Here a few ways I can think of to make this harder for an attacker:
* Add a Strict-Transport-Security to all HTTPS requests. This means the attacker will need to get a valid cert (still easy if you can hijack BGP).
* Pick a preferred SSL issuer and stick with them. Add a CAA DNS record only allowing that one issuer.
* Go through the EV SSL process with your preferred issuer. Now modify your CAA DNS record to add an EV policy. This should make it very difficult for an attacker to get a cert issued during a BGP hijack.
* DNSSEC? Make sure to choose an SSL issuer that will correctly test DNSSEC?
1. The targeted domain would need to make use of both DNSSEC and CAA in the first place. I doubt that's true for more than a tenth of one percent of all domains out there.
2. The attackers would have to only target DNS resolution, and not the IP ranges hosting the targeted domain itself.*
3. Every single CA out there would have to follow the Baseline Requirements to the letter and fail closed for DNSSEC-enabled domains.†
I'm not sure if that makes for a good argument in favour of wading into the cesspit of DNSSEC.
* By targeting the IP ranges the site is hosted at, rather than the authoritative DNS, an attacker would be able to complete a "Agreed-Upon Change to Website" challenge as defined in the Baseline Requirements (http-01 in ACME). There's work being done to somewhat mitigate this by extending CAA to support whitelisting domain validation methods.
† From what I recall, when researchers looked into this this shortly after CAA became mandatory for CAs, a number of CAs were found to have issues with DNSSEC enforcement. Additionally, some argued the language in the Baseline Requirements regarding CAA and DNSSEC was quite ambiguous.
"All issuances under example.com shall first be approved by telephone call to our security office on 1-234-567-8900, and the certificate issued shall have a notBefore timestamp no earlier than 24 hours after an SCT included in the certificate"
This requires no new technology that I can see. If CAA and DNSSEC work together as intended (which I admit is a big "If" but they can and should) the Bad Guys now need to mess with the phone system for approval, then wait past the MMD and hope you aren't watching for their shenanigans. Or break into a CA and issue for themselves. That's a much higher bar, albeit at great cost.
Merely hijacking the authoritative DNS for a domain does not defeat DNSSEC, which chains from the root to TLDs to registered domains. In other words, and assuming all CAs are perfect w.r.t DNSSEC, you cannot spoof a "No CAA record here" response for a DNSSEC-enabled domain merely by hijacking the authoritative DNS or a resolver.
I also had been referring more to CAA than DNSSEC. It is a premium feature at certain registrars such as GoDaddy, which hinders adoption.
Today, if I got a basic cert for your domain by temporarily hijacking DNS, I can later use it to MITM you even without DNS poisoning/takeover.
I thought HPKP is TOFU, not (necessarily?) preloaded? Meaning you don't need to control the client for the client to be able to take advantage of it?
* Why would HSTS help in this case? While HSTS is active, does it prevent clicking through the warning (which was done here)?
* How would a CAA record help against cert issuance in this case? Is it only helping against compromise of the authoritative during the remaining TTL of the record in recursives AND if the CAA record points to something that doesn't have on-demand DV like Lets Encrypt?
Yes, HSTS (if preloaded or cached by the browser) prevents clicking through the warning, although there's a secret code you can type in chrome? to get around it still.
> * CAA record
Yeah, a CAA record wouldn't help. Presumably the CA in question is going to want to get that record freshly, and while the DNS is hijacked, they can return whatever they like. DNSSEC could conceivably help, but that's a pretty big can of worms.
CAA record would only help in remaining TTL. Once expired, then it doesn't matter.
So yeah, these seem like decent steps to help protect but certainly not going to 100% prevent an attack like this one.
Actually it would have! Chrome and possible other browsers do not allow clicking throw certificate validation issues on sites with HSTS. For example, try to get to https://badssl.finn.io in Chrome.
Makes sense because it keeps HSTS from the lockout scenario that makes HPKP so scary.
There is no strong defense against this as a website. With an app the solution would be certificate pinning. You could try HPKP but that comes with a host of issues and I think it is being deprecated.
I think unless a TLD registrar gets hijacked that mitigates the attack on your own DNS after the NS TTL
Here though, people using area53 for DNS probably can't move away from it as they are stuck on amazon.
curl -I https://www.myetherwallet.com/
strict-transport-security: max-age=63072000; includeSubdomains; preload
But MEW doesn't have HSTS? I would never use it personally on a public Wifi, but many people will for sure and they have no idea they'd be MITM'd.
Even without HSTS a bad actor would have to either trick a user to install a root cert or trick a certificate authority to generate a cert for the domain. Both of these are possible and have happened in the past, but they're also are a requirement for the attack you mention that you seemed to have completely forgotten about.
Are you thinking of HPKP?
Now I need to re-read the whole thread with this context. Thanks for the correction!
It may be worth also suggesting HPKP here. That would be effective for many customers.
> * DNSSEC? Make sure to choose an SSL issuer that will correctly test DNSSEC?
This basically means you can't use Route53, which is a deal-breaker for a lot of people running services.
was very easy to setup on GCP too
Then again, DNSSEC is useless against a BGP hijack where the nameservers for the domain are replaced with malicious ones.
