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Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol (whispersystems.org)
633 points by mayneack on July 8, 2016 | hide | past | web | favorite | 295 comments



From what is written, I understand this to mean that users can select this feature for specific conversations. That not all messages are subject to this encryption.

I am not usually one for paranoia, but is anyone else becoming more suspicious about Facebooks motivations and involvement with gov? This feature is a massive boost for intelligence services dealing with unsophisticated actors. This reduces the haystack significantly, by users self flagging messages that may be incriminating. Multi-millions of FB messages must be sent every day, brute-forcing encryption on all of these is probably not possible. A small % marked as 'secret conversation'? Much easier.

Why doesn't FB just apply encryption on all messages? Surely they have the resources avail. Is it because this feature makes somebody else's job a lot easier? If my suspicions are correct, what sort of threats would this pick up. Are serious threats likely to use FB messages with 'secret conversation' flagged to co-ordinate actions?


Reasons from @alexstamos (CSO @ Facebook):

- FBM is multi-device, and we'd like to see E2E usability improve to support this. For now, pick one device and keys never leave it

- Secret conversations don't currently support popular features like searching message history, switching devices, voice/video, etc

- Hundreds of millions use Messenger from a web browser. No secure way to verify code or store keys without routing through mobile.

"We don't want to disrupt people's current experience."

Source: https://twitter.com/alexstamos


    Hundreds of millions use Messenger from a web browser.
    No secure way to verify code or store keys without 
    routing through mobile.
I wouldn't use the web version if they had not disabled Jabber access... and then I could use OTR.

This trend makes me very sad... IM networks are getting more centralized as ever. I don't feel thankful for this kind of development. End-to-end encryption should not be a feature of the service provider, but the client. The way this works with Whatsapp/FB/Google just requires us to believe that their proprietary client is actually doing what it promises. And for me that I don't have a smartphone they just don't even promise anything.

I just wish I could use XMPP or Matrix with my non-nerdy friends. There was this time Google seemed to not be evil with GTalk/XMPP, but then... The business cynicism that dominates this industry, allowing people to claim that they "connect people" at the same time that they put everyone in digital prisons, makes me really want to leave computing and go live in a cave.


Enabling interoperable chat to non-nerdy friends is basically Matrix's raison d'être. We're not there yet (see https://matrix.org/blog/2016/07/04/the-matrix-summer-special... for the current status), but if we don't provide it we will have failed in the whole mission to defragment these silos, letting users choose which service to trust without losing interoperability.

The good news is that the Olm end-to-end cryptographic ratchet that Matrix is in the process of deploying (https://matrix.org/git/olm) is built using the same algorithms as Signal Protocol's ratchet (although it's an independent implementation) - so we're hopeful that at least technically the window is open in future for using Matrix to defragment all the services who have adopted Signal Protocol (WhatsApp, Google Allo, FB Messenger, Signal itself etc) without compromising the E2E privacy. Right now this is total sci-fi, and won't likely happen (whilst preserving E2E crypto) without cooperation from FB, Google etc.

However, we hope to get Matrix to the point where they see that the longer term benefits of participating in a healthy open ecosystem outweigh the short term benefits of trying to lock users into a silo - just as email eventually interoperated over the early internet. That's a while off, but this is still the goal.

The best way to make sure this happens is to play with Matrix in its current form, and help us write bridges (e.g. https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-bridge/blob/...) to interface as many silos as possible into Matrix. The more bridges, the more useful Matrix is, and the higher the chance of building an ecosystem which eventually Google, FB and friends will find attractive.


Thanks a lot for your work on Matrix. It is definitely one of the projects (like Syncthing, IPFS or GNU Social) that gives me enough hope to not run to the caves so early :)


Sorry if this is a stupid question, can I store chat logs of all (even encrypted) conversations locally?


On the serverside (which may be "local" depending on where your server is running), the history for the rooms you participate in is stored as a matter of course. Matrix operates by replicating that history between the servers participating in the conversation. If that history is e2e encrypted, any device with the necessary cryptographic ratchet state can decrypt it. (Note that rooms may be configured to change ratchet frequently to deliberately stop history being decrypted multiple times, providing a form of PFS).

On the client side, it depends on the client you're using. Many native Matrix clients and many bridged clients give the option to store local history (whether it was originally encypted or not). Smarter clients will store it encrypted at rest by whatever mechanisms the OS and hardware provides.


I honestly find this centralization as worrying as mass surveillance itself. I'm as afraid of the Facebooks of this world as I am of any government, and I don't want all my communication locked in with one company.

This is why I will not use or recommend Signal. Moxie's anti-federation stance is unacceptable to me. It's replacing one problem with another.


I don't like this either. My long time wishes have been to have federated systems for instant messaging and for social networks. Neither seem to be getting any traction with the big and rich corporations actively working against any kind of interoperability. All the pro-privacy solutions depend on getting all your contacts into another walled garden, albeit a nicer one than the likes of Facebook and Google.

Beyond federation, I would also like the solutions to have good features and usability. Right now I'm bouncing between a few walled systems:

1. Telegram - really fast development pace, poor crypto, E2E encryption is only for chosen chats and single device.

2. Signal - slow to deliver messages, not multi-device and has usability bugs and issues. I update it somewhat regularly and try using it, but still go back to Telegram because basic expectations aren't met.

3. Wire - I discovered this recently and like the feature set (it's a lot richer than Signal). It claims to use the Signal protocol and has support for voice and video too. All chats are E2E encrypted (unlike Telegram where non-secret chats are by default not encrypted on the device or on Telegram's servers), and it has multi-device support with message sync (only from the time the device is joined to the account). Clients are available for different mobile and desktop platforms. But this one also has poor usability in getting started with it and has simple things missing - like no message delivered or message read indicators (the latter could at least be present as a user selectable option for privacy). I don't know how slow this is to deliver messages, but it's definitely not as fast as Telegram is. Not knowing if a message reached or not is unacceptable in this era.

