When I started the article the first it came to me was that, once that package actually arrived at someone's desk, the main goal of the attackers would be to exploit Bluetooth attack vectors, where you can actually snoop at user/passwords, take control of devices or event plug the warship as a keyboard and deploy malicious code into the internal PCs.
For some of the bluetooth attack vectors, the warship wouldn't even need the cell network access and a call home, just a powerful bluetooth antenna should suffice.
But now I wonder how many other attacks can be launched from a sealed box in a mailroom. Van Eck phreaking will get you a decent image off an LCD monitor from 10+ meters away through multiple interior walls, and can survive significant channel noise. Other side-channel attacks can directly pick up keys during decryption, though the proofs are short-range and it's not clear whether increasing device size/power would boost that.
It'd be tricky and expensive to arrange, especially with the risk of ending up pointed in a boring direction. But it seems like an absolutely wild idea for remote access to the contents of even air-gapped monitors.
24/7 power, a platform to mount attacks via Bluetooth, WiFi, microphone, integrated USB hub, and heck, aren't the new monitors often attached to Thunderbolt, which is almost the same as PCIe. And even in case it's not Thunderbolt, it's likely going to be USB-C — not too shabby for evil keyboard emulation, memory sticks, fake ethernet adapters etc.
Perfect visibility to keyboards as well.
3G for return channel.