When I say "a lot of people running services", I don't mean me. I mean a lot of people I know and associate with. A lot of them have grown to rely on close integration between DNS and all their other infrastructure services. That CF covers them technically isn't helpful - they expected it all under one roof and they need to not spend cycles on thinking about something marginal to them like DNS.
One of the biggest selling-points of AWS is that it puts all your services in one spot. It limits orchestration work and makes life simpler. Asking people to leave that for security improvements may be necessary, but it's not a small ask.
Warning: this is only to be used by experts. Otherwise, your site is going to become permanently/long-term inaccessible by the browser if you screw up just once.
If any certs were issued for hijacked domains (which as far as I've ready was only one, not using LetsEncrypt), it's a pretty glaring failure on the issuer, assuming they used "DNS Validation"
Any given production validation right now may come from one of two of our datacenter locations, but not both.
You may see multiple validation requests if you use our staging servers, but that's just an early version of multi perspective validation which doesn't work well enough to promote to production. There are some performance issues, and the external validation points are all on AWS, which uses the same autonomous system (AS) across datacenters. In order to effectively defend against BGP attacks we're probably going to have to deploy validation servers on 3+ different ASes so that our network perspectives are sufficiently diverse.
If multi perspective validation is effective and nothing is done to significantly improve BGP security (we're not holding our breath) then I expect multi perspective validation to be a requirement for all CAs down the line.
AWS does have some network diversity in different regions; they apparently do not operate their own backbone to interconnect the different AWS regions.
(And for all that Hurricane Electric seems to have not been doing a great job of filtering BGP announcements from peers, they do seem to have pretty aggressive pricing on colo space in their Fremont data center where they can provide a full BGP feed.)
Just give up on BGP. Strongly suggest people use DNSSEC. For TLDs that don't support DNSSEC, require a public key issued to the registrar. You (the Certificate Authority) can get the public key from [R]WHOIS, IRIS, RDAP, whatever method you like, directly from the registrar. This is standard practice using the thin WHOIS data model, where .com and .net require domain registrars to maintain their own customers' data. Other TLDs simply run thick WHOIS servers that store all the data for their domains.
Registrars are already required to pass up Delegation Signer records to a TLD to support DNSSEC. Passing on a similar record to a Certificate Authority would be practically the exact same thing. So we know the registrars can support it, and we know it would ensure that people would only be able to generate certificates for those domains that they actually own (and not "whomever can control the IP space currently").
There is a major chicken-and-egg/game-theoretical problem though: any browser that does that today will piss off/irritate its users, forcing them to use other browsers or older versions of the same browser, as DNSSEC is not widely deployed on the corporate side. And until most/all browsers do something major to make the current DNS security crisis obvious to large numbers of users, most companies won't care enough to deploy DNSSEC.
At least it will be interesting to see whether, and how, this eventually gets solved.
 Certain abysmal DNSSEC cryptographic choices, such as 512-1024-bit RSA, should also be addressed.
This seems analogous to the problem browsers faced with Flash. Perhaps they can leverage the same incremental approach here.
1) Validate DNSSEC. If present and valid, the HTTPS "green lock icon" gets a bonus glow.
2) 6 months later, not having a DNSSEC response gives a little red X badge on the "green lock icon".
3) 6 months later, not having a DNSSEC response graduates to a little ignorable info/warning box near the location bar.
4) 12 months later, you have to click through a big scary warning to access the site.
Essentially, start by providing a carrot and then introduce a progressively larger stick. Communicate the whole plan up front so that large organizations can get the ball rolling.
I think this is absolutely unreasonable and damaging to me as a small player. I don't want to give my registrars more power to mess with me, they already refused to support DNSSEC on my domain because I am not using their hosting service, I don't want them to be responsible if I can get certificates of not. DNSSEC is also way too hard to set up (especially if, for example, I use OVH's name servers and another company as registrar), we need DNSSEC equivalent of LetsEncrypt's certbot for it to be usable.
The root servers and TLD are not supposed to be the authoritative source of trust for your domain. That is the registrar's job. That is the registrar's only job: control my domain, and don't let anyone fuck with it. Hence, they should be the ones to keep a record that you can control to tell people where trust should lie. If you don't like your registrar, you can transfer your domain to a different one.
The purpose of DNS is to be a phone book. When you call a number from the phone book, the person you are calling might not be who you expect, even if you got the number from a very trustworthy source. Perhaps a spy is sitting on the other end of the phone. After you connect to the phone number, you should authenticate the other end.
Why not put the authentication information in the phone book? Because you got the phone book from one place. The spy could have compromised the phone book, and now you have no way to know if your authentication is real. It is a better idea to have one phone book for calls, and one separate authentication book that you get from a separate source.
DNSSEC's security depends on one child publishing one key to one parent. If you attack that one factor successfully, the security is broken, and there are multiple vectors to attack. There is no defense in depth. For a highly motivated state actor, this is not difficult to circumvent. The more you lean on DNSSEC, the more fragile the entire internet's security becomes. A better method is to decentralize and distribute trust into multiple organizations and processes, so that it would be very difficult to compromise an entire internet system.
