(1) Your working vocabulary of 20k words is irrelevant. If you pick the words yourself, they aren't random and your random-word-vocabulary (the ones you'd actually pick) is waaaay less. If you use a randomizer, which you should, just give it the full dictionary (or say, top 100k for memorability).
(2) Faced with the suggestion of adding more words, they show that 4 is crackable. But go to 5, and you're solid for 400y. This is so clearly relevant that excluding it seems suspect. This article should be as simple as "use 5 random words, not 4".
Password managers have their own issues, both with usability and their tendency to provide centralized targets. And, they still require a secure passkey themselves -- for which a long random phrase is a perfectly reasonable approach.
"If you use a randomizer, which you should"
That's a big IF. People should use a password manager, or create unique random passwords for every site... but they don't. Of course, if someone other than you chooses the words, you'd need to include the entire dictionary.
"But go to 5, and you're solid for 400y. This is so clearly relevant that excluding it seems suspect."
I haven't excluded this; I make reference to DiceWare at the bottom of the page. This covers both using more words chosen at random, which is the entire point.
But that would actually be useful, and get fewer hits.
The only "really bad idea" for passwords is password reuse. A unique 14 character three word password for each site you use will protect you from the threats you face online.
The fact that someone can relatively quickly crack your password if you used 3 random words is meaningless. That only works if they knew that you did that in the first place. Capitalize one random letter in all of that, throw a number between the second or third letter, add dashes, whatever and they're totally screwed. Game over, you win.
Password reuse, or even following a simple pattern for having different password for each site (i.e. a seed+site name) is the main problem here. If one site falls, then it should not be trivial to deduce your password or how to attack it for other, maybe more important or secure, sites.
Target a bank with it? They can't bruteforce a 14 character password for the bank over the internet. What trivial method would you use to get into your bank account, if you didn't reuse that password?
and even if the password list is not in plain text, but the attacker manages to find your 3-word password, if you didn't reuse that password any where else, then it can't be used to get into any of your other accounts.
and for the account for which they found your password, they already broke into that system, so no additional loss here either.
Erm, haven't you proven my point for me?
You can't say "The fact that someone can relatively quickly crack your password if you used 3 random words is meaningless" and "isn't a really bad idea" in the same sentence.
"Capitalize one random letter in all of that, throw a number between the second or third letter, add dashes, whatever and they're totally screwed"
So.... ignore the "just use 3 words" advice completely and add random letters, numbers and dashes to make it secure? You'll find that's the advice we've given for years... and it too is ignored.
In reality brute force is last resort, you have dictionaries, walks on keyboard. You can also use additional data about your target if you have database like name etc.
But is that really the ONLY "really bad idea" when using passwords?
I wish LastPass would take this advice. They ask me to change my master password every time I log in because I've had the same one for a long time.
Another thing is for example Chrome's built in password manager. If I make a bunch of accounts with these passwords, do I NEED Chrome to ever be able to log in to these accounts?
If your home isn't secure enough for this purpose due to roommates or other issues, ask a trusted friend, parent or relative to hold onto it and your other important documents on your behalf. If your situation makes putting it in someone else's hands a problem, you can split the password or other key material between multiple locations as well. 1Password makes it easy with the "rescue kit", and KeepassXC can use a combination of a password and file-based key for this purpose.
Security conversations on this topic typically go down some rabbit hole about the government, police etc. Keep it simple and don't crawl into that hole. End of the day, in the United States, the most reliable and legally secure place is your home or in some cases an attorney's office.
When you need your password at 4:30PM, the bank is closed.
Also, it’s an awful place for important documents like a will, as the bank will require a court order for your family to open it upon your death.
You can setup your password manager authorization to expire periodically (eg, every 30 days) as well as on reboot. With LastPass (probably others) you can also mark certain sites as 'high security' and require entering your master password again. I do this with a small handful of sites, including my bank and domain registrar. I typically log into my bank once or twice a month.
I very rarely reboot my devices (sleep + locked with a different password I have memorized and type in) so I don't get prompted for it that much otherwise, but enough that I have it memorized.
Basically, storing your master password physically only really vulnerable to highly targeted attacks.
And, as I mentioned earlier, we're really quite good at keeping track of wallets and purses in the first case. Losing them is typically (at least in my own experience) a once-in-a-decade event.
If you want to also have a shorter password for daily use, save it in a separate database protected with that long passphrase.
Re: losing access - a 1password family plan allows your family members to recover your account. Or just write your master password down on paper and store it somewhere secure - like a safe or safety deposit box.
