* Navy culture where chronic sleep deprivation is used as substitute for battlefield heroics. Navy aviators have enough sleep scheduled. Surface Navy has not seen battle for ages. Being tired is a way to show you are pushing it to the limit. Everybody being so tired that they microsleep in the bridge is the standard condition. People in the bridge start teleporting from one place to another because you keep falling asleep constantly. Driving a car that tired is not allowed, but it's OK in the Navy.
* Lack of basic seamanship skills and experience. Officers are rotated inside the ship and outside the ship to completely unrelated posts. They learn basics of everything but master nothing. Navy officers have less experience in basic ship driving than anyone in the merchant fleet. Other navies specialize officers for different areas. Training is cut because there is no time for it, but that's not the core reason. You would need less training with more specialization.
* 7th fleet leadership continues to be a corrupt mess. Most of the ongoing bad stuff related to Navy happens in the 7th. Fat Leonard scandal, collisions...
>For nearly 30 years, all new surface warfare officers spent their first six months in uniform at the Surface Warfare Officer’s School in Newport, Rhode Island, learning the theory behind driving ships and leading sailors as division officers.
But that changed in 2003. The Navy decided to eliminate the “SWOS Basic” school and simply send surface fleet officers out to sea to learn on the job. The Navy did that mainly to save money, and the fleet has suffered severely for it, said retired Cmdr. Kurt Lippold.
“The Navy has cut training as a budgetary device and they have done it at the expense of our ability to operate safely at sea,” said Lippold, who commanded the destroyer Cole in 2000 when it was attacked by terrorists in Yemen.
They are expensive to put together, twenty billion to thirty billion per task force and hundreds of millions per year just in crew salaries to run.
It's interesting that when a government or party that's not in the US's best interests is in power, it's okay for the CIA to use asymmetric tactics to fund rebels and favourable terrorism, stage coups d'etat, overthrow governments and meddle in foreign elections but when those parties seek to do the same to the US, it's terrorism.
Kind of hypocritical really. But that's US exceptionalism for you. It's only bad when someone else does it.
It's almost impossible at this point to point a finger and say "there's the bad guy, right there" because both sides are as bad as the other and both using much the same tactics on one another, both spewing rhetoric and hatred in the face of the other terrorists. It's like trying to mediate a kindergarten playground fight where the cost of losing the fight is death instead of being dragged to the principal's office by your ears. It's so undignified it's nauseating.
No, I meant non-state. The US doesn't generally use the T-word for, say, Russia's actions in Crimea or in Syria. Being opposed to US interests is necessary but not sufficient to make you a terrorist in this definition.
- define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations
- declare War
- grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal
- make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water
- raise and support Armies
- provide and maintain a Navy
- make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces
- provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions
- provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States
Nowhere in that list is "for an indefinite period of time, kill a bunch of unidentified people in unspecified foreign lands for unspecified reasons". Wars fought among nations are generally bad things, but historically there has been a protocol that the Constitution references in the simple phrase "declare war". Various acts of violence against various parties for various purposes have been considered necessary for the peace and security of any political unit, but those acts have been limited to the territory of that political unit.
Ever since the USA army wasn't properly stood down from WWII, the requirements of the military-industrial complex have dictated the invention of another procedure for killing thousands of innocents every week on an ongoing basis. A cursory examination of the Constitution reveals that this new innovation violates the enumerated powers of Congress and the executive.
I was shocked to read above. You don't personally trust someone or people in CIC so you just don't communicate with CIC when you are crossing the most congested patch of ocean on the planet?
What is this? High school??
Trust issues can occur from top down as well as bottom up. I have observed management not trusting their people far more commonly than opposed to people not trusting their management. When management does not trust their staff the staff will not be used or properly developed. It may be that the leadership believes it takes less effort to do the job themselves than watch their staff struggle and fail. This is a benign form of toxic leadership. Staff must be made to do their jobs and properly mentored to just before the point where the incompetence is likely to result in criminal/policy violations or immediate harms.
Isn’t it the opposite - that management/officers are oblivious to their own toxic behaviour that led to the rank-and-file distrusting them?
People occupying positions of management are more capable of seeing trust issues simply because they have the responsibility to talk with subordinates of their own and reason upon the effectiveness of that dialogue. People without managerial experience generally lack the tools to perceive the behaviors driving the decisions thrust upon them. People outside of management also tend to lack the necessary exposure to situations where these behaviors are present.