I haven't mentioned the many fundamental problems with DNSSEC rollout and use because I think those are mainly a problem of lack of incentives, and are addressable. Go ahead and use DNSSEC if you want. Just don't tie a rope around your neck by making all internet security dependent on it.
Seems like a reasonable basis for a pull request.
The server-side part of DNS validation takes about a second. The delay is all about clients waiting for their authoritative DNS servers to update. If you use a fast DNS provider, there's no reason to wait longer than necessary.
> If any certs were issued for hijacked domains (which as far as I've ready was only one, not using LetsEncrypt), it's a pretty glaring failure on the issuer, assuming they used "DNS Validation"
It wouldn't be a compliance failure, though. CAs are not required to be invulnerable to BGP hijacking attacks.
The only thing you cannot do is fake out DNSSEC. If you use a TLD which supports DNSSEC, you can make sure records have to be signed with your key. If fake DNS records aren't signed with your key, and the CA uses a validating stub resolver, and the CA is checking for CAA records, they will reject the attempt to create the cert. In theory.
Here's the thing. The CAs know about these flaws and are still not providing more secure ways to prevent these attacks. How could it be more secure? The domain registrar could accept a public key from you at the time of purchase. At that point, nobody should ever be allowed to generate a cert anywhere without you signing off on it with your key. Is this some magically impossible technical challenge which mere mortals can't comprehend? Hell no. They literally just need to write an ASCII file in a database next to your domain name. But we aren't demanding it of them, so they aren't doing it. So attacks like this leave everyone vulnerable, because nobody cares enough to fix it.
If the registrar signed a message that had your key in it, they could re-sign it with a replacement key. So now you can 1) verify who originally assigned the domain, 2) record the public key, and 3) see a verifiable history of changes as long as the old history is included in successive signing. This could be used as part of a public record ala Certificate Transparency, or a blockchain-style system. If the attacker spoofs BGP and SE's your registrar, you (or whomever) can see if anyone creates a new key.
Surely they would have realised they could make the whole thing a lot more profitable if any SSL provider was impacted.
In turn, if your own DNS wasn't configured to use a DNS server with a poisoned fraudulent address, a web server based verification landed on the valid server, not the attackers.
Not that there's an easy way for LE to validate identity automatically - governments need to do a better job of providing electronic/smart identification, in which case a physical chip ID serves as a second factor (alongside DNS ownership) for automatic EV certs - but the weaknesses of only having DNS ownership are pretty much why EV certs exist.
I'm sure that there were ops teams working on it before then. The people involved in actually fixing the problem wouldn't have been posting to public mailing lists.
Surely, but their coworkers should have been.
Inflammatory/clickbait headlines do not make the internet a better place.
OR better yet I wait for you to log into an unsecured site like neopets.com or something and then pair that unencrypted password wait the fact that I saw you request the domain for a certain bank and if your password is the same (which it is for most people) then that can also get me in.
We need a new more secure system to replace DNS.
What you're describing is called a Downgrade attack, and it can be detected. The newer the software at both ends, the better (more capable) the detection.
In TLS 1.3 both sides need to have experienced exactly the same conversation right up until the encryption switches on, or else encryption fails and they abort. If you sneak in say a message saying "No, do crappy old crypto" to the client that was never actually sent by the server, the two conversations won't match and the connect fails. If you snuck in a message to the server saying "I can only do crappy old crypto" that was never really sent by the client, again, no match, no connection.
In earlier versions of TLS, you can't fake the version number or tweak the ciphersuites or again the encryption fails and no connection is made.
Only downgrading to SSL 3.0 or lower gets you somewhere, and no modern client software will allow such a downgrade.
Sounds like xenophobic bullshit.
For instance, I host my personal site on both IPFS and normal web traffic.
If myetherwallet.com had been DNSSEC signed then users who validated the signature chain would have not been redirected to the fake site. But it's not DNSSEC signed.
Note that "the auth servers hosting myetherwallet.com" aren't some random IP addresses in Tallinn, Estonia. It's Route53!
I get what you're saying with your counterfactual, that DNSSEC "breaks the exploit", requiring the attackers to use a slightly different exploit. But who cares? The slightly different exploit has the same predicates.
That's what's so funny about the narrative that DNSSEC has some role to play in today's attack. It would almost make sense if the narrative was "we could use DANE to get rid of all CAs and then it wouldn't matter if you could trick a DV validator". But, no, people are talking about how DNSSEC would help LetsEncrypt, in the event of a global BGP hijacking. Admit it! That's funny.
I think he's saying: let's say the correct IP address for example.com is 192.0.2.80. Instead of hijacking the prefix containing example.com's nameservers, an attacker could just hijack 192.0.2.0/24 and immediately get a DV cert. Within seconds they would be up and running and DNSSEC wouldn't have done a thing to prevent it.
I posted in response to pfg's comment above a mechanism that high value targets could choose, which is modelled on how Facebook behave today but (since we're proving a point here) more extreme. Make a deal with a CA, forbid all other CAs from issuing.
