>the implications of an omnipotent, omniscient being
There is nothing in the premise or conclusion about omnipotent or omniscient. Just "most powerful". If there is nothing which is omnipotent then the most powerful being is not omnipotent.
said another way: while I can (sort of) imagine omnipotentence, it does not follow that there is an omnipotent being in the same way. That is to say, there is necessarily a most powerful object in existence but there is not necessarily an omnipotent object in existence.
Indeed we can infer no attributes of this most powerful object except its power: we may just be talking about the largest black hole or something.
Anselm's argument was about "greater," not "more powerful." Specifically, was about the existence of "a being than which nothing greater can be conceived." Since you just conceived of a potential being with omnipotence, it follows that Anselm's being must have omnipotence, at least if we assume having omnipotence is greater than not having it.
More practically, Anselm was thinking within the Christian tradition, which also attributes omniscience, omnipotence, and fearworthiness to God. Had Anselm understood his argument to refer to a "greater" entity that potentially lacked these characteristics, he would not have called that being "God." I do generally agree that the argument is not particularly useful because it doesn't describe interesting properties of God and God's relationship with / desires for humanity, but at least for understanding the argument as Anselm understood it, we can fairly easily conclude that Anselm saw nothing in the being of the argument that was inconsistent with the God of his religion.
Very true, Anselm refers to greater, not more powerful. And is describing God entirely in the Christian tradition. But another problem is, the conclusion does not follow from the premises.
1) Imagine/conceive of the greatest possible thing. (This premise is more than true, it's a directive.)
2) Real things are greater than imaginary things. (This premise is un-controversially true.)
So we can imagine an extraordinary being omnipotent and great. And we must imagine him existing because if we imagine he does not exist, we're imagining something less great.
The problem is, in his own premise, _any_ existing being is greater than _any_ imagined being.
So it's very true that a real God is greater than an imagined God. But, from premise 2, so is any physical real thing including the most humble being.
At the risk of wandering outside of my expertise, I would think this would not bother the faithful either way since I understand faith is central to the religion. I'm guessing that Anselm's argument is a "nice to have" but if it fails it does not disturb anyone. And incidentally, I hope I have not said anything offensive.
> But, from premise 2, so is any physical real thing including the most humble being.
This doesn't invalidate the argument. A real person is certainly better than his imaginations of what God might be. But the real God is still greater than even that.
There is nothing in the premise or conclusion about omnipotent or omniscient. Just "most powerful". If there is nothing which is omnipotent then the most powerful being is not omnipotent.
said another way: while I can (sort of) imagine omnipotentence, it does not follow that there is an omnipotent being in the same way. That is to say, there is necessarily a most powerful object in existence but there is not necessarily an omnipotent object in existence.
Indeed we can infer no attributes of this most powerful object except its power: we may just be talking about the largest black hole or something.