showing the conquered best and richest of the Empire while gating political participation by culture.
This worked for quite some time...