> the paper records can be used to run a stop-loss audit to verify the electronic vote count
You can't do this. Probably the most fundamental problem with electronic vote verification is that you cannot give someone physical evidence of how their vote was cast, because it makes voter coercion feasible.
Its why almost all absentee / write in ballots are set up so that if you send multiple ballots only the last one is counted (or an in person vote if you give one). If someone tries to coerce your vote and use the absentee ballot as proof unless they keep you imprisoned until the election is over they can't prove you didn't resubmit / go in person to change your vote.
With receipts for in person ballots the only way to defeat coercion is to make it so you can, at the point of receipt, get issued an intentionally flawed receipt. But if you are verifying votes this way, it would have to be for another legitimate voter voting the exact way your coercer wanted. That sounds like a hugely limiting technical flaw.
> You can't do this. Probably the most fundamental problem with electronic vote verification is that you cannot give someone physical evidence of how their vote was cast, because it makes voter coercion feasible.
There are machines that print paper receipts to voters (presented under glass so voters can verify), and then drop the receipts into a traditional lockable ballot box. The voter cannot access the paper ballot without evidently tampering with the machine; the only issue is that you'd need a way to get poll workers the ballot at issue without identifying the voter.
> you cannot give someone physical evidence of how their vote was cast, because it makes voter coercion feasible
Some countries try to solve this with an extended voting period and by making votes repudiable / changeable up until the end of the election.
Another solution is generous whistleblower rewards and significant criminal penalties.
There are tools outside the ballot box to prevent crime, and extortion is a crime regardless of whether there's an election going on or not.
(If you bake deniability into your system, you lose the ability to let voters prove to others that their vote was miscounted, so receipts lose a key feature at that point.)
You can't do this. Probably the most fundamental problem with electronic vote verification is that you cannot give someone physical evidence of how their vote was cast, because it makes voter coercion feasible.
Its why almost all absentee / write in ballots are set up so that if you send multiple ballots only the last one is counted (or an in person vote if you give one). If someone tries to coerce your vote and use the absentee ballot as proof unless they keep you imprisoned until the election is over they can't prove you didn't resubmit / go in person to change your vote.
With receipts for in person ballots the only way to defeat coercion is to make it so you can, at the point of receipt, get issued an intentionally flawed receipt. But if you are verifying votes this way, it would have to be for another legitimate voter voting the exact way your coercer wanted. That sounds like a hugely limiting technical flaw.