There is also the power dynamic. A boss can more easily terminate a toxic employee than an employee can terminate a toxic boss. This power distance prevents many toxic employees from establish trust issues against a superior until there exists a pattern of identifiable behavior beyond a single employee.
You can try and get a relief so you can go to the head, but it's generally frowned upon if your that guy that always needs a head break, and in the middle of the night, no one wants to wake up so you can go pee.
Edited to add: Also, what will people do? They will drink less than they should to avoid the humiliation. On top of a tired crew you will get also a dehydrated one. This is a surefire recipe for bad things to happen.
I agree with the need to always keep training in top shape.
There is no naval enemy on earth that is even remotely competitive with the US in any regard.
Iran? North Korea? ISIS? What enemy?
Russia has no global naval projection, it can barely sustainably push beyond the Black Sea with its surface ships. Their sub fleet is a medium threat. The US is also not at war with Russia, they aren't actually an enemy. There is no war coming with the Russians, they're only good for boogeyman status. They've got a perma stagnant economy (Australia will surpass it soon) and melting social-economic position (see: pension cuts making Putin unpopular), crimping their ability to continue to spend on anything military (most of their military is badly dilapidated, so they've taken to focusing very narrowly because they can't field a high quality force across the board any longer; this is also why Putin puts so much effort into screaming about his magic super weapons that are unstoppable, their conventional military is rotting).
Could China one day be a naval enemy? Sure. At some point in the next 20 years there could be a naval conflict near Chinese territory. The US isn't winning that near-shore conflict short of going to a WW2 level output of ships. The dumbest thing the US could do from a navy perspective is get into a naval conflict with China close to their shores 10-20 years from now. It wouldn't matter how well trained the officers are, it's an inherently losing position.
I find this hilarious in the context of the incident,
Who would win: the greatest navel power on earth operating a highly sophisticated and technologically advanced destroyer, or one container ship?
Just because there isn't an enemy now doesn't mean that you can just forgo training. They shouldn't sink to a lowest common denominator, but rather strive for a higher standard. They're hardly in top shape according to the report
It's a good thing the US is still friendly with Europe. Everything I've read about their (admittedly much smaller) navies is that they're far more professional and better run, and look at the Americans as unprofessional and even dangerous when they have to do training exercises with them.
Of course, this shouldn't be too big a surprise; just take a trip to Europe and see how much better day-to-day stuff is run. Public transit is excellent and much larger in scope, unlike America where the subways are falling apart and Amtrak is a joke. Airports are smoothly run, unlike America where they aren't even paying the security people (TSA) to come to work. Bridges in Europe aren't dilapidated and literally falling down like they are in America.
I wouldn't be so sure about that.
Norway managed to sink one of their own frigates.
Germany doesn't have anything left to sink.
Japan also has a pretty sizable Navy with over 120 ships.
None of Germany's 6 subs were operational at the beginning of last year. That may have changed since, but the underlying reasons, poor planning and lack of spare parts, are still there. Only 9 of 15 Frigates were operational and the lead of their new class of frigates, the F125, failed sea trials. The Navy subsequently refused to commission the ship. Admittedly, these are not necessarily crew training issues, but crews without operational ships are not likely to maintain a desirable level of combat readiness. These issues aren't just limited to the Navy; ground forces are also in a bad state.
France and the UK are in better shape, but the Royal Navy in particular has holes in its capabilities where the US Navy is expected to fill in. They're regaining some capabilities with their new (and only operational) carrier, but it's not even clear if it has a functional air wing yet as the F-35B's they purchased only began carrier operations this past September. Another carrier is under construction, but it may be awhile before their carrier based naval aviation becomes combat effective.
The remaining European Navies are pretty small and pretty limited in what they can do. They tend to focus on ASW with some surface warfare capabilities, but are again dependent upon one of the larger Navies for air defense.
Japan may well be the most combat effective of the bunch, but that's a completely different theater of operations.
This isn't intended to be a rah-rah, USA forever sort of rant. Everyone, including the US, seem to have let things slip to the extent that combat effectiveness is becoming questionable.