The other thing about Let's Encrypt is that they wouldn't be a good target for such an attacker because they are seeing the world from more than one place. You specify particularly a global BGP hijack, but those are hard, which is why this wasn't global. Tricking just, say, the original San Francisco office of Let's Encrypt doesn't get the job done.
Your second link is a reference to what is now called DANE. There is an alternate universe in which DANE helps this problem. In that universe, there are no CAs anymore (otherwise, DANE is effectively just another CA, and attackers will just choose whichever CA allows them to execute their attack).
But DANE is already dead on arrival. Both Mozilla and Chrome flirted with DANE support a few years ago, and then withdrew it. Adam Langley wrote a post on why DANE support turned out to be untenable.
There's another big reason why you shouldn't be excited for DANE deployment, which is that it is essentially a TLS key escrow system. The most important TLDs in the world are controlled by world governments with massive SIGINT infrastructure. DANE turns those TLDs into the new Web PKI roots.
There is another, even less likely, universe where DANE works. Here, every cert needs to be validated by both DANE and a CA.
Security wise, this would be an improvement over just CAs. However, the large governments would still be able to MitM TLDs in their control (just patriot act some CA).
This is where I point out that the current CA system is also controlled by those who control the TLD, because domain validation depends on the DNS system. But that is an old argument.
There is some hope for the CA system through the use of certificate transparency logs. Notably, this system moves away from trusting the DNS system. Sadly, it is mostly a detection-after-the-fact system, but there is hope.
(The reason this isn't an application header like HSTS is that DANE advocates want to bake this into TLS itself, so that it works without needing new application features in every single TLS-using application)
The big problem Chrome had with DANE was that they couldn't (and presumably still can't) assume reliable DNSSEC/DANE record lookups. If you can't fail closed with DANE, then all DANE really is is another CA; attackers can "strip" DANE from connections, trivially, and be exactly where they are today. Meanwhile, end-users pay the price in latency and reduced performance for a cosmetic security improvement that most people don't care about.
At this point in this attack, we are not sure of which domains have been hit. With a BGP attack, the specific IPs would've been quite public.
Between 4:05 AM PDT and 5:56 AM PDT, some customers may have experienced elevated errors resolving DNS records hosted on Route 53 using DNS resolvers 18.104.22.168 / 22.214.171.124. This issue was caused by a problem with a third-party Internet provider. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.
You know that if you do something nefarious, or if someone at your downstream does something nefarious, your upstream will identify it and block your traffic, or the part of it that they identify to be the issue.
Thus as long as you need to appear on the internet, you do your best to play nice, otherwise your traffic gets blocked, and you also do your part to identify and block traffic when something goes bad.
> They re-routed DNS traffic using a man in the middle attack using a server at Equinix in Chicago.
AS7007 incident demonstrated this being a bad idea in the nineties.
Believe it. HE has many, many netiron-based routers in their network and many, many ASNs as transit customers. the hardware doesn't have the capacity to implement complete filtering for everyone.
between hardware-constrained equipment being replaced and the tireless work Job Snijders (& others) are doing with route security, these kinds of episodes will become far more difficult and occur much, much less.
Sane networks register prefixes.
Other sane networks do not accept prefixes that are not registered to parties announcing them.
If your network does not register prefixes, you need to fire them and move to someone else. If your network does not accept only registered prefixes, you need to fire them and move somewhere else.
Not registering prefixes/filtering based on registrations is having sex without condoms with a toothless hooker behind a dumpster who charges $5 for a full service.
If so then companies that intentionally advertise routes that are not theirs to advertise would lose their peering agreements with others because other companies would no longer want to peer with them.
Was troubleshooting this for the two hours, until I started reading reports of the BGP leak. Not in networking, so don't fully understand how it works.
I'd just like to know how to troubleshoot this in the future, and check for leaks, if any. Are there any other online tools I could use? Obviously don't have an edge router or anything like that.
Checkout this video analysis from the team on the hijack: https://youtu.be/YXm4GJMUlP0
I have other domains using Route53 (and hosted at AWS, just like this one).. that weren't affected AFAICT.
That's a very accurate time. What system do you use to allow sampling at under 1 second intervals? My nagios boxes poll every minute, so an outage could be 2 seconds, or nearly 2 minutes, and nagios would report the downtime as 1 minute.
I get very suspicious when people quote things accurate to 1 part in 1000
What does this sentence mean? Sorry if I'm being slow. I thought the whole point of certificates is that you can't generate a legitimate one for a domain you don't control, so messing with name resolution wouldn't affect it.
But they did control it. The domain's name servers were pointed to route53 ips, which were controlled by the attackers. If they setup a dns server, they can point those entries to any server they want. They certainly could have gotten a dv ssl certificate for any of the domains affected.
Which is a shame. They could have prevented users clicking through warnings by implementing HTTP Strict Transport Security.
