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Someone at Cisco intentionally created a keypair and intentionally put it in the image build process. They may or may not have intended to put it in production builds, but they clearly intended to set it up in some form, when they could have just ... not. If you take the easy but risky approach, you have certainly intentionally put yourself at risk.

I've worked for a company that built OS images for distribution to customers. Putting my SSH key in development image builds would have been convenient, but there was too much of a risk of exactly this problem; instead we just made it easy enough to download an SSH key on a development build (and start up an sshd) once you've booted it and have physical access to a terminal.

Also, a practical concern with disclosed vulnerabilities is that non-nation-state attackers (which are most of the attackers most people care about) are very unlikely to find and exploit a vulnerability that neither has a public CVE issued now nor will have one issued for years. So even if the alternative vendor has difficult-to-discover vulnerabilities, there is, in a very real sense, reduced exposure from those vulnerabilities compared to things that are disclosed and fixed. And especially if Cisco's disclosed-and-fixed vulnerabilities originate from outside vulnerability reports, there's a definite correlation between whether a vulnerability can be found by someone who would report it and whether a vulnerability can be found by someone who would exploit it.




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