I'm still waiting for some more strong solutions to appear in this space. Seeing that more platforms are adopting the Signal protocol, it would be great to have some standardization in user identification and federation. I actually do not want any of these solutions to be completely free and wish they would provide some way to help them monetarily (at least for the people who do want to help them). I feel repelled by the "free forever" and "we'll sell premium things later, like stickers" parts. That also brings suspicions about the motives of the company/developers and the future viability of the application or platform. At least allow people to donate to you so that you feel some kind of return obligation for all users!


Makes me wonder... what's the current total number of active XMPP users (for chat, I mean, not for Android notifications)? Is it still bigger than the number of Signal uses?

I have a feeling that federation is one of those Good Things that reduce the potential user base until it isn't good any more.


Can you elaborate on the "anti-federation" stance of Signal's creator? I'm not familiar with this.


You can't run your own signal server. All accounts use phone numbers in the same namespace as ID, and all messages go from the phone to opensystems.org, further on to google, and from google to the destination phone (with lots of encryption being added and removed at various points). This has advantages (it's difficult for the Man distinguish a received signal message from other android notifications) but also disadvantage (moxie can do traffic analysis and you can't do anything about it).


You can totally run your own server for yourself and your friends: https://github.com/WhisperSystems/TextSecure-Server (you'll have to change the server's URL in the client's source as well and compile it yourself, but that's really easy)

What you won't be able to do is federate with the official servers.

Oh, and there's also a WebSocket transport (used by the Desktop client) that doesn't involve Google. That just doesn't provide a pleasant experience on mobile.


Yeah, so instead of being in Whisper Systems' walled garden, I can set up my own and ask people to install Rvense's Magical Messenger App. Sit there in my treehouse with a bucket on my head and a NO DUMMIES sign or something.


Seems like you want the advantages of both centralization and federation without any of the disadvantages.


Being able to set up your own server is not federation unless your users can communicate with users on other servers.


Distributing a modified client is non-trivial, especially if any of your friends use iOS.


You can sideload apps without a developer subscription. It's annoying but works. But you have an unsolved update problem on both Android and iOS. You really shouldn't do this if you're not 100% sure of the implications.


> you'll have to change the server's URL in the client's source as well and compile it yourself, but that's really easy

I'm sorry, but is this a joke? "To not use a centralized server that you can neither audit nor trust, you have to recompile the client, but that's easy?"

This smacks of "oh, PGP for email is fiiiiiine." To say nothing of the silliness of the inability to federate.


No, it's not a joke and you shouldn't treat it as such. Non-technical people really shouldn't be whining that their "free service" doesn't cater to a click-and-run crowd. The source is available to the public to create their own, and changing a URL in the code is a single regex command away.

Don't casually disregard him because you or others can't understand basics of doing what it takes to alter and run a service in your own private space.


I don't casually disregard him. I thoughtfully and with consideration disregard him, and you as well. The idea that there is a priestly-class of technical people and "non-technical people shouldn't whine" is silly. This is not for technical people. This is for non-technical people. I've been doing this stuff for twenty years. But me being able to do it doesn't do a damned thing to help the people who actually need help.

I don't need Signal to communicate with knowledgeable people. We need something to communicate with everyone else.


And yet the same argument has been made time and time again against SMTP. Let's stand back for a second and understand why SMTP has stood the test of time. Yes it has flaws that allow the "first contact" problem (ie spam). But the people working on SMTP at least understand the weaknesses and advantages of that.


^ this


>silliness of the inability to federate

The moment you open the door for federation, the protocol is written in stone forever. All it takes is one server in the federation network with a substantial user base that chooses not to update. (See SMTP).

OWS decided that relinquishing the ability to force updates (i.e. away from a broken cryptosystem) would sacrifice too much in the way of security to be consistent with the project's goals.


I understand that. I don't think it's a malicious decision. I think it's a wrong one. I'm not criticizing Whisper Systems, I'm criticizing the tech-priesty stuff out of the post I replied to.


I didn't say this was a good way for normal users. Normal users don't care about federation and don't want to run their own server. But for people on HN it should be easy, and if you and your hacker friends don't trust moxie you can do it. I never said you should, just that's it's possible and not hard.


I don't think end users should have to trust him, either.


Compiling the client is much less daunting than running your own server, so "easy" seems like a fair description in this context. I don't think there's a large intersection between "People who can't easily compile the client" and "People who would run or audit a secure messaging server."



That seems to be a very coherent, insightful post by a very highly-respected cypherpunk. I am pretty much 100% on board with what he is saying.


My response is that we just have to try harder. He's focusing only on encryption and ignoring the massive social problem of one company or a few companies having a monopoly on digital communication. Just like whether or not I'm spied on is irrelevant to whether or not I have the right to private (encrypted) communications, it doesn't matter who has monopoly or what they use it for. We should not be building infrastructure that encourages monopolies, and unfederated services are by definition monopolies.


Go on and try harder, and please post a Show HN when you have something to show.


> digital prisons

Did you just coin that? It appropriately captures what is going on, but without having the positive connotation that comes from a 'walled garden'. I love the phrase.

As an example outside of messaging, I have a fitbit and 'digital prison' so aptly describes what happens with my personal health data. I can't get my heart rate data out of their prison, because the fitbit warden doesn't see it fit to grant me the privilege to access my raw data.


"Walled garden" is more appropriate than "digital prison". No one is being sentenced involuntarily to these enclosures, they are voluntarily choosing to accept them because of what is inside them.


"Cult compound" is probably how I would describe it. Sure, you can leave, but there is immense social pressure to continue in what has become the norm, despite there clearly being something not okay with what is going on. And good luck convincing others to leave when you do.


Never heard "cult compound" in this context so far and by thinking about it I really think it better fits then "walled garden". "Walled garden" sounds like you go there because of its beauty or for getting the best crops while in reality you go there because it's the most crowded place.


> "Walled garden" sounds like you go there because of its beauty or for getting the best crops

Which is exactly why people go to them.