So.... TLS certs mean jack squat if you can pull off a BGP+DNS attack. You might want to start pinning certs for your bank's website. (but not using HPKP, Google is removing it from Chrome)
The client should be getting the list of authorized CAs for the domain from DNS on first connection, and/or from inside the first cert, with expiry dates. It should require that if there is a new CA, that its authorization be signed by a previous CA or cert. The client needs to verify the entire chain of authorized changes throughout history, rather than just believe any cert from any CA at any time. And there should probably be a certificate transparency pooled service which the client checks the first time they see a new chain or new root of a chain (or something, i'm making this up as I go). In the current case the domain owner may eventually figure out something's up, but the client may not, and changing BGP/revoking certs/etc are ineffective when the attack is already in play.
This is the only time you will ever see me say this, but we kind of need Blockchain here.
Even if the domain does, if either they or a CA screw anything up, they are vulnerable. The client will accept any cert signed by any CA. One rogue cert screws the security.
Compare this to if the client was verifying it using a blockchain. The blockchain provides a record that the client can verify, not only from multiple peers that share the same records, but at the sources of the original records, to verify a CA was authorized, and to verify a specific domain owner created a cert. This is a much higher barrier to attack than what CAA provides. Even if this verification were optional, it would be a much better authenticity guarantee than what clients get today.
The other thing a blockchain would provide is protection against state actors. If the FBI barges into Verisign waving a FISA warrant, they could possibly force Verisign to generate valid certs outside of the CT or CAA process. A blockchain could show the client that a cert it received was never in the blockchain. Comparing the blockchain to CT could further emphasize rogue certs.
I count significantly less than 100 organisations, I started with the CCADB (the database shared by Mozilla and Microsoft) for all intermediates, I cut those that aren't part of the Mozilla root programme, and then I asked for the "CA Owner" field, which avoids thinking a single owner is really several distinct entities when it isn't.
I'm the GM for Security Products at GoDaddy, responsible for the GoDaddy CA. I have checked with the team and do not see any certificates issued to: http://myetherwallet.com/ (including DV).
If someone has an image of what was seen, please send it to me at email@example.com so that we can investigate further.
That’s hardly “anyone” – it requires non-trivial resources and, thanks to certificate transparency, is going to be noticed and revoked relatively quickly. That further lowers the likelihood that someone capable of the attack will burn it for a limited window of access.
On top of this, many high profile hacks in recent years involve attacking the protocols used by banks to transfer funds. Many BGP attacks in the past have attacked the networks of major payment processors as well as banks. Again, you don't need two hours, or even one hour, to pull off this attack. Give me 10 minutes and a good connection.
It is "anyone" because literally anyone can use literally any CA to create the certificate, after they begin the attack. Who has the resources to do this attack? Anyone who can read a book on BGP and get on a backbone with the right provider. At least 13 high profile BGP attacks have happened in the past decade and a half. There's 328 "possible" BGP hijacks listed on bgpstream. https://www.google.com/search?q="Possible+BGP+hijack"+site%3...
Is Joe Schmoe script kiddie going to be doing many BGP attacks? No. But that's not the attacker I'm scared of. I mean, even the current attacker burned their capability to collect a fake currency. Obviously, there is not a high bar to who will use this access once they get it.
Again, I'm not saying that this isn't a big deal but that you're really downplaying the level of effort required for the worst-case scenarios. Besides the average script kiddie not being likely to compromise an ISP to send the malicious announcements, your online banking scenario would only work for the people actively logging in during those two hours to banks which don't use IP fixing, out of band confirmation or other precautions to actually transfer money (every single financial institution I use has a period measured in days with human-on-phone verification to setup a new outbound transfer target); whose security staff don't check certificate transparency logs; and you'd have to develop the code to collect credentials and run the transfer for each bank, taking care to avoid triggering key-pinning and other high visibility errors.
Malware is similar: yes, it'd suck if you could get a valid HTTPS cert for someone's automatic update service but these days those certificates are pinned and most system use signed updates which would require a separate exploit to avoid.
One thing to remember is that this is coming after a decade of everyone responsible in the tech industry trying to protect against malicious state actors. This attack is what happens all the time to people in countries with repressive governments.
In a case like this, the attackers had sufficient control to pass those kinds of checks - although people are saying they didn't do that, and just relied on enough users clicking through the certificate warnings.
Step two: Obtain a certificate from Let's Encrypt using website validation.
Step three: Proxy traffic through a proxy you provide that SSL cert for and capture anything you like. In the event that a website legitimately has a higher-class Extended Validation cert or other such thing, hope users don't notice the downgrade from Extended Validation correct SSL cert to a merely correct SSL cert, which is a pretty solid hope.
Certs don't have any sort of overriding or superseding property. A given cert and its chain of signatures is either accepted because you trust the signers, or it isn't; at the time you are making that decision, you don't have access to know whether any other certs have been issued since then or anything.
One thing that comes to mind is that browsers really ought to scream if they see a domain that was previously Extendedly Verified drop down to a Let's Encrypt-level cert. Though how much good this would do in practice is hard to tell... "Hmmm, what's this about the SSL cert being less good? It still has one, right? Let's just click through this... hmm... looks like the web site I expected... must just be the computer being weird enters password"
For example, if you have a service running on multiple backed servers, you might want to have once certificate per server for all of your domains.
