If MCAS is the culprit here, Boeing clearly released this functionality without proper vetting and testing. It’s a sad day for safety and for automation. These accidents will likely slow the advance of BVR for drones and more autonomous flight for cargo. The fact these accidents are occurring overseas where the pilots have less training will also buttress the decision for the 1500 hour rule. Like I said, if MCAS is suspected here, probably time to ground the new 737 despite what it will do to Boeing, because right now it looks like they cut some corners, the FAA let them, and families are mourning. Pilot error isn’t really the issue, it’s engineering, process, and training.
That doesn’t seem like engineering, process, nor training.
That looks like something connected to large scale corporate profit.
How did Boeing manage to gain self reporting to the FAA?
From what I read MCAS is not even a true safety system, much more like a piloting assist, and should not have had the authority to override pilot input.
It appears that the true stall avoidance system is a "hard" safety system and works independently with much safeguards, and a lot of "overrideability" just for such moments of sensor failure.
So, they added that dangerous system to just let pilots to have the same feel and experience as in old model - an absolutely noncritical issue.
Truly, "UX" people...
I'm sure this is an edge case given all of the successful 737 MAX 8 fights, but it's a catastrophic one.
To go from smooth flying conditions to having the nose unexpectedly dive and having seconds to save your life and everyone on board is almost more dangerous than difficult flying conditions because it's so unexpected.
I'd be surprised if Boeing continues to treat this as a training issue. The plane needs to be better.
There are 350 737Max in service. It's a brand new airplane - it went into service in mid-2017.
For 2 brand new (months old) 737Max to fall out of the sky is not an "edge case".
And Boeing’s procedures on how it disseminates information should be held under a microscope and punished severely.
2 accidents is 2 too many, but it's not like every MAX 8 or anywhere close to the majority or even a large minority are experiencing catastrophic failure.
Sure, it's far higher than what's acceptable and the industry norm, but I'd imagine it's enough of an edge case that it snuck past testing and 99%+ of real world flights.
Until we teach spherical cows to fly planes, that is...
I'm just saying its simpler, cheaper, and safer to deploy people who can troubleshoot simple flying systems rather than to deploy people who will have to debug untested and complicated automation systems on the fly. It would be the most extreme field service posting, ever.
What we have here is an over optimization problem; we "have to" build unflyable aircraft to keep up with everyone elses level of recklessness to squeeze a couple more hyper-financialized pennies out of the system or be replaced by someone reckless enough to do it. Traditionally regulation helps in these situations. The aircraft of the future is far more likely to have networking and interconnected processors prohibited by law for safety reasons than to be an internet of things self-flying appliance. That would result in a nice simple, admittedly lower performance, far more reliable overall system. Non-networked non-interconnected control microprocessors seem safe enough so far, but making an infinitely complicated hyper optimized system seems in practice to result in planes falling out of the sky too often.
basis: none whatsoever; just a guess.
I hope it's a coincidence, but that can't look good on Boeing.
E: Removed the word 'sure'
Very unlikely for a brand new plane to suffer issues with altitude shortly after take off.
Even less likely for it to happen twice in a span of a few months.
However, aviation history has more than a handful of samples where a new design suffered multiple crashes shortly after introduction and the cause was ultimately a design flaw.
I don't think that's how statistics work. You need larger sample sizes in order to make such a statement with high confidence.
Me, the software engineer, am extremely paranoid with newly released models of any kind. I'd rather wait a few years for it to be tested, never being an early adopter for it.
I am not flying any leg on the 737 Max now.
- the one that avoided flying MAXs and it turned out to be something else
- the one that avoided flying MAXs and it turned out to be a problem with the MAX
- the one that did not avoid flying MAXs and it turned out to be something else
- the one that did not avoid flying MAXs and it turned out to be a problem with the MAX
I think it is much safer to be in the first two and potentially being labeled paranoid later on worst case.
I agree with grounding the fleet, especially if it's the case that an MCAS software update was already being prepared but not yet deployed.
Previous crash was involving a stall prevention software overwhelming the pilot input.
It was said to be added to new 737 due to it getting slightly tail heavier, and as a safeguard to pilot overreacting to it feeling unusual.
It may be the case that Airbus is simply better at building automation into the fabric of their aircraft from the ground up than Boeing.
I have a friend who is a commercial pilot and who doesn't like Airbus planes because he doesn't want to be overruled by a computer... Accident statistics are a wash between Boeing and Airbus, though.
So, sure, it might not be a coincidence, but "it happened near take off" is not surprising.
Boeing and Regulators Delay Jetliner Fixes Prompted by Lion Air Crash
Software update, initially expected in January, now likely pushed until April or later
Given the number of other similarities to the Lion Air crash, I think the parent comment was being pretty conservative in their speculation (at this point, I'd be surprised if it _wasn't_ MCAS related).
"My guess is both pilots fell asleep right after takeoff but before they could get the autopilot engaged, so the plane plummeted to the ground because no one was awake at the controls."
It was clearly marked speculation. If we are not allowed discussions about possibilities we can kill off comment fields right now.
http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/rate_mod.htm lumps max together with other 737 models, which of course turns out to be very safe.