> while in reality you go there because it's the most crowded place.

Directly true of social networks (where the "crop" is "people you can interact with through the network"), perhaps less directly true of some other walled gardens (though network effects are a thing.)

But also directly opposite of what you'd expect from a "cult compound", which people go more to escape what is most popular, than to experience what is most popular.


> "But also directly opposite of what you'd expect from a "cult compound", which people go more to escape what is most popular, than to experience what is most popular."

Agreed, I thought of this point while sending my comment but wasn't sure how to put that in words. So maybe it's the "most crowded garden party".


It's also one hell of a loaded term with things like Heavens Gate and Jim Jones having existed. To my knowledge, Facebook has yet to cause a mass suicide by people worshiping Zuckerberg.


Facebook has convinced millions of people to give up vast amounts of private information to an apparatus that would make the Stasi or KGB drool.

Part of cult indoctrination is giving up personal and private information, documents, secrets and property to participate and become part of the whole. Meanwhile, leaders profit from the property and information given up and use secrets to blackmail or breakdown an individual's identity so they become dependent on the group.


Yes yes yes, make your descriptors fuzzy enough and you can compare anything with anything else.

Here's a list of actual cult characteristics [1]. The comparison is an idiotic one to make.

[1]: http://www.anandainfo.com/cult_checklist.html


I think of it as more of a 'Hotel California' - you can check in any time you want, but you can never leave. [0]

Or at least your data can't.

[0] http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/eagles/hotelcalifornia.html


Unfortunately your use case, while valid, is for a very small demographic. In general people want the guaranteed experience that locked in products give them.

A lot of people like to sideline complain about that, but tech is no longer its own customer -- there are billions of users who have different preferences than us and they are a lot more lucrative.


People opted into several of these services before they were "locked in", many of whom never noticed the switch of XMPP backplanes in Facebook Messages and GTalk. Some of them haven't even seemed to notice the loss of a few technically minded friends from their messenger windows, changes in branding, and or even really changes in apps. The ambivalence is not a preference or a "want" for a locked in experience. There isn't even a preference for a type of experience: the general human thought process is "I want to talk to my friend Jim" never "I want to use [Facebook Messenger/Google Hangouts/SMS/smoke signals] to talk to my friend Jim".

I've seen people that ritualistically open certain apps to talk to certain friends and networks of friends, but have no idea what apps they are using beyond the background navigation needs of "the one with the fuzzy green icon on my last page" and "the blue one with the annoying notifications".

Locked in platforms are a consequence of network efforts, not a "preference" for some mystical "guaranteed experience": the experience and the platform don't matter if the social interactions aren't there.

The diaspora of communications platforms hasn't hit home to the average consumer yet, and it's currently background inconvenience that people are using five to ten different apps to communicate these days in some cases, but that doesn't mean average consumers are entirely ignorant of the situation either. (To some extent that's why OS-level notification systems have become so important to the average consumer; at least when you have a half-dozen messenging apps all the notifications arrive in the same place.)


Have you used Signal before? You don't have to use Whatsapp, Allo, or FB Messenger. It's just a pain to get people to download it.


Signal Protocol already supports multi-device. We've encouraged them to enable that for Secret Conversations.

Voice/video etc are obviously straightforward; hopefully they'll continue to iterate towards support for e2e by default.


"Signal Protocol already supports multi-device"

This is what I thought. If one were starting a new messaging platform, how would you implement the Signal protocol from scratch I wonder? I'm assuming for people who don't have strong security backgrounds, this means dissecting the Signal source code from Github.


> I'm assuming for people who don't have strong security backgrounds

That's already a bad start.

You mean inventing Signal from scratch (which is rough) or incorporating the libsignal protocol into a new messaging app?

All of the libsignal repos have a good readme that explains init [1][2] , so you can start there. Browsing Signal source is helpful not so much to understand the protocol, but to see if any special precautions were taken against side-channel and other implementation pitfalls.

I mean, you could contract moxie (hey moxie, what's your price?)

EDIT: there's also this [3] independent implementation of libsignal in golang that tries to make some targeted modifications to fit their need. Can't vouch for its quality, but it's an interesting effort nonetheless.

[1] https://github.com/WhisperSystems/libsignal-protocol-java [2] https://github.com/WhisperSystems/libsignal-service-java [3] https://github.com/OpenBazaar/libsignal


It may be a bad start, but if we want to see this implemented in many products at a large scale, you'll have to expect that not everyone is a security expert.

I swear HN has become riddled with people who want to be contrarian for the sake of being so.


No, I'm just repeating the oft-said maxim of 'Don't Roll Your Own Crypto' [1] (which applies in the form of know-what-you're-doing-while-implementing-someone-else's-crypto) while emphasizing that you should probably be a domain expert in the domain you're developing in. If I know nothing about High Frequency Trading or Oil Exploration, I wouldn't want to be coding for it at all, and nor would my employer.

I believe it's a reasonable expectation that people who implement secure messaging be domain experts in crypto AND messaging.

[1] http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/18197/why-should...


Getting high-grade security right is exceptionally hard.

There's a saying about sex: make one mistake and you have to support it for the rest of your life. Security and cryptography are orders of magnitude worse. It's bad enough that errors compound, but it doesn't end there. You can have subtle and counter-intuitive failure modes where a single step outside the happy path is enough to completely annihilate the security of your system.

I feel there is no analogy that could capture the absurd complexity and catastrophic failure potential.

To give some background - I've been working with applied crypto since 90's, and professionally (on and off) since early 2000's. That experience is still next to worthless: I know for a fact that I am not good enough to actually implement anything that could withstand the attacks of a motivated and well-funded adversary. (Or even that of a bored PhD student.)

The best I can do is find tools and components that have been battle hardened by the handful few exceptional professionals. At least that way my hubris shouldn't amount to too much damage.


You shouldn't have many different people implementing critical crypto code; that'll lead to horrible broken implementations and compromise of security.