Some traceroutes captured during the incident. The results that show "Target unreachable" are the ones seeing the hijacked paths
For any BGP operators out there, you could automate your inbound/outbound BGP prefix filters using IRR/LIR databases, peeringdb.com, RADB etc. Tools like https://github.com/snar/bgpq3 can help with auto-generation. Even manual prefix lists will do, anything is better than nothing!
It would be good if operators could also use AS-SETs so that other operators can see what downstream ASNs should be seen via their peers (and which ones should not).
Also BGP RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) based ROA (Route Origin Authorisations) can also help to ensure that prefixes are announced by their true originator.
Most networks follow the Pareto rule - 20% of prefixes learnt via BGP (in some cases even less!) are the source/destination for 80% of their traffic flows. Some operators use an approach of writing explicit filters for those 20% of prefixes explicitly blocking them from all their BGP peers except the origin peer sessions.
None of these techniques are fool proof and we all need to play along to improve their impact. They cost nothing, only man hours, and we can all benefit. In metaphor - no encryption is unbreakable but we can try and make it unappealingly difficult.
The only reason why such attack was possible is because some of the providers did not filter announcements from hobos claiming to be able to advertise AWS space. That could have only happened if:
a) AWS did not register all their policy prefixes
b) providers did not apply filters on the transit announcements from those that announced AWS prefixes based on the policies registered by AWS.
This is a modern day "let residential IPs to send data directly to tcp/25 and not check".
 That statement excludes Google whose idea of filtering is to let me announce anything I want and build filters based on what I announce.
APIs will probably go directly to https://, and hopefully cert failures will cause the API to blow up with minimal harm.
If you want to visit my web site, and you need to type it in, you'll probably just put realms.org into the URL bar of your browser. Most secure websites, such as paypal.com, have something called HSTS https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security to force the browser to always hit the site with https, even if requested to it it http:
dana@araman:~$ curl -D - https://paypal.com 2> /dev/null |grep -i strict-transport
So even if going to paypal.com lands you on a blackhat server, the cert will still blow up, protecting you.
Slightly related: much to my annoyance, it seems that neither AWS ELB nor ALB support sending HSTS, which is a real bummer.
Most of our internal infrastructure handling GDPR-data would be fine with this incident, since we encoded mutual validation and trust into a lot of systems. Clients need to authenticate to be authorized, obviously, but clients also authenticate the server against company-internal secrets. This is done using a bunch of secret, self-signed CA-Chains or managed ssh/known_hosts files.
But that kind of system is quite impossible to implement without control over the server and the client-side. And if the client has to get the information from somewhere, you have a tradeoff - flexibility vs security. You can either change the source of trust in a client quickly, as an attacker, or you can provide a secure connection which can be changed with 6 years of planning as a service provider.
I didn't know that either one lets you set any kind of header - I've always set a passthrough on the upstream, so it's guaranteed no matter what the LB or routing framework is used.
curl -sI -H 'Host: myhost.mydomain.com' https://long-alb-descriptor.us-west-2.elb.amazonaws.com/ | grep Strict
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains; preload
This occasionally annoys people who have an idea like "I will firewall everything but whitelist Let's Encrypt" and then find out that while you're welcome to try to puzzle out some way to make this work, Let's Encrypt won't help you and when it breaks you get to keep both halves.
Keep in mind that crt.sh has a certain time lag between the time a certificate is issued and a certificate entry is inserted into the crt.sh database.
Interestingly this only seemed to be a problem with Google DNS, other large providers as well as smaller ones where not affected.
there's a route53 status update on their page that says basically that -- only affected google dns.
Is it worth keeping a record of the IP addresses for "your favorite websites"?
For example, with IP addresses saved, would this enable reaching the websites ven if DNS is not working?
How often do these "favorite websites" change IP addresses?
Are they all the same in that regard?
(The frequency with which they chaange IP addresses.)
Is it worth paying attention when one of them changes its IP address?
Is it worth noting where these addresses are thought to be located (e.g. the countries)?
What if several of "your favorite websites" each change their IP address on the same day, the same week or even the same month?
Is this worth noting?
Some IPs may stay stable for a long time, but virtually every change to them is going to be intended. And you can't tell easily which one want.
What if the request is always sent from the same location?
What if when the user moves location, e.g., from one country to another, she updates her stored IP addresses?
"And you can't tell easily which one want."
Personal experience as a user is that when it is an "intended" change, the previous IP address no longer hosts the content.
Personal experience is that this is surprisingly rare.
In the case of the more common load balancing, the user who may store several IP addresses for the website, all of which continue to serve the content. She can choose which of those she prefers.
Personal experience is that this works very well.
If this was a BGP hijack, why did the hijackers target the IP addresses of DNS servers, rather than the target IP addresses of the websites?
If they had targeted the IP addresses of the websites, then what would be the possible mitigations, if any?
Then you may get the same IP.
> What if when the user moves location, e.g., from one country to another, she updates her stored IP addresses?
It doesn't have to be a different country. Different ISPs with different peering may get different results. Moving between your home wifi and you phone tethering may get different results. So depending on your usage style, it's between "change multiple times a day" and "no change".
> Personal experience as a user is that when it is an "intended" change, the previous IP address no longer hosts the content.
In some cases I'm sure it's true. In others, it isn't. Basically it's not a reliable indicator.
> If this was a BGP hijack, why did the hijackers target the IP addresses of DNS servers, rather than the target IP addresses of the websites?
Haven't seen the site's announced block, but it's possible that it's announced as /24 block. This attack was possible because Amazon announced /23 and the attacker could announce something more specific.
For me, for each ISP, it's been "no change". Can only relate personal experience.
> That BGP hijack allowed the hacker to redirect the miners’ computers to a malicious server controlled by the hijacker.
Also, the entire blockchain ecosystem is very susceptible to BGP hijacks 
You register an AS and get a dedicated server  at at an internet exchange point (IXP) and install a BGP router on it. Your router advertises a route to the original route53 IP, with a shorter AS path to the target IP than the route advertised by the “real” Amazon router. You peer your router with at least one provider who peers with the real route53 servers (they accept your route advertisements).
Then you redirect incoming traffic on port 53 to a mitm dns proxy, where you either do nothing or return an IP address you control, which could be anywhere.
At the IP address you control, you run a transparent HTTP proxy that signs HTTPS responses with the valid DNS cert you obtained by spoofing MX replies in the dns proxy. You then either do nothing, or modify the page to return arbitrary content (like rewriting bitcoin addresses).
 or you get a VPS at a provider willing to advertise BGP routes on your behalf without validating them
Firstly, I believe BGP hijacking works by announcing a more specific prefix rather than path-length. That is to get to 126.96.36.199 A 188.8.131.52/16 route takes precedence over a 184.108.40.206/8 route.
Secondly, this attack did not obtain a valid cert. They probably could have using spoofing (either of MX or just of A records and using lets-encrypt), but they did not.
This might be because the BGP hijack did not affect any CA, or it might just have been laziness.
Really the hardest part of the attack, and what makes it so infrequent, is the social engineering aspect of registering the AS and getting an influential peer to accept your advertisements. To really cover your tracks you would need fake identities, fake businesses, fake bank accounts...
BGP Path to Target IP prefix = ordered list of autonomous systems to reach target IP prefix
The point of BGP is to find the shortest AS path to an IP. Each AS has at least one router, and each router has at least one other AS peer. A router will forward the packet as far as it can given the peers it knows, until the AS list is length 0, at which point the controlling AS routes traffic to its destination.
Basically, a top level Internet shard. You need to become a Real ISP to pull off this attack.
Then you need to find other ASes to peer with you of course.
Also note that technically all you need is the ability to advertise routes. That could be mutually exclusive from AS status if your server provider is willing to advertise routes from their AS on your behalf (like vultr does, I think). In that case the provider is acting irresponsibly and should validate the routes.
> That is to get to 220.127.116.11 A 18.104.22.168/16 route takes precedence over a 22.214.171.124/32 route.
I think you mean:
> That is to get to 126.96.36.199 A 188.8.131.52/16 route takes precedence over a 184.108.40.206/8 route.
a /32 is _more_ specific.
If they did, this is what would have happened (this ignores specific implementations which may make certain parts of this impossible which in turn would completely block this kind of attack):
1. Attackers would have noticed that either AWS does not register their prefixes or some of the prefixes were not registered or their registered policies did not match the views of AWS from the location that was to be attacked.
2. Attackers identified transit networks that did not enforce AWS registered policies for routes advertised by AWS as well as their peers that had the same flaw.
3. Attackers obtained credentials to the router(s) and monitoring/provisioning systems used by the transit networks that would have been attacked.
4. After obtaining access to the (3) and disabling monitoring/provisioning/version control systems(!)/automated backups/verification(!) the attackers brought up a GRE-type tunnel to some destination that the attackers controlled.
5. Attackers shimmed a static route for the address space that the attackers needed to attack pointing it to the local side of the GRE-type tunnel thereby sending the traffic to the servers controlled by the attackers.
6. Using a few other techniques ( most likely another GRE-type tunnel ), the attackers created a way for MITM traffic to get back to the attacked router.
7. Attackers added the route that was being MITM into IGP protocol of the router they got credentials to. Attackers adjusted outbound filters between this router and other routers from (2) to allow this route to be announced to the routers in (2).
8. Networks in (2) would not filter AWS announcement, so anyone who would be single-homed to networks in (2) would be no wiser that their traffic never reached the affected prefix. Those that receive transit from (2) via BGP and do not do a full policy based prefix filtering would be affected if those networks did not engage in hot potato-type routing.
All in all, it is extremely unlikely that a full global BGP hijack happened.
All of this needed to be done without configuration changes being picked up or overridden by management systems which is extremely unlikely on non-hobo ran networks identified in (2)
As far as I know, most of ASNs only filter routes coming from their direct customers (if even that and even in that case they are likely to accept those prefixes from their own peers), so once route gets into the tier 1 ISPs routing tables, it's going to be propagated pretty much everywhere.
