Really goes to show that engg != business and unless you have a firm business model and growth, an amazing engg team can only get you so far.
I know I'm just stating the obvious, but just putting it out there!
Vespa looks super interesting (more so since I'm in a company that provides ecommerce search APIs as a product) and I'm sure I'll play with it more. Thanks Yahoo! :)
"Over the decades Yahoo! has contributed substantially to the greater good, publishing its own code as open source.
Arguably Yahoo!’s greatest legacy once it is a division of Verizon will be big data, after one of its engineers – Doug Cutting – wrote an open-source implementation of Google’s MapReduce that became Hadoop. What followed was an entire ecosystem of startups and projects crunching data at scale – Cloudera, Hortonworks, MapR to name three in a market some calculate will be worth $50bn by 2020."
Generally when you disclose something (like the fact that you run the open source process at Yahoo) that's a disclosure, rather a disclaimer.
A disclaimer might be considered the opposite "I don't run the open source process at Yahoo, but...", or, more commonly, "IANAL".
Very optimistic calculation...
Hopefully Verizon's open source legacy will become even bigger and make it easier for these kinds of innovations to happen.
We've had some success a few cities over in Verizon Labs...
Especially so after Yahoo conceded Search.
So one side wants to pour money into getting technical leverage. The other side largely just wanted more effective ways of publishing and monetizing content.
It doesn't really matter which side was right, only that they were at times pulling in wildly different directions in terms of what they believed it was important to invest in.
Somehow, over time, this message was lost, and it was no longer ok to be #2 or #3 in some verticals (like search), and having very healthy profit margins wasn't enough either. The Microsoft search deal was a bad deal, poorly executed, as well: Microsoft couldn't meet the monetization and performance requirements from the start (Microsoft paid out of pocket for a while for this), y! lost control of an important product, and the staffing reductions to search that were supposed to be enabled never came.
Put another way should your purpose be something customer focused?
And/or what do you propose that fits what Yahoo! did (or should have been doing) at any point in its life? Alternatively, provide a clear mission statement than encompasses what any large company with lots of products does -- GE, IBM, Google, etc.
And outside of investment in Alibaba, their involvement in online shopping was marginal. In fact, Yahoo's premium services was always marginal across the board - I spent years trying to push product teams to find services they could potentially charge for in Europe, and from what I can tell my replacements had no luck in that respect either.
Instead Yahoo actually divested a number of services in that respect. Yahoo! Personals was sold to Match.com, and while it may have been co-branded for a while, that's long since lapsed in most markets.
So either Yahoo dramatically failed to follow this up in any reasonable way, or the actual intent was a lot narrower. Or both.
But what does "be a part of" even mean? Have an ad on the page? Be recognised by the user as providing the service? Providing content? Provide the tech? It really says nothing. It doesn't say anything about the purpose either. Is it to sell more ads? To grow the brand? To drive people to premium services?
It's a non-statement.
To me it's a statement that's basically carte blanche for whatever management happens to want right now, but it's certainly not providing focus.
And while I would interpret it as directed towards media, I suspect it did nothing to e.g. clarify to the company whether Yahoo was a media company or a tech company. Maybe intentionally, because there were a lot of people in engineering when I was there who did not want to accept that what mattered to Yahoo was connecting eyeballs to content, and that.
It's a little hyperbolic. A realistic refinement would add family friendly and having a decent amount of marketing spend and/or user time spent.
> And outside of investment in Alibaba, their involvement in online shopping was marginal.
Yahoo! Shopping was a decent price comparison tool (and Kelkoo was an acquisition of the same in Europe), and Yahoo! Stores was enabling a lot of small businesses to sell online. Auctions was closed in 2007 (except in Japan), because it's hard to be the number 2 for auctions. Yahoo! Wallet was supposed to make it easier to buy things all over the web by storing your payment credentials in one (trusted) place. There was a person to person payment thing that I can't recall the name of.
> Yahoo! Personals was sold to Match.com
In 2010 -- way into the period where nobody knew what Yahoo! was trying to do.
> To me it's a statement that's basically carte blanche for whatever management happens to want right now, but it's certainly not providing focus.
Yahoo may have been focused on the directory initially, but at least by 1997 it was not a goal to be focused -- there was never one thing Yahoo did to focus around, other than the brand. Even the first archive.org capture from October 1996 has links to random things.
> And while I would interpret it as directed towards media, I suspect it did nothing to e.g. clarify to the company whether Yahoo was a media company or a tech company.
Does it matter if it is a media company or a tech company? The real answer is Yahoo is an eyeballs company. Premium services I guess were technology revenue, but services revenue was never expected to be a large portion of revenue for the company (although certainly it was for some verticals). Yahoo's tech stack enabled small teams to build vertical sites that competed with much larger teams. Yahoo's business stack enabled those small teams to sign large advertisers and content deals. Yahoo's network of sites enabled the small teams to start with lots of eyeballs, without huge marketing spends. Building compelling verticals gets the eyeballs to come back. Having a great internet search product that the eyeballs saw as a great internet search product would have really helped with keeping eyeballs.
Steve Jobs responding to a question about OpenDoc in 1997:
> You’ve got to start with the customer experience and work backwards to the technology.
If you build crappy tools don't be surprised when people don't find a lot of value in them.
a) the concept of 'tough love' is applicable
b) were engineers allowed and challenged to innovate? or did their work effort primarily consist of navigating red tape and beurocracy to the point that all creativity was crushed?
see also: dilbert.
It was also kind of clear that it went too far, that a more experienced hardware design and engineering team would have found (not a cheaper), but a more effective way to handle those same challenges.
What you mean to say is that the Juicero was overbuilt and underengineered. As the saying goes, "anyone can build a bridge, it takes an engineer to barely build it".
Nadella isn't making a particularly strong case for MS either with his seeming distaste for any product of theirs that isn't either mobile or cloud-based (like the ones where they actually have a monopoly to build off and no competition worth speaking of), which seems to arise from that 'chasing growth numbers' mindset.
(The first sentence was "Windows is a service and updates are a normal part of keeping it running smoothly.")
So she did exactly what Google paid her to do. Eliminate a competitor.
How dumb do you have to be to hire a CEO from high in the ranks of your biggest rival?
What are you talking about? She's no longer employed and Yahoo has been sold off to Verizon...
Loss of direction is what stalls big tech companies 9 times out of 10. If you have 10 decision making actors on the board of directors, you have to effectively do 10 different things that each of that guys want, and all of them with compromises made to accommodate the 9 remaining other things that had to be done simultaneously.
My father frequently says that "a public company is a like a woman with 10 husbands, all trying to make love to her at the same time"