> "We don't want to disrupt people's current experience."

You don't say? (not you, Facebook) How about the dozens of times Facebook disrupted the user experience of the service for its own benefit? How about the dozen+ times it changed people's settings from private to public, after people previously manually enabled a certain setting to be private, or after having a setting by default as private initially and letting people believe that such action is private? Wasn't THAT disrupting to users' experience?

Of course it was. But it benefited Facebook, and that's the difference here. They just don't want to "disrupt" the experience in a way that also hurts the company's bottom line, even if it's better for users.

In other words, it's just a weak excuse for not doing it by default, or at least allowing people to always set it as default (although knowing Facebook, I'd probably worry that they'd revert it back to non-E2E without even making it obvious that it did that. Announcing a new privacy policy change doesn't really count).


> No secure way to verify code or store keys without routing through mobile.

Weeeeeeell, not quite. Every device and browser the user uses can get it's own private key, and then you use Facebook's central servers and SSL to exchange keys.

If I don't trust Facebook for key exchange, then I can't trust them with their app. Any encryption they implement, they can trivially circumvent by putting a backdoor in their app.

But if I trust their (closed source, frequently updated) app at all, then I can trust them to relay people my public keys. Especially since MITM can be discovered by comparing hashes over a hard to manipulate channel (telefone, video, or IRL).

And if you're really paranoid, you could think about using an open-source app and letting a trusted third party handle the keys.


Yes I completely agree. Actually, what is the difference in security between an app that generates a key pair on first use and exchanges the public key via a 3rd party servers and a web application doing exactly that. As long as the connection is secure and you trust the 3rd party for not having you send the private key to them, the model seems reasonably secure for both scenarios.

Though public key exchange can be improved on mobile by better direct communication capabilities like barcode scanning, rfid, bluetooth etc.

Am I missing something or is this more of a "JS is not reliably fast on all devices so we rather don't" kind of thing?


I assume the issue is more to do with private key storage on the device. JS provides several local storage mechanisms, but none of them have cryptographic guarantees and all are potentially vulnerable to attacks like XSS and "attacks" like development console disclosure. There's been calls for the Web Application Platform to standardize on an HTML5 "Key Store" for cryptography, but thus far it doesn't sound like any consensus has been managed to be reached on how that key store would operate.

Certainly, there are mitigations such as very short lived private keys and relying on existing sandboxing and XSS protections browsers already have to do for JS local storages, but it's easy to understand how from a paranoia standpoint there's no guaranteed safe key store just yet in a browser, especially not one backed up by OS-level security guarantees as one would be able to use on mobile devices.


That's all fine, but why isn't there a setting somewhere, where I can just knowingly choose "always use end-to-end encryption" at least?

The way it's implemented now still makes it a pain/inconvenient thing to do when you want private conversations. So let's face it. Facebook just wants to get away with the minimum necessary to convey that it cares about privacy, while knowing that only 0.1% of the conversations will ever be encrypted this way.


> "We don't want to disrupt people's current experience."

Hahaha.

Sounded plausible until I saw that line. When did FB suddenly start caring about that?


Doesn't ring true after how they ripped all messaging functions out of the main Facebook app and forced me to download Messenger.


The fact that "We don't want to disrupt people's current experience." did not previously outweigh other considerations does not mean it is not a consideration. It does imply an upper bound on the weight though.


Alex Stamos should check out https://wire.com (full disclosure: I work there)

• E2EE by default, in groups too

• Has solved the multi device, sync problem

• Has webapp

• Fingerprinting of all devices

• Does not sacrifice features for security - voice, video, media

• Crypto and comms protocols open source https://github.com/wireapp

• Privacy and security whitepaper https://wire.com/privacy


I recently started using Wire and liked the richer feature set. But I'd say it still has some way to go on usability, features and speed. I hope you look at Telegram as an inspiration on those (not on crypto though, where you seem to have the one commonly accepted as the best).


While it might be disappointing, I firmly believe this is a technical and business decision, not a conspiracy. If you look at the features Messenger offers, and the direction the product has been moving, it relies heavily on server-side technology.

Facebook have added contextual ride-share ordering, person-to-person payments, bots, etc. Unlike WhatsApp or Signal, Messenger also still works over the Web without an app or a smartphone-based login: how do you implement credible E2E over the Web, without using the phone as a crutch? How do you allow multi-device support, with a message history, and do E2E on all conversations?

I think they've (rightly, IMO) assessed that most people value those features and convenience over 100% E2E conversations, but want to offer the option to those who don't. Besides, if Facebook were really completely in bed with the surveillance state, why would they have just rolled out full E2E on WhatsApp?


> Unlike WhatsApp or Signal, Messenger also still works over the Web without an app or a smartphone-based login: how do you implement credible E2E over the Web, without using the phone as a crutch? How do you allow multi-device support, with a message history, and do E2E on all conversations?

Wire [1] does multi-device E2E encryption, sync of message history and allows users to use phone numbers and email addresses as identifiers. It also uses the Signal protocol.

Note: I do not work for Wire nor am I associated with it in any way, except as a user. I discovered it only recently and am trying it out, in addition to using Telegram as my most frequent client and Signal.

[1]: wire.com


> I am not usually one for paranoia, but is anyone else becoming more suspicious about Facebooks motivations and involvement with gov?

I worked for Facebook; I am friends with the people who developed this: I would like to reassure you strongly (well, as much as an Internet stranger can) on their motives. They are the good guys, and this was develop with people being spied on by abusive governments in mind — because those people use Messenger and would like to do it for those conversations too. Don’t trust me, but reach out to them if you are curious: few people appreciate their work, so they are generally happy to talk (about published work; unannounced products are very much off limits).

Facebook does collaborate with governments when the messages are not encrypted and the crimes are clear, and the court issued warrants. I seriously doubt any of those are political dissidents. Facebook engineers receive very generous poaching offers all the time, and they would have minimal economic damage from leaving the company over something like this. The shit-show from engineers leaving over that would massive (and many engineers are true believers).

