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This seems to be a favourite topic for people here - make votes able to be checked by voters.

I've seen many proposed implementations but they all fail because if I can prove my vote to myself in any way, someone else can make me prove it to them either to buy or coerce my ballot.




Not necessarily. You could provide people with a 4 digit code they can use alongside their id to verify that their vote was counted as they intended, but also give them access to a tool that allows them to receive a code that “proves” their vote was counted for any arbitrary party. That way you can verify you own code because you know the real reference code, but anyone else can’t rely on your vote truthfully being anything beyond them trusting you, which is already the case for the current system.


Not sure I'm seeing the 'proof' there. By what mechanism do these two codes prove anything much?

If the 'real' code shows one thing and the 'fake' codes another what assurance do you have that the counting was done with your 'real' code and the voting machine didn't put another one in there?


Here's one way to do it that requires basically zero trust in the software:

1) When voters enter the booth, they throw a large number of multi-sided dice.

2) The resultant throw is scanned via computer-vision. Voter verifies it is correct, and it becomes the voter's ID. Voter votes normally and the vote is recorded alongside that generated "ID".

3) The voter receives a print-out that contains their (ID, vote), however it is randomly shuffled in among other real (ID, vote) pairs. The print-out is guaranteed to have at least one vote for each candidate.

4) The entire list of (ID, vote) pairs can be published nationally. Everyone can verify that the right number of votes were counted, and that their vote was accurately counted since they can find both their ID and vote in the national list.

They can show their receipt to others but cannot prove which one of the many IDs on the receipt was actually theirs.


OK, OK, thankyou!

I can see that working, particularly part 3 there being key.

Seriously I've been asking for years and this is the first time anyone's actually spelled out a scheme that allows the person to go back and prove the vote to themselves and have genuine plausible deniability to others who may seek to coerce them. Thanks :)


A simple, two-option system that allows for private vote verification:

  Vote: 0 for Gore, 1 for Bush
  Provide, in the polling booth: a random salt of either 0 or 1
  Publish: vote XOR salt
Now, if you want to lie about what vote you cast, you also lie about the random salt. But you can always check for yourself.

Now, the issue becomes obvious - if someone can falsify votes, why can't they falsify salts as well? Less obviously, this is true of any verification system - abstractly, you can always count the vote one way, and "verify" it the other way. So what you have to do is have completely different possession chains for the vote roll and the salt roll. Make it so that at no point does any one person have access to all three of 1) the voter id, 2) the vote cast, and 3) the salt. This means that nobody has the required information, or access, to undetectably falsify a vote.

Extending this to handle more than two options, and making it easy enough to comprehend that the average voter won't get caught out if they try to lie, is left as an exercise for the reader. But it's possible.


If nobody has access to all three pieces of information, including the voter, how can they verify their own vote?


The voter, and only the voter, has access to all three pieces of information.


If they have access, so does someone trying to coerce them...


No, they don't. That's the point. The voter can lie about the salt. Only the voter knows they are lying, because they were alone in the polling booth.


Then how can they be sure their vote was counted correctly?


By comparing their private knowledge of 1) who they voted for and 2) the salt they were shown in the booth with 3) the public hash of the two.

In any case it was only meant as an existence proof, not a practical system. I like aeternus's suggestion much more, since it has the useful property that everyone can see all the votes - just not whose is whose. (Although I'm not sure what function the receipt serves)


> I've seen many proposed implementations but they all fail because if I can prove my vote to myself in any way, someone else can make me prove it to them either to buy or coerce my ballot.

There is a way to prove that your vote was counted without being able to prove what you voted for by using homomorphic encryption. So, if someone wanted to coerce you or pay you for voting at all for whomever you want, they could do it, but that's fine. Microsoft is actually working with Galois on a system operating on this principle[1], and here's a good video explaining the basic concepts of how it works[2].

[1] https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/05/06/protect...

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BYRTvoZ3Rho


That's kind of interesting and I can see that being a good halfway point, to prove you weren't disenfranchised, at least.




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