They should also be constantly monitoring views of AWS network from other BGP speaking networks, allowing them to immediately detect such poisoning. If other important BGP speaking network does not want to provide them the view, they can go to a single-homed with BGP customer of such network and buy the view.
Maybe Route53 does use individual IP addresses for the nameservers of registered domains? Or at least are using them hihgly segmented? I guess this would help to handle the amount of traffic quite a bit if so. Otherwise it seems inplausible that the mentioned site is the only target or that there was just a few targets because that should be easier to pull off.
On the other hand i am not sure if these targets might share IP addresses with a large pool of websites and handling "only" authoritative DNS requests for them (and any other that happens to have the same IP addresses setup as nameserver) would be alot easier. How does Route53 handle delegation exactly? Would i have to handle all NS requests that happens to resolve to Route53 or just some specific set of domains? Only handling these delegation related NS requests might reduce the amount of traffic alot in any case. But maybe they setup glue records for registered domains. In this case the amount of traffic they would have to handle would be even larger and i guess disrupt quite alot of DNS clients because they would not be able to sign the zone properly.
I also wonder why they were not able to issue a new valid certificate. This appears to be very easy even without any interruption at this stage. Especially this feels like it was only done in order to direct the attention away.
Hopefully a more detailed writeup appears because this seems rather interesting.
(Somehow) A BGP route was advertised and accepted for the IP range for amazons route53 - so that some / many DNS requests hit a fake server instead of the real amazon one. The only dns requests that changed seem to be for a bitcoin site, and they were redirected to a site that seems to have then grabbed their passwords and then emptied their wallets on the real site.
Mitigation strategies that come to mind
- certificate pinning (where I have my browser only accept certificates that I have approved, not just are signed by a CA (this has not really taken off)
- Certificate warning - surely browsers should shout of a certificate that was valid for domain X changes today? (suffers similar problems to pinning)
- BGP route acceptance. We are out of my comfort area now, but this is surely where the real solution lies - why did people accept a BGP chnage to redirect route53 to russia? Can routes be advertised with signing ?
What can be done is filtering the routes you receive from peers. Any ISP that knows what they're doing will coordinate ahead of time with their customers which routes the customer will be advertising, and whether the customer really owns that IP space. Then the ISP sets up rules on their routers to only allow those specific networks to be advertised by you, and drop all other advertisements you might send. This can be done manually via a Letter of Authorization, or by querying some central registry like http://www.radb.net/. But clearly it can be done incorrectly or not at all, and that opens the door for route hijacks like this one.
BGP is an old, old protocol in tech terms. The RFC for the current version dates from the 1990's. The go-to textbook reference for it (Sam Halabi's Internet Routing Architectures) was published in the year 2000 and is still considered up to date. It's really not equipped at all for the sophisticated threats seen on the modern internet.
Why? If the new cert is valid, why sound any alarms?
Should my browser warn me?
I don't know. the chances are high that 99% of people will click OK and 99% of the 1% left will look at it and think "how do i verify this?"
That is probably the reason browsers don't bother with pinning and the rest - there is simply no chain of trust i as an individual can possibly use to verify a fraction of the sites i visit.
but still ... if I pay my landlord every week in cash and one day someone else turns up and says "hi i am your landlord, pay me" I have visual signals to warn me of a possible problem.
The signals are there - my browser could fingerprint the servers, the headers, the response times, a lot could be done. But then most days my browser would act like Donald Sutherland and point at people and say "they have been replaced" and i would have no means to tell.
we really have become reliant on one piece of technology haven't we.
You realize this stuff can change by the minute, nay, second?
> but still ... if I pay my landlord every week in cash and one day someone else turns up and says "hi i am your landlord, pay me" I have visual signals to warn me of a possible problem.
No, it's more like you walk into your landlord's office and there is a new secretary. Sure, usually there won't be, but it's not unheard of for companies to get new secretaries.
> I visit my bank site and my browser gets a certificate for barclaysbank Ltd, to expire in 12 months. Tomorrow i visit the same site and get a different certificate, or from a different CA.
> Should my browser warn me?
If the new cert is valid, and there are no CAA records (which, admittedly a dns hijack would make worthless), then why should the browser warn you? Everything is valid, what's wrong?
What you should be asking yourself is why we don't use mutual authentication for banks. The answer is banks think we're all idiots and couldn't handle it.
e.g. if Amazon was announcing 220.127.116.11/21, that would cover all the /24s that were announced in the hijack. Not sure what Amazon actually announces, this is all just examples.
Say I'm trying to get to 18.104.22.168, for example. If I have two routes, one advertising 22.214.171.124/21 and another advertising 126.96.36.199/24, the router will forward the traffic to the next-hop advertising the /24, all else being equal.
So if you have the ability to advertise routes over BGP to the internet, you advertise a more specific route than what someone else is already advertising, and your peer has no filtering in place with regard to what they're accepting from you, you can potentially hijack IP space like this.
ETA: Anycast DNS generally advertises the exact same prefix to multiple peers. That way, the best path to that IP will be dependent on where your traffic is coming from, and will hopefully come in over the closest peering to you.