I wasn’t in the company six months ago when that project was decided, but from my experience of the internal culture, I know that there was a debate on whether this feature could cover crimes that Facebook would object to — and the need for protecting the good guys obviously had the upper hand.

> Why doesn't FB just apply encryption on all messages? > Surely they have the resources avail.

Scaling. I know nothing about this, but I have no doubt that this is the main reason. Any tiny amount of extra memory, computation, etc. times a billion becomes massive. Facebook struggles building enough capacity for all its services: the data center expansions you hear about are done a break-neck pace, to meet service expansion deadlines. The engineers working on this are heroes internally, and the units they use are unheard of outside of astronomy. More specifically, they probably want to test some scaling aspects, but it might be unethical to use the usual approach of A/B testing.


I'm former FB Infra and agree with your first point re: motives. There's a lot of true believers working in the security space at Facebook, and I have tons of respect for them. I used to work closely with many of them.

However, scaling and/or capacity is not the reason E2E encryption isn't applied on all messages. The crypto operations are relatively trivial in terms of cpu.

This comment summarizes what FB's CSO said about why they are not launching E2E broadly yet. It boils down to usability concerns. Sounds like they are working on it:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12055567


Usability with Facebook M, much like Google Allo, will require E2E encryption to be turned off in order to take advantage of those features. Alex didn't mention that, but I think that's the real reason. Also FB wants to know what's going on in your conversations. That metadata can be used for advertising.


This might sound offensive, but please don't take it that way, I just don't know how else to phrase it:

I have no reason to trust you, or them. Just because you think people have good motives, doesn't mean it's true. I'm sure there are great people working there, but I'm also sure there are shady people working there. Just like at any big org. "Even though you don't know me, trust me, these guys are cool" arguments don't really help anything.


Of course I won’t be offended — that’s why I wrote, if that mattered to you, to reach out to them. Although, as someone pointed out, that feature was developed by a team mostly in London.


It's also impossible for us to trust them given NSL's means they can't honest tell us the trusth if "we just go talk to them".


Many of the engineers who worked on this feature live outside the US.


Hi. To move all messages to be E2E encrypted, we need credible solution for web clients and every other platform, including old feature phones. This is easier said than done, but is something we are thinking about.

Secret Conversations is a step in the right direction.


I think people underestimate just how ludicrously hard it is to provide an encrypted experience that's as good as plaintext. Even showing a chat on multiple devices becomes a hard problem. I agree with you that it's a step in the right direction, and Viber and Whatsapp have a much easier problem to solve, given that both only support device-to-device messaging. The only app that supports multi-device chats that I know of is Silent Phone, but I admit to not being very up to date with the instant messaging landscape.


Signal handles sync between phone and desktop just fine.


http://Wire.com supports encrypted multi-device chats.


I'm building one. When you start with the idea that it's going to be encrypted and that you won't know what users are sending back and forth you have to make some concessions but functionally I don't think the average person would even know that my application is encrypted from a UX perspective. You need to handle abuse client-side, it requires a bit more thought but I'm sure that's not beyond Facebook.


"feature phones" sounds like newspeak. Why are they called that? If anything I'd think they'd be called "lack-of-feature-phones".


Feature phone is actually oldspeak. It's what we called cell phones with features back when most cell phones didn't have features. Then smartphones came along and reset the expectations for what features a phone has, leaving feature phones in the dust. But there was a time where feature phone meant something positive.


Because "phone" is the primary feature. Phone-feature phone sounds silly. You can say lack of features phone if you like, most people prefer shorter phrases.


Sold based on features, rather than sold for being based on a particular platform. That's what it means.


> Why doesn't FB just apply encryption on all messages?

The same reason Gmail can't work with end-to-end encryption--they want to advertise at you based on message content.

I highly doubt there is any government intervention in FB's business strategy, but there seems to be plenty of cooperation after the business decisions are made. (The same is largely true with Microsoft, Google, and yes, even Apple.) It's not really a conspiracy, or a matter of paranoia--it's been very widely reported for a while now, and people just generally don't seem to give a shit (myself increasingly included).

EDIT: I do care. But I think (a) people need to take privacy into their own hands, since companies will never be incentivized to do it and (b) we've entered a new cultural era, where the levels of privacy enjoyed in the past are no longer socially normal.


> The same reason Gmail can't work with end-to-end encryption--they want to advertise at you based on message content.

I wonder how they'd do if they were more open about it. "You're getting Gmail for free because we read your email and advertise to you. However, if you want to pay for a premium account (or Google Apps for Work) then we won't advertise to you, won't read your email and we'll even make end-to-end encryption easy and convenient".

I mean, it seems like a good compromise. I'd be happier with the rampant advertising and profiling going on if it was only for signed-in users and everyone was given the choice - use it for free or pay and get guaranteed privacy and no ads.


It would be a (financially) bad choice for corpo. And answer why, is the same in many similar questions 'why can't corpo do this-and-that'.

Here it is (google as an example only, simplified) the answer:

* Put two googles side by side. competing.

* one is a current one, earning money from ads on you being product, and keeping it under the radar (although in fine print etc etc)

* second is the one devised: premium accounts plus free w/ads

* wait 5 years and observe by market efficiency evolution which of the (competing) companies wins. The first one. In this specific scenario, the second loses because time and money spent on 'premium accounts' will not be compensated by revenues from it. While at the same time, the first google, spending this capital difference purely on the ads department will make its ads department (here 100% of it) much better than ads part in second company. hereby winning on the market.

In general (as the google example is SIMPLIFIED, due to the alphabet scale. Please don't use google apps FOR WORK (emphasis mine ;) as an counter example - it's B2B product :) it is because: we, humans, don't like companies who use fine print etc, yet those companies win case by case with the 'moral, pure pricing and fine ethics' companies BECAUSE OF BIASES AND ERRORS (+) OF HUMAN BRAINS during choice making shopping, exploited day by day.

