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That's a different issue from what the parent comment is talking about. He's not saying that IRV will be fully efficient, but that the switch itself will be Pareto efficient (which means that each entity is better off, or the same).

This actually isn't true, because major party candidates will be worse off, but I think he meant something like Hicks-Kaldor efficient, or positive sum.




Yes, I wasn't claiming that there is a perfect voting system. Just that IRV seems strictly better for pretty much all voters than FPTP.

I am also seeing several comments that try to take into account the preferences of the candidates themselves, or their parties. Why? Aren't we talking about efficiency from the perspective of the electorate? To the extent that the candidates are themselves members of the electorate, and can vote for themselves, shouldn't we ignore them in this analysis because their preferences are inherently biased?


> I am also seeing several comments that try to take into account the preferences of the candidates themselves, or their parties. Why? Aren't we talking about efficiency from the perspective of the electorate? To the extent that the candidates are themselves members of the electorate, and can vote for themselves, shouldn't we ignore them in this analysis because their preferences are inherently biased?

I fully agree with you. I was just being precise in my usage of Pareto efficiency, which includes all agents in a situation. Especially because it's used so often when Hicks-Kaldor improvement is meant (which means that there's the possibility for Pareto improvement after redistribution of gains).




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