I use LastPass (seem to be in the minority here - there are definitely some things about it that bother me; never tried 1Password). Password manager has simplified my life. Not much any more do I have to wonder which password I used where, etc.
You can export passwords in Chrome. Type chrome://settings/passwords into the URL & click the 3 icon settings to the right of Saved Passwords.
Another option is to test the forgot password of your chosen password manager. See what options are & how comfortable they make you.
The base comparison seems to be a mixed character password with a length of 14. That's far more complex than the vast majority of passwords out there, so the simple three word password would be significantly more "secure" than the average password used.
Password managers are relatively easy to setup for technical people, but getting everything working on your home pc, tablet, and phone isn't a simple task for many people.
The threat 99.999999% of us face isn't that someone will bruteforce our password using a Cray. The attack that is currently occurring against you and the people you know is credential stuffing, which simply targets password reuse.
Existing passwords are broken in a matter of milliseconds, perhaps a few seconds. Do you honestly believe it's sufficient consolation to an end-user to know it took 40 seconds instead? The end result is the same... they're breached.
My point is simple. We already have FAR superior techniques in 2018 and wasting time advocating questionable techniques is an exercise in futility. The people who follow the advice are still at considerable risk, the majority will ignore it and remain almost as vulnerable.
But until then, three words is better than re-use, and your pedantry still isn't helping the people who need it most, i.e. people lacking technical literacy in the first place.
Anything is better than re-use, that's not really an argument. If I recommended using "1", "2", "3" for three different sites, that's technically better than reusing the same password... but still not safe.
Labelling it as pedantry really ignores the wider point. Having 3 unique passwords which take 40 seconds to break really isn't a great improvement, neither is it pedantic to point out that fact.
An application using a memory-hard algorithm like bcrypt would yield the same results, but without the hassle of retraining all users to use longer passwords.
The 200 billion md5 hashes per second figure they use matches up nicely with this 8x GTX 1080 system: https://gist.github.com/epixoip/a83d38f412b4737e99bbef804a27... which cracks bcrypt (at a weak security factor) two million times slower.
So, that same system would crack a 3 word password at this weak bcrypt setting in about 3 years, and a 4 word password in 50 thousand years.
Of course, using a slower hash algorith will increase the time required to break it... but we know the majority of sites don't adequately protect passwords.
There are 331 breaches on HIBP. 108 used MD5, 43 used SHAx... meaning half of all firms used algorithms which we can break quickly & easily.
Normal people's passwords are terrible! It's the site name, their name, "password123" or a single word with a number on the end.
A lot of advice about passwords is aimed at getting normal people to make easy steps to make their passwords better, not perfectly uncrackable.
Complex passwords don't work for lay users and most of them aren't going to switch to password managers. So getting people to make small steps, like not reusing the same password and making it more than one word and a number, does make a big difference to users' security.
If that password was hashed with a single pass of vanilla MD5, the Jeremi Gonsey's cluster of 8 Nvidia GTX 1080i GPUs  would be running at 307,200,000,000 hashes per second.
In order to exhaust half of the keyspace, so odds would be in the favor of the password cracker finding the original hash, they would need to search only 140,737,488,355,328 hashes.
At 307.2 gigahashes per second, this would take approximately 458 seconds, or just under 8 hours using the Niceware list.
However, jumping to 4 random words grows that time by a factor of 65,536, which means reaching 50% exhaustion would take approximately 1 full year. Moving to 5 randomly generated Niceware words, and it's impractical to attempt cracking the MD5 hash.
Cherry-picking 3 words is a little dishonest for the discussion surrounding password security. The right "best answer" for password generation is to use a password manager, no argument there. And I don't know of any password generators that generate passphrases by default, Niceware, Diceware, or otherwise.
But if a user wants a passphrase instead, I don't know of a security expert who would recommend 3 words.
If you're writing out a string of letters and characters, that's not going to be random either. The only way to generate a random password is to use a device that gives you random numbers. If you're relying on your working vocabulary and picking passphrases out of thin air, then your 12 character letters, numbers, and symbols isn't going to very good either, because you're not good at choosing things randomly and picking letters out of thin air won't be any better than words.
This entire article could be rewritten as one sentence: "Use a program or a dictionary/dice to generate your >4 word passphrase."
eggscellent frantillion scrofulon
Ok. I'm skewing to the letter 'L' - but they don't have to know that.
I have always thought of "3 random words" as a starting point for randomizing a password not literal advice to follow.
