The plane has become too large to rely on muscles and mechanical linkages to move a primary control surface.
Once the pilots understand that runaway stab trim can be immediately halted by throwing the stab trim cutoff switches on the console, which is what the pilots did in the first instance of an MCAS failure and landed safely, the airplane can be safely flown.
The have a clear incentive to force Boeing to make it far far safer than any other craft in the sky, and if Boeing complains, nobody will believe them.
What worries me is the series of newspaper articles about a corrupted safety culture at Boeing, e.g. about the Dreamliner and how QC were finding forgotten parts and wrenches in the airframe. Commercial pressures are always at odds with safety, but I had the impression that aircraft manufacturers had this under control.
And the scary part is if this could happen in the US, other manufacturers aren't necessarily better, but they haven't fucked up so badly as Boeing (yet?). It's shaken my faith in faith in the idea of air safety engineering, which was always seen as shining example of safety engineering - it might be that the systems have become too complex to be managed safely.
I won't fly on it myself.