Thats why.

(+) read stupidity also known why-I-buy-overpriced-sweets-at-checkout ;)


That analysis only makes sense if that is the only product of the company. Google would still be spending way more on making ads better than a pure gmail competitor just because it shows ads for so many other things.


The wording "we read your email" isn't quite accurate. There is nobody at google who goes through davb's emails one by one.


But they can. I doubt they do, because it's just not practical, but they do have the ability to


Right, but the phrasing above wasn't "We can read your email," it was "We read your email." What actually happens is more relevant than what they could do if they wanted.


Yeah, worse, he's being scored by highly imperfect algorithms.


In what way is it worse?


What if he's scored as a threat and reported to the FBI? A human can understand sarcasm, jokes, or hyperbole. An algorithm is going to see scary words and add them to the 'dangerous' score.


> What if he's scored as a threat and reported to the FBI?

Then he'll be referred to a human, who may or may not understand sarcasm, jokes, or hyperbole?


'May not' seems likely, we are talking about the FBI after all ;)


I think if companies were fully transparent with what they're doing with the data and made sure almost all of their users knew exactly what they're doing with it (meaning, it shouldn't just be in a privacy policy no one ever reads, but it should be actively "promoted" somehow within the service, everytime the data is collected and used) people would be a lot more careful about what data they share through these services.

This is exactly why these companies don't want to be more transparent unless they absolutely have to (like what the EU is doing to Google), but it really should be more regulated by governments, because I think it's a very "fair" thing to do - sharing everything you're doing with someone's info. It's not about restricting the data collection through regulation, just being transparent about it. That might lead to less useful information for the data collectors, but people should be informed and it should trump everything else.


My intuition is that this will either lead to people going to other providers who do the same but do not mention it or lead to people not caring.

I mean, a large number of people here do know that machines scan their email. In what manner do the majority act? That shows us the revealed preference.


ads is a by product. The aim of google is to build AI. For training AI, it needs access to all the data about you. Maybe, google has already succeeded and the singularity has already happened ;-)


A by product of what? 86% of their profits come from advertising[1].

If that's not the definition of an ad company then I don't know what is.

[1] - http://adage.com/article/digital/google-q4-2015-earnings/302...



Money is absolutely not a mean. Google is a public company. Money is its ultimate end.


There is a legal obligation to serve shareholders’ “best interests”. It is not exactly the same thing as either maximizing profits, or maximizing shareholder value. See http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-cor...


Because of people like you, I am able to strengthen my bullshit filter.


live in your own illusions


End to end means that your computer is the only one that can read your gmail email, because the key is stored on your computer and not in the cloud. The whole reason we all moved to webmail from pop3 is to have access to our mailboxes on any device. If you put the key in the cloud and make it decryptable by some user-known data (like a password), there's very little point in having the key - brute forcing a user's key becomes very simple. Also, any legitimate service provider is going to provide a backup way to "recover your password", which means they have a shortcut to decrypting your data. So you can have one or the other, not both. Either you have simple, easy access to your data from multiple devices, or you have secure end to end encryption.


Text advertisements are cheap, bandwidth-wise. I wonder if they couldn't just send everybody dozens of advertisements, and decide on the client side what to show. Or even, download a dozens of MBs of graphical ads with each app update / the first time you visit the site.

You could go further and do something like, email sent by people to people is off-limits and will be end-to-end encrypted and not looked at - but (almost) all automatically generated email is fair game and will be processed. Google already does that with Google Now (and shows you your flights, package deliveries etc.). I really prefer them making more explicit what they look at and what not.


> Text advertisements are cheap, bandwidth-wise. I wonder if they couldn't just send everybody dozens of advertisements, and decide on the client side what to show. Or even, download a dozens of MBs of graphical ads with each app update / the first time you visit the site.

Shh, don't tell everyone about my next project. I think it can be done with images as well sending 5 of them for various demographic groups would be doable and should create enough noise (one tampon ad, a video game ad, an ad for amazon, a mountain dew ad, and a retirement plan ad for example). For those who care not for anonymity, but more for bandwidth they can opt out and only download the ad's they need.


> The same reason Gmail can't work with end-to-end encryption--they want to advertise at you based on message content.

Facebook can do fine without that information: they have more information than they can develop ad services for at the moment; they could use a lot more engineers though. The goodwill from the dev community in allowing appropriate targeting is far more important to them.

Two good examples being location and language: you can advertise for people in a certain place or who speak a certain language, but there are many unserved combinations, like tourists, language minorities and commuters. In my case, I’d love to see ads on learning Swedish: Facebook can see some of my friends speak it, and this is new.

Source: worked for Fb, but in Engagement, not the Ads team; offered a lot of targeting suggestions, but most where “presumably not the biggest opportunities (they) could work on”. At Facebook’s scale, we are talking really big numbers.


> (b) we've entered a new cultural era, where the levels of privacy enjoyed in the past are no longer socially normal.

Yeah, that whole Bill of Rights thing just needs to go away, right?


My comment was descriptive, not normative.


Want to give up on gmail search too ?


Uhm, if you look back at history, privacy is a very recent thing. McLuhan has a lot of work around this.


I think the more likely scenario is they know the value of the conversations they datamine, but don't want to lose customers to these other message apps that tout their encryption. So they do the bare minimum to support encryption while still having access to most data.


Over here in the real world, Facebook does not need to worry about "[losing] customers to these other message apps that tout their encryption" because the latter are not even in the game. There are only a few messaging apps that matter, because the value of the app is in its network and who it can connect you to rather than some feature checklist for the HN crowd.

Dropping secure E2E encryption into an app that is deployed on hundreds of millions of phones across the globe is a game changer. Period. Once you climb down from your lofty ivory tower and consider the impact this will have globally then perhaps you you will be a bit less dismissive of the goals and efforts of the team that convinced a company that lives on data to delierately blind itself to some for the sake of their users privacy and security.