When I need a secure password that's easy to remember I'll obfuscate the initials of a memorable passphrase from a joke, poem, song or book. My password manager is offline (remember the LastPass hack?) so I need to read from it once and type it in.
Update: I remembered this old article that describes some of the techniques that have been used to crack passwords, including 133t-character replacement:
A cracker can try all the word combinations below a certain depth, then try all the passwords below a certain depth. Then increase the search space a bit for each, as long as they want.
Where sym is 0-1 symbols or numbers, and comma indicates concatenation.
If you use 5+symbols you’re probably creating enough entropy, but you’re veering into hard to type, might as well just use gibberish territory.
* word sym
* sym word
* word word sym
* word sym word
* sym word word
* word word word sym
* word word sym word
* word sym word word
* sym word word word
And then what about 2 symbols? Or separating words with spaces, or dashes, or underscores, or nothing? How many schemas are we up to by now? At what point is there no value to trying all of these, and just running the brute force lookup?
Ultimately, even a schema like "sym? word sym? word sym? word sym? word sym?" is useless. They'll have to use brute force, and that means the difficulty of cracking your password is back to being based on the length.
1: try lists of known stupid passwords
2: test for random words
3: brute force all character combinations
there should be a few more steps available, but just to give an idea.
if your password is from category 1, you'll drop first, and only of it is a sufficiently long password from category 3, or a longer version of category 2 will keep you safe.
one more things: a password with 8 random characters, and a password with 8 random words are equally easy to remember. because it's 8 items.
8 random words are longer to type, but much harder to crack than 8 random characters.
I must have read online for 2 solid years about how much better/safer and secure Password Managers are before I finally switched to one.
After switching though, the CONVENIENCE of a password manager is the most undersold part of it.
Nothing seems to be perfect solution with security, but if you're reading this and haven't switched to a password manager for whatever reason, security benefits aside I would highly recommend finally doing it.
Absolutely. The only issue I have is when I'm logging into something I log into every day, but other than that it's great to log into the manager and go "ah, here's the password I set up a decade ago".
Have I missed something in the article that would make the connection?
EDIT: Yes, hashing works with bytes, so technically, it can be even stronger if we include charsets from other scripts in the problem space.
So I disagree with the article's advice: "Don't use words in passwords. Ever." Yes, you should use caution when using words in a password, but even if you use a password manager, a 5- or 6-word diceware password is ideal. Even better if you stick on a 4-digit numeric "salt" to your diceware passwords.
But yes, I do agree that a 3-word password is too short (~33 bits of entropy). It should be at least 5 words (~55 bits). And you really need at least 6 words (~66 bits, obviously) for a master password.
1. Using EFF's user-friendly, ~1200 word list for diceware.
So first you get all dumb single passwords from dictionary (love, hate, fuck, password), if you have cracking rig or some beefed up server you will go through 100k passwords and all single words, starting with ones commonly used very quickly (sorry, but math I leave for others). Even though hash algorithm works on characters you just make hashes from dictionary words and compare to hash. You can go even further and have list of stupid words already hashed, so now you just need to compare prepared hashes (google rainbow tables), nice optimization. Then you can have improved dictionary with l33t sp33k.
Let's say you get 10% of passwords this way form 100k.
Now you see other people have stronger passwords, so still instead of going random generate combinations of 2 words and run through database, then you can go with combinations of 3 words. This will let's say get you another 20% of passwords.
There are many other optimizations you can come up with. Passwords that you did not cracked you just leave, you don't have incentives to run 12 character full brute force combinations. You have to get passwords as soon as you have them and start credential stuffing everywhere to get as much as you can. It is not some fun and games to crack your school mate password to post "I am stupid" on his wall.
I couldn't find a better source than this stackexchange thread : https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/167235/how-does...
Hope it helps
1) I don't think the base changes nor the exponent deviates from the character approach (in reference to the 20,000, 40,000, and 171,000 base stated). If we're in a system that allows all uppercase letters, all lower case letters, all special characters, and all numbers, then the base is the sum of those: regardless if my password is purplepenguinparade because you don't know that I've artificially set parameters for my password within the existing parameters. It could be argued you could try all permutations of lowercase characters first (base 26) but then how do you know to go to 26^19 before adding more to the base?
1a) if the hashed passwords give away tells as to what the decoded password is like (in this case 3 words lowercase), that'd seem like a concern about the encryption moreso than the password.