Ship to ship maneuverability and tactics, even? How can you be so sure? Do you think that it's impossible for a US ship to lose a "dogfight" at sea in Asia as tensions escalate? If the lack of training is as bad as they say, I have a hard time imagining them winning one.
They have more Admirals now that ships.
Otherwise if there's a war what are these crews going to be doing? Pissing themselves on the bridge, or have a bottle in one hand and their dick in the other while trying to man their station, possibly while undergoing hard maneuvers?
This seems to be some fundamental failure of crew management. Crews should be allocated in such a way that there's time for toilet breaks.
I can't say I have any experience with the military, but from listening to "Life and Work on HMS Enterprise", they are constantly running realistic exercises (in their case, mostly simulating fires and people overboard, since it's a research vessel).
But yeah it is a failure of crew management certainly - at very least there should be a solid "relief" procedure that can handle it - and even stable in the long odds of a crewman getting killed out of line of sight by say a glancing hit.
Of course this must be balanced against the fact that her poor performance killed sailors.
Also, the answer to "If she was the boss, why did she tolerate others doing what she can't?" assumes a lot about the boss. Tolerating something boss himself cant do by boss is pretty normal. (Not that I think pee bottles are sign of good management.)
The answer to "If she wasn't the boss, it seems she has a pretty good case for having been subjected to a toxic work environment." is that well, that happen and soldiers tolerate a lot. She might have good reasons not to open that can of worms. It is usually better not to.
However, the officer in charge of the CIC - Natalie Combs - was also female.
In a surprise move during a Tuesday hearing in a Washington Navy Yard courtroom, defense attorneys representing Lt. Natalie Combs held up a new piece of evidence that might exonerate her at her upcoming court-martial trial.
It’s a photograph — a still image captured from digital footage recorded by an aft Vertical Launching System camera mounted on the guided-missile destroyer Fitzgerald on June 17, 2017, seconds after it was speared and spun off the coast of Japan by the hulking ACX Crystal, a Philippine-flagged cargo vessel.
What it reveals is something that hasn’t surfaced in any of the Navy’s publicly-released probes or even a secret military “dual-purpose” investigation obtained by Navy Times and completed 41 days after the tragedy.
It shows a string of lights on the ACX Crystal that Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. Jeff Janaro — an attorney who also commanded vessels at sea — called an “improper lighting configuration,” one that appeared to the defense team to be “recklessly unlawful.”
That’s important because if the ACX Crystal’s lamps were positioned incorrectly, that alignment might’ve fooled the watchstanders on the Fitz’s bridge who were trying to track multiple vessels in one of the world’s busiest maritime superhighways, piecing together a picture of the night through radar readings and visual clues.
Ship travel is governed by the “rules of the road,” a set of guidelines regarding speed, lookouts and other best practices to avoid collisions. Those bylaws include how lights are configured on ships.
The green lights on the side of a vessel should be visible from three miles away, six miles for the bright white lights running from bow to stern.
“This picture tells us it didn’t look right,” Janaro told Navy judge Cmdr. Arthur Gaston. “We think the Crystal was very negligent in this matter.”
Few people have seen the image — maybe only a handful of attorneys in Washington, Lt. Combs and Navy Times — but it “might be worth a thousand words,” as Gaston put it.
It’s unclear if even the Coast Guard investigators working on a National Transportation Safety Board probe into the Fitzgerald collision have a copy of it.
n the night of the collision, Combs never would’ve seen the lights of the ACX Crystal with her own eyes. She was in charge of the Fitz’s electronic nerve center below the bridge, what’s called the Combat Information Center, or "CIC.'
Her team was supposed to use advanced sensors like the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer’s SPS-67 radar to track vessels near the Fitz and relay what they detected to the watchstanders on the bridge.
But the secret probe helmed by Rear Adm. Brian Fort determined that Combs' CIC had "zero communication” with the bridge team before the Crystal loomed seemingly out of nowhere to ram the Fitz’s starboard hull.
Although listed as operational, the CIC’s SPS-67 system actually had fallen into a “degraded status,” according to Fort’s report. Some CIC sailors didn’t appear to know how to use the equipment — much of it in various states of disrepair — and the room itself was heaped in garbage, human waste and exercise equipment.
In the aftermath of the ACX Crystal collision, Fort found a stack of abandoned forms where Combs had been sitting.