If barely anyone uses it then how is it a game changer? Please update us in a few months with usage statistics.


I can't tell if you've deliberately misinterpreted evgen's comment or not. But this feature is being deployed to hundreds of millions of phones. Even if only 1% of people use this, that's millions more people using E2E secured communication. Hardly "barely anyone".


This does seem a likely scenario. Unfortunately all the stories of over the last few years have severely eroded the benefit of doubt that I give these companies, which is a great shame. I imagine others due to this, approach similar moves with great suspicious.


"brute-forcing encryption on all of these is probably not possible. A small % marked as 'secret conversation'? Much easier."

They probably wouldn't have to brute-force them. Backdooring's still quite possible - the NSA are perfectly capable of compelling Facebook to install a keylogger in their app.


Given what modern science knows about mathematics and computer science, you cannot brute-force decrypt messages encrypted by Signal Protocol. Not millions, not hundreds, not tens, not even one.


Am I confused? Isn't it impossible to brute force a single properly encrypted message?

(where properly means that the protocol and implementation are sound and so on)


This makes a lot of assumptions, like the NSA hasn't broken algorithms we consider secure, that they're not somehow sharing keys, or using a gimped algorithm on purpose, etc.


Sure, but those assumptions are implicit in the statement I replied to Multi-millions of FB messages must be sent every day, brute-forcing encryption on all of these is probably not possible. A small % marked as 'secret conversation'? Much easier.

If you don't trust Facebook, you don't need to evaluate the quality of their implementation of secret messaging, you just shouldn't use it.


NSA mostly likely hasn't broken AES or ECC. And the rest of the arguments don't apply in this case; the parent was talking about hope having a few users use encryption makes it easier for Facebook to compromise security. Using gimped algorithms or sharing keys would affect both scenarios equally.


They have taken exactly the same approach as Google with the Allo service. This is most probably done because people want to use Chat Bots and services and these do not work with E2E encryption. Well they could work but it would be dishonest branding as the messages would leak.


>> "Chat Bots and services and these do not work with E2E encryption"

It might be true that FB adding E2E breaks existing bots, but it's false that it breaks that ability to use bots on FB.


It could work but as I said it would be dishonest. If a bot can read your messages then you have to trust a third party to not leak/store them. I believe that he goal of E2E encryption is to remove the need to trust somebody. (Of course you still have to trust FB that they do not backdoor or hinder the encryption but you do not have to trust the third parties)


With a chatbot you are chatting with the bot.

All the bot needs to is be able to use the Signal E2E protocol to establish key & message exchanges.

Nothing dishonest about this and nothing different than existing bots other than one uses E2E and one does not.


I do not speak of chatbots such as Cleverbot. For example your bot will listen to your messages and provide contextual information, such as theatres airing a movie you are currently talking about. The bot also probably needs to keep track of the context, which probably means keeping the chat history for some time. In order to learn the chatbot needs to keep the history forever and scan it for ML purposes. All of these mean that the bot has to keep the history somewhere unencrypted, basically nullifying the benefit of E2E.


Brute-forcing is infeasible. The meta-data is certainly visible however, so intelligence agencies could glean a lot of information about certain users from other sources. You're right that "private conversations" does throw up a red flag.


It's like the entire world forgot about PRISM.


Because the whole story was bs? Zuckerberg himself commented on that https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10100828955847631


I agree. I hate how everyone trusted the Snowden story without question. It's pretty much US sponsored propaganda. I doubt Snowden is even in Russia.


Do you honestly believe in his words?


Multi-millions of FB messages must be sent every day, brute-forcing encryption on all of these is probably not possible

It's kind of a Hobson's Choice. You can message in the clear, or you can encrypt your messages and the government can keep your messages forever.

https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130620/15390323549/nsa-h...


You answered your own question. No, serious threats do not use Facebook Messenger. The reason it's limited deploy is technical (for now) not caging. Metadata is more important than content. They will always have the metadata.


n excellent point, however I will add to your thinking that we want our government to be able to eavesdrop on conversation provided it's done constitutionally, with probably cause, in an open court and with a warrant.

If we can't get those things then it's pointless to fight back with encryption. We must have our constitutional protections.


I'm sad I'm being downvoted. Our generation needs to learn it can't solve all of its problems with a screen in front of its face all of the time.

A lot of this technology is enslaving us. Piling it higher and deeper isn't the solution.


Reasons from not enabling it by default by @alexstamos (CSO @ Facebook):

- FBM is multi-device, and we'd like to see E2E usability improve to support this. For now, pick one device and keys never leave it

- Secret conversations don't currently support popular features like searching message history, switching devices, voice/video, etc

- Hundreds of millions use Messenger from a web browser. No secure way to verify code or store keys without routing through mobile.

"We don't want to disrupt people's current experience."

Source: https://twitter.com/alexstamos


Signal Protocol already supports multi-device. We've encouraged them to enable that for Secret Conversations, and hopefully they'll continue to iterate towards support for e2e by default.


Signal protocol supports multi-device when the device is capable of storing the keys (like the Signal desktop app). His point about web browsers still stands I believe.

Although you could use local storage, you would have to do that with every browser you logged into and also somehow make it user-account-specific. I definitely see the challenges there for them.

What would you think about using a user's password to encrypt the browser keys and store them on Facebook's servers? Is that too large a compromise for usability?


That's nice! :)

What did the OP mean by "No secure way to verify code or store keys (in web browser) without routing through mobile" ?


There's no way for a site to securely store keys in the browser. The server can't put them there because then the server would have them too. A client-side script could generate them, but it can't store them without extensions (or the server via some JS it sends) also having access to them.

This is why Signal and WhatsApp require the client to run on the phone - the phones are doing the decryption for the web apps.

This is flaky, consumes a lot of battery and generally is somewhat error-prone - probably not something FB wants to deal with.


Actually, Signal works without routing the messages trough your phone. Instead they use a browser extension to store the keys client side, which acts as a full client with its own, separate keypair.