2) The 20,000 and 40,000 part seems like a meaningless piece of trivia. What if one of the words I want to use doesn't fall in your 20,000-40,000 word store? You're never going to crack my password. Better go the full 171,000 or whatever it was and hope I don't slip an extra character of the numeric, special character, upper/lower case variety.
While I do personally use a password manager, it isn't perfect for me either (requires loading 1Password 2x on Windows 10 for me because the first attempt does nothing, but loads on second try). I do hope more OS creators do like Apple did to better tie in with password managers and that may help alleviate some of it). So I don't see my parents or grandparents, for example, using one.
That said, for the rank and file folks that are taking their security advice from the government and police departments, I think pushing for various words in sequence is much better advice than "8 characters in length because it takes longer to guess than 6 characters" or whatever it is that people predominantly operate under and usually ties back to something about themselves that someone with some familiarity about them could guess (if I recall, this is what happened to Sarah Palin when she was hacked shortly after being McCain's VP nominee).
In particular, short passwords with up to 8 characters are weaker because they form a small and common subset of passwords that people often draw from, and attackers exploit that by trying short passwords first.
Passwords that are 3 dictionary words, with possibly some small perturbations like punctuation inserts or replacements (which helps but only expands the space so much), also form a relatively small subset of passwords that people increasingly draw upon, and attackers aware of this will tailor their brute-force search accordingly.
What I was saying is if the rules of the site allow for all lower, all upper, special characters, and numerals, the sum of that is your base. If your password is purplepenguinparade, the expectation is you've cracked it by the time you've completed combined_base^1 through combined_base^19. They could artificially limit it (most people use lowercase characters and this site allows just lowercase characters, so let's try 26^n), but they'd run the risk of never cracking it because characters could've been added that deviate from their parameters.
Maybe a clearer example w.r.t. the base^exponent value would be another highly structured class of long passwords, instead of short passwords. For example, those that are just a 2-character sequence repeated 20 times (e.g. abab...ab). You can still say that it'll take maybe up to 26^40 tries for an attacker to guess this, but that number should be more obviously too charitable, since less entropic classes of passwords are more likely to be guessed first.
More generally, this kind of counting analysis depends on your choice of attacker, and it's plausible for attackers to be more sophisticated than just trying all the strings in lexicographical order. A more concrete but still practical attack sketch adapted to the frequency of password schemes today could be: guess dictionary word combinations first, starting with common/short words/phrase lengths, then repeat with small perturbations, then more perturbations, and so on until you search all the remaining strings.
Then, the number of tries for such an attacker to find a 3-word passphrase with a few changes would be much closer to (some small constant) * (# dictionary words)^3 than (# characters)^(string length). Of course, you can still say that such an attacker would take at most (# characters)^(string length) tries to get it, but such an upper bound isn't as useful when the password is much more structured and easy to guess with a slightly more sophisticated attacker.
(Yet another way to put it: one shouldn't expect a password that's 'slightly out of reach' to be significantly more secure than a password that follows a scheme exactly - a more sophisticated attacker would test neighbouring passwords as it brute-forces the combinations in the scheme)
It seems like a good idea to me but I’m not knowledgeable enough about cryptography to know if that’s really true and would be very interested to hear from anyone who does know
Anyone else still using this?
But most people don't, and the attacker doesn't know that.
It's useless to use a strong password if it's going to be stored in plaintext on some service.
Because it doesn't apply the same comparison standard to character-based passwords than to word-based passwords.
Sure, we only use a few common dictionary words. But by the same token, our character-based passwords aren't random strings either: they are variation based on random words.
This is the basis of the xkcd advice to use 4 random words:
Notice Randall gives each word 11 bits of entropy, meaning he considers each word is chosen at random amongst a pool of ~2000 words. Yet that base is still much bigger than ~64 for characters.
If you take 3 common words, you get ~8 billion possibilities. 4 common words: 17,000 billion. That's much more than than ~400 billion for a perfectly random (again: that's not the case in practice) password of 12 characters. And four words is easy to remember, 12 random characters is HARD.
If anything bad can be said about the xkcd comic, it's that it doesn't hammer the point that it has to be FOUR words. As three is much less secure (but still probably more secure than the 12 characters password people are likely to use in practice).
Also as you point out their analysis of the entropy of random words is quite uncharitable. It fails to account for any sort of punctuation, capitalization, etc. Is my password "correct horse battery staple" or "correct Horse, battery staple!" or "CORRECT HORSE! Battery staple.", etc. There is a lot of entropy inherent in crafting a phrase.