“She was most likely consumed and distracted by a review of Operations Department paperwork for the three and a half hours of her watch prior to the collision,” he wrote.
Fort determined that Combs was derelict in her CIC duties, but an investigating officer assigned to her initial Article 32 hearing, Cmdr. Anthony Johnson, sifted through the same evidence and recommended that she skip court-martial proceedings and go instead to a Navy board of inquiry to determine if she should remain on duty.
Adm. James Caldwell, the convening authority in her case, disregarded Johnson and charged Combs with dereliction of duty that negligently resulted in the death of fellow sailors and the negligent and improper hazarding of a vessel.
To Janaro and star military defense attorney David Sheldon, the photo casts into doubt the first charge.
It relies on a “but for” clause — but for Combs' derelict leadership, the mishap would not have occurred. They believe that the ACX Crystal shouldered much of the blame for the accident, and bad Navy practices set her up to fail.
They pointed to the recent settlement between the U.S. Department of Justice and Olympic Steamship Company, S.A., Panama, the owners of the ACX Crystal.
They’re forking over $26.7 million to the United States.
While finding plenty of fault with Combs and other Americans on the Fitzgerald for the collision, Fort’s report also takes aim at the crew of the ACX Crystal, in particular an unnamed second officer.
Among a long list of failures listed in the Fort report, that officer “failed to maintain a proper lookout so as to make a full appraisal of the risk of collision” with the Fitzgerald, "failed to determine if a risk of collision with FTZ existed by using all available means” and “he failed to appreciate, by radar or visual observation, that FTZ was on a constant bearing with a decreasing range, which observation would have led him to deem risk of collision to exist.”
Sheldon and Janaro want to interview two Filipino officers from the ACX Crystal about their vessel’s lights captured in the photo, plus the many other problems raised in Fort’s report.
The attorneys have a series of transcripts from previous interviews the officers did, but their words are marked “indiscernible” 203 times.
The defense team thinks their testimony might free Combs.
Military prosecutor Lt. Cmdr. Kate Shovlin told Gaston that Naval Criminal Investigative Service made a good faith effort to talk to the men, but they avoided the agent who visited their homes and workplace.
Their family members also told NCIS the ACX Crystal crewmen wouldn’t cooperate with American investigators.
Combs' defense team wants to trigger a treaty between Washington and Manila that would prod authorities in the Philippines to compel the ACX Crystal’s officers to testify, but that threatens to push the court-martial trial well past its slated late May opening.
That’s also around the time the highly-anticipated NTSB probe is expected to be released.
We are in the context of CIC being full of bottles of pee and crew members who didn’t know how to use radar controls.
The personal mistrust may mean various things, but likely means something like "they rarely provided something useful and last x times I passed information it caused unnecessary complications, slowdowns and problems". The perception may be true of false of course, may be caused by technical incompetence or by people causing dramas for no reason or whatever. It is just something common in large badly managed groups where you cant rely on other people.
According to most of the ex-Navy people I've met, it's high school part 2. None of them had been officers, and I'm a tiny bit surprised it extends to the officer class, but only a tiny bit.
I'm amazed that serving naval officers flunked a quiz on the Rules of the Road, and even more amazed that the XO of the ship refused to take such a quiz. That's so basic. It's the driver's handbook for ships. See rules 11-19, which are about How Not To Run Into Other Ships. These are simple right of way rules. There's a one-page summary in "Power Boating for Dummies." That anyone on the bridge of a US Navy vessel would not know these is terrifying. That the Navy brass tried to cover that up is worse.
The CO and XO shouldn't be sleeping while their ship is crossing a busy sealane full of behemoth freighters driving on autopilot in the dark.
The Navy deliberately understaffs their vessels to meet unrealistic budgets. Overwork, fatigue, mistakes, and catastrophe are the inevitable consequence.
The only thing more predictable is the scapegoating of ship personnel and the untouchability of those who create the conditions which guarantee eventual disaster.
I always suspected this was partly because lots of sailors means a big navy base, and a big navy base means a booming local economy in that congressional district.
If that also helps politically that is a bonus.
Source: I once talked to some dude who was both important and in a Navy.
Most current sailors I talk to are overworked, training gets gundecked, following safety procedures and impede advancement - what's reworded is a "can do" approach that takes large risks.
I don't know anyone currently serving, in any command, who says they have too many people.
It's not so much that we were doing "unnecessary" work, but rather that many tasks which required a dedicated person were so trivial that any reasonably competent sailor could easily handle two or three of them at once, or the task could be even more reliably automated.
One quick example is the fathometer operator: When we were sailing in shallow or uncharted waters, a sailor had to spend hours doing absolutely nothing but watching the depth gauge so he could give a verbal warning if we were in danger of running aground. This is not a job that requires a person's full attention even in the most challenging undersea terrain.
To some extent it's necessary to break jobs down into simple repetitive tasks so that they can reliably be done in a high-stress environment, but the navy really took it to an extreme. The end result was the overwork and fatigue that others are referring to.
If you don’t believe a warship needs that many personnel on duty, that is different. Most of the crew aren’t there to sail. Cargo ships, for example, have a dozen crew at most. And their duty is to sail the ship from one port to another.
Why aren't these people "the best of the best", to quote the trite line from Top Gun?
According to Wikipedia, the US Navy has 282 deployable combat vessels. It employs a total of 325,673 active duty personnel plus 270,265 civilian employees.
So out of those 600,000 people, they can't find a few thousand who are willing, able, and capable of commanding a destroyer? The US Naval Academy alone graduates 1000 people a year. Where do they all go? What do they all do?
Really? I'm serious. My understanding is that the absolutely most prestigious military assignments are in "command" positions. Those assignments are the key to climbing the promotion ladder.
This whole thing makes no sense to me.
Surface warfare officer is not the most desireable job for most people.
And it sucks so bad most people have much better options and leave after the initial five year commitment.
According to Wikipedia, the US decommissioned its last battleship in 1992. Even then, the US Navy largely forswore battlehsips after WWII, and battleships were decommissioned and recommissioned twice during the Cold War. The last time two battleships ever fired at one another was the Battle of Surigao Strait 74 years ago.
This was from a younger Navy guy and older Navy guy swapping stories. The older guy was horrified.
Really, the advent of military aviation made them more or less obsolete in WWII.
There were almost no ship-to-ship battles involving battleships in WWII; they were used almost exclusively to shell inland targets close to shorelines, but there are much more efficient ways to do that and those ways aren't limited to striking targets within gun range of the shoreline.
So it's pretty much carriers and destroyers as far as combat ships on the surface these days. (Not sure the term "destroyer" is used much these days, but the non-carrier surface combat ships are roughly comparable in size to what would have been called a destroyer in the old days)
And then of course you have the many amphibious assault ships, support ships, etc.
1. IN WW2, US Navy admirals learned painful lessons to trust captains who manage subordinates well, not the superiors.
When US was suddenly pulled into WW2, the submarines of US navy in WW2 did not achieve much at beginning. For months, US navy submarines failed to sink enemy ships. One big factor was faulty torpedoes. US navy had recently finished developing a new type of torpedo with a magnetic detonator. It was supposed to be a very effective weapon. But due to budget restrictions before WW2 (in the Great Depression), not enough testing was done. If I recall correctly, after spending the precious budget to develop a new type of weapon, not one complete torpedo with live warhead was actually fired in a realistic manner. But I digress.
The real reason US submarines did not achieve much initially at beginning of WW2 in the Pacific theater was the captains on the submarines. A captain in a WW2 submarine disproportionately influences how well or badly the submarine's crew performed. The captain's aggressiveness, skill, carelessness, excessive cautiousness, and etc all directly determined what the crew in the submarine achieved. When the US submarines in Pacific theater finally began to sink Japanese ships at a satisfactory level, it was discovered not a single (or very few) US Navy captain who had reached the rank before the war was still in command of a US submarine. They had failed to achieve results, and were replaced with proven captains who knew how to actually manage the crew below him on the submarine, not manage the higher officers in officers' club.
Basically, before WW2, a US navy officer who was competent enough, projected image fit for a captain, AND managed his superiors well got the promotion. Well ok, previous statement is my own assumption. But the fact is when a shooting war began, it was discovered the officers who got command of a submarine prior to the beginning of WW2 couldn't find the enemy or shoot straight when it really mattered.
US navy finally began promoting officers who knew how to manage the crew below him well and had a killer instinct, not the ones with superior social skills. US navy brass learned that the enemy did not care how good a US Navy officer was at self marketing/promoting.
2. My own managers who moved onto bigger firms.
I've been in US tech scene (IT), about 15 years. Of the managers I had during that time, 2 managers (at separate firm/time) who were above me went on to work at globally well known tech/entertainment firms in tech VP roles. I mean really well known firms. Not Google or Facebook but older, established firms. Top of the heap. Because I worked in small companies with these managers, I got to observe them in close proximity.
What I remember the most of them 2 is how incessantly they visited/chatted/hung-out with the CEO. Sure a lot of it was work I'm sure, but I also know it was a lot of befriending, kissing up, using one's social skill. I as a staff member was given slices of their time, but nothing like the attention given to the CEO.
And sure enough, both firms were closed down. Of course a LOT of it was beyond their control. But it also shows they as managers couldn't find the right project to tackle or manage their subordinates effectively so the company could make $ to survive. Well, maybe or maybe not.
But I do know they spent a lot of time and energy befriending the higher-ups above them. And, I trust the hard lessons US Navy admirals in WW2 learned, that were paid for with lives. The lesson that you should avoid those who spend much energy at self promoting, as they don't actually deliver when it matters.
For a domain (tech industry) that is supposedly dominated by facts and numbers, there is a lot of promotion and hiring based on such mysterious feelings, not based on actual facts and numbers. Culture fit?
In the Star Trek reboot Kirk goes straight from Academy sophomore to commanding a capital ship in a matter of days.
It is not like that. It takes many years. Only a small percentage of Academy graduates will ever get there. And many have no ambition to either, there are lots of other challenging and prestigious jobs in the Navy. You could be a fighter pilot or a SEAL platoon commander, neither of those career paths leads to commanding a destroyer.
I think some really big fights and even a bit of an ass kicking has some rejuvenating powers for big military apparatus. The military likes to really teach from mistakes, they make lots of noise about what does and doesn’t work after a big fight, they change. I’m not saying the navy hasn’t seen action but they definitely have t seen WWII style battleship to battleship action in 70 years, we don’t even have battleships anymore...
The question isn't why one person is asleep, it's why there's nobody filling the role.
Either they're slacking or there aren't enough, and you can fix either problem with 10 quality candidates per ship.
That was certainly how it worked 40 years ago aboard the USS Enterprise (the aircraft carrier, not the starship). Day or night, the CO would always come to the bridge whenever another ship got to within about two- to four miles and was predicted to come within one mile. And in traffic, e.g., transiting the Strait of Malacca, the skipper would be on the bridge pretty much continuously. (Not the XO; his full-time job was basically running the ship's internal operations.)
Or, as the broader lesson goes, taking a risk without it blowing up doesn't necessarily mean the risks are less. It might just mean you were lucky.
I'm not asking rhetorically -- honest question.
And to be sure, it's not quite apples to apples. An aircraft carrier normally spends most of its time in the open sea: To launch and recover aircraft (other than helos and vertical take-off and -landing aircraft), the carrier needs miles and miles of room to steam at high speed into the wind without having to change course for traffic. (If you're steaming into the wind at, say, 30 knots, the aircraft being launched or recovered get a head start in staying above stall speed.) Depending on the circumstances, even in peacetime a carrier might have one or more weapons-loaded aircraft in alert status, ready for launch on comparatively-short notice as a combat air patrol (CAP). When that's the case, the ship would need to be away from traffic, in case it had to quickly turn into the wind to put up a CAP. That's why, except when entering or leaving port, or transiting, carriers usually stay away from highly-trafficked areas.
If the CO and XO are so critical that the ship needs one of them during normal operations I think there is a bigger problem.
What happens in a conflict that lasts more than 24 hours? They alternate schedules and just don't talk to eachother much?
What happens if one of them is incapacitated? The ship is ineffective for half of every day?
>He saw kettlebells on the floor and bottles filled with pee.
Peeing in bottles is something i have only heard of engineering doing - in engineering spaces. You will get labeled a nasty-mothafucka if anyone catches you regardless. To fill a bottle in CIC (with the exception of a few curtained off spaces) would require the complicity of several watchstanders. Where was chief? Where was LT?
The kettlebells are really not a big deal - we all would "borrow" things from the gym to get a little pump on watch because there is a LOT of downtime. I can imagine sitting at a CIC station just knocking out some curls to stay awake. We did pull-ups on light fixtures in radio.
>Some radar controls didn’t work and he soon discovered crew members who didn’t know how to use them anyway.
HA! Most of the equipment on ships is ancient. Things are ALWAYS breaking. How we treat the topside steel is analogous to how we treat equipment - prime and paint over it! When something breaks you submit a casualty report to let Big Navy know. If you need a part you have to wait to hit port or receive it at-sea replenishment. Troubleshooting consists of tribal knowledge and talking over the IP phone to a shore station. Watchstanders not knowing how to use the equipment is completely UNSAT (there is of course an "A" team and a "B" team on every ship, but the basic knowledge should be there). While there are a lot of useless bodies on a ship, you should not be sitting a watch station unless you have completed your personal qualification standard which needs to be signed off by someone who is qualified. Some of them even require you sit a board and get quizzed. That also being said, i have traded dip for signatures before.
We had this poster in our chow line that talked about when the exception becomes the rule (wish i could find the quote). Basically, all the little "exceptions" you make to the rules start to become normal and then new and junior sailors think these exceptions are actually rule. These all build and build until you are so far from baseline you don't even remember what baseline was. The fitz and mccain no doubt were a result of this phenomenon. Failures on every level from junior enlisted to the Captain. It breaks my heart these sailors lost their life as the result. I really loved my time in the Navy (and miss it!) but the operation tempo in the current climate is just not healthy and i imagine this won't be the last tragedy to happen unless something changes.
Sounds like normalisation of deviance . The exception happens so many times that it becomes normal, then the exception to that normal and before you know it you’re way outside the original normal and you’ve blown up a space shuttle .
For software, I'm familiar with a process of intentionally designing and executing a safe breakage as a sort of drill to keep people's heads in the game---no better way to find where you accidentally didn't have redundancy than by turning off a system that should have a fallback and seeing what else breaks. Is that practical for CIC, or is there insufficient redundancy in CIC to do something like that safely?
I'm really surprised that all it takes to be declared qualified is the signature of someone else who's qualified. That leaves lots of room for slippage and social pressure, like the dip you mention. It also leaves no one specifically responsible for the crew's level of qualification. A cynic might say that was the point of the system: we know this is going to fail, so make sure no one is directly in the line of fire when the shit cannon goes off.
While I understand the need to honestly record and fit-rep staff. If leaders are not also teachers and if ALL failure has dire consequence, then how do people learn?
You end up with qualification programs and skill sets like there were on this ship. That culture created an environment where questions were taboo.
And, how could the fleet command be ignorant of the culture problems on this ship?
Seems like those NCO issues should have flagged long-term problems to both the ship's command and to the fleet. I don't understand why they would ignore something like that.
Having precise AIS data flowing in for every ship in the area is navigating on "easy mode".
Naturally we're not supposed to infer “any liability, negligence, breach of duty, or wrongdoing” by either party as a result of such a settlement.
The accident took place on June 17, 2017. So for 2 - 3 years, they couldn't find a chief petty officer to accept the assignment?
I wonder, were potential chief petty officers avoiding the ship knowing it was a bad assignment, with crew that had low morale and not enough training?
It reminds me of companies failing in the marketplace and blaming their employees instead of their upper management.
If the Navy feels understaffed and overworked, they can stop illegally blockading countries.
Also, which countries is US actively blockading illegally?
Quoting from that link, "The United States had joined the blockade in October 2016" and "According to the international law of naval blockade the naval measures conducted by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia do not amount to a naval blockade in the legal sense" and "Due to the devastating famine in Yemen and supply shortage of essetinal goods, which are caused by the enforcement measures, the naval operations off the coast of Yemen are criticized as a violation of international humanitarian law."
They are supposed to require a deceleration of war going through Congress, but that has largely been circumvented. They are not just some puppet, the ballooning budget shows their input is considered. If there were some sense that the Navy was resisting the current state of affairs, I'd be more sympathetic.
And the other poster is correct, I was considering the Yemen blockade. Any pretense of legality requires deliberately bending the description of what's taking place, or acknowledging that the US has made itself exempt from prosecution for war crimes.
Navy Times should hold its readers in higher esteem. Of course we assumed the worst.
... and when the relevant documents were declassified, it was revealed that the secret the government was hiding was that test was run on a plane with a grossly-substandard maintenance history.