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It doesn't matter if you use offline signing for your zone if someone owns up the account you log into to control your domain with your registrar, or owns up the registrar. So no, even with offline signing, DNSSEC did nothing here.

But it's worth keeping in mind that most organizations can't use offline signing, because the duct-tape-and-baling-wire solutions DNSSEC applies to people dumping zones with NSEC records all require online signers.

Depending on the registrar, updating glue records can be a separate process that requires additional authentication. Not long ago my registrar required me to contact them directly to update glue records.

Offline signing is a very useful feature precisely because it makes it easier to differentiate security domains. For example, I could use offline signing for foo.com (along with a registrar lock) but delegate the subdomain dyn.foo.com to a separate SOA that uses real-time signing (or none at all) for use by internal services.

The problem with the modern web PKI is that, as a practical matter, everybody is forced to put their private keys not only online, but unprotected (because HSM and PKCS#11 support isn't that great, yet).[1] Key rotation and certificate expiration doesn't really solve the problem; in fact, rotation exacerbates the problem by 1) forcing you to keep the CA keys online, and 2) incentivizing increasingly loose authorization policies.

Offline signing makes it easier to manage risk in a more robust manner. It's a tool, not a panacea; a tool conspicuously missing from TLS infrastructure. Some newer projects like Wireguard have effectively turned asymmetric key authentication systems into something that walks and quacks exactly like shared passwords. They do it because key management is a hard problem. But I'm not ready to throw in the towel, and the option (both officially and as a practical choice) of offline key signing in DNSSEC is under appreciated. From a security perspective, allowing people to enumerate my subdomains is a small price to pay for permitting me to keep my private keys offline. I don't expect everybody to make that calculation, but it bothers me that people fail to see the value at all.

[1] People faithfully recite the mantra "encrypt at rest" as if that means something. Data at rest is useless. If your data is worth anything then you're going to actually be, you know, using it, and if it's not protected in use then it's all just security theater. This is most clear with the private keys (e.g. stored "encrypted at rest" in KMS) used by cloud services for acquiring access tokens. It's 2019 and industry is still basically using shared passwords--tons of them, a complex web of passwords dutifully pushed around the network by layers of complex software. As if any of it matters to someone who has figured out how to penetrate your network; as if 5 minute or even 5 second password rotation matters to the guy who already figured out how to automate penetration onto your systems.

With the root account on every registrar I have access to, I can trivially defeat DNSSEC for my zone. Tell me which registrar you're talking about where you believe their security controls would make DNSSEC resilient.

(You addressed the first half of my comment and not the second).

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