You could even register only the browser, without having a smartphone at all.


Server would have the keys _because_ the client-side code can send it to the server. That's also possible in the native app, isn't it?


Yes. But let's assume FB doesn't want the keys (because if they have them, then it's no longer E2E encryption), then client-side generated keys in a browser are still exposed to XSS attacks and extensions.

Installing a malicious extension, tricking users into typing commands in the developer tools, XSSing FB, all of these are much easier to do than attacking a native app on a phone.


How is the possibility of XSS worse than the status quo (plaintext)? Thats like saying SSL is useless on desktop because root kits and keyloggers exist on desktop.


A false sense of security can be more damaging than no sense of security.

Certainly it can be important to know when you have a "no compromises" security option versus "mostly better than plaintext but maybe not secure".

It could be a UX judgment to not confuse users they have a "secure connection" when in fact they might not. Look at all the various attempts over the years browsers have made to keep the UX semi-reliable and easy for users to understand whether or not their SSL connection is secure.


The apps are updated relatively infrequently, and you can put off updating to see if problems are found with each release. In the browser, you'd have to analyze every script Facebook ever sends you to see if it's exfiltrating your key.


Valid point. But apps too can have non-obvious backdoors that don't require updating the new version. If you don't have source code and reproducible builds, you are already fully trusting the server.


Some notes:

- Signal does have some multi-device support (the Android and Desktop clients, iOS not yet). I still sometimes have minor issues but overall it works very well.

- Signal does include end-to-end encrypted voice calls (what used to be called RedPhone) that also work quite well. It's my go-to "call from Wifi abroad" solution to avoid roaming charges, and also works very well with a good 4G/3G signal

- The browser issue seems unsolved as of now, WhatsApp's web thingy (routing through the phone) seems to work quite well but obviously only if the phone is on, and WhatsApp requires a phone while FB messenger doesn't so this isn't an option for them.


Given that I don't have a smartphone, and use messenger.com; yeah, I wouldn't want it to require a mobile.


Downvotes for not owning a smartphone? I think we can agree that not requiring a mobile phone to use a messenger is a nice feature.


"End-To-End Encrypted ‘Secret Conversations’" in software that is ordinarily used to harvest electronic phone books and rummage through user photos, from a company that made its whole fortune trying to obliterate privacy as a part of human culture?

It's going to be pretty high standards of proof to give this anything that resembles credibility.


Credibility isn't binary. Facebook was way down to 0% on the credibility scale, and now it's up to 5%. Let's applaud this move instead of being hostile when they're trying to improve, because the only thing that will achieve is to discourage improvement.


I am confident Facebook will meet your high standards when it comes to E2E encryption for Messenger.


And we had some smart outside people review it: https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/75140316340882636...



The first question you should ask in evaluating any encryption or privacy-based software is, 'do I trust the provider?'

What sane person would ever trust Facebook to keep something private? If anything, the addition of "secret conversations" will be more intrusive, because this service delivers more nodes to the social graph: how many secret conversations, with whom, where, at what times, etc. Facebook and the global spy regimes it provides content for care more about building a network of associations than actual content. Who cares about the needle when you can control the haystack?


Thanks for doing this – it's very exciting news. I've avoided FB Messenger for years and now downloaded it today due to this.


This is exactly what I'm thinking. I expect a post in he next day or so from Open Whisper people to lend credibility to this project. They seem to be the Go-To these days.

Edit: and it is http://www.whispersystems.org/blog/facebook-messenger


Yeah, but then, again, how much credibility does Open Whisper Systems actually deserve?

For me personally, they've lost a huge chunk of credibility by lending credibility to companies for apparently rewriting the definition of "end-to-end-encryption" from previously referring to the users as the end to now referring to some magical proprietary blackbox as the end.

And the other chunk of credibility sort of died off, as they apparently seem to think depending on proprietary Google software for their products is how you do privacy.

That is, their Android-client for Signal depends on Google Play Services for receiving notifications, even though LibreSignal exists, which is a fork specifically to remove that dependency, and from which they could have easily pulled that changed code in as a fallback.

And when they figured they should make a desktop client, apparently the best technology that they could think of, was a Google Chrome extension.


This article doesn't mention it, but Facebook Messenger will be using the Signal protocol: https://whispersystems.org/blog/facebook-messenger/

also, here is the white paper (from the above post): https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/secret_conv...


We moved this comment here from the other thread: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12055042.


I'm pretty sure (actually positively sure) the article mentions this.


I think the mods merged two threads here, and the other article didn't mention it


I've read the whole thread and I'm surprised that nobody mentionned how easy it would be for Facebook to store the secret keys.

Page 10 of the white paper mentions that there is a remote key stored on Facebook servers which can be used to decrypt the local key. If Facebook still is to be trusted, I don't see what's the deal here.

I think that as soon as you put the words "end-to-end" encryption on a marketing material, you have to be ready to open-source your client. This is the cost that companies aiming to be credible can't escape.

End-to-end encryption without open-source has no value. It is a waste of energy for the company doing that too - or perhaps a marketing cost.


You've read it wrong. The local key is encrypted with the remote key. It means if someone steals your phone, they still have to pass facebook's authentication (e.g. 2fa) before being able to read your messages.


You are correct, but displaying a little message in millions of user-devices which says that it is end-to-end-encrypted, that makes them correcter.


"End-to-end encryption without open-source has no value. "

Not quite.

It means nobody is going to be able to read your data other than:

A) A nefarious Facebook staffer who has hacked their internal systems

B) A government entity with a court order

It's a step up from no encryption


> It means nobody is going to be able to read your data other than:

(Assuming it is properly implemented and doesn't have backdoors, which can only be practically verified if the client is free software).


It's worth remembering that this does not protect metadata. It's believed (though not known for sure) that WhatsApp logs metadata for their encrypted messages, and it looks like Facebook do the same here.

If you want to resist mass surveillance this is not a good solution.


I'd argue that WhatsApp and FBM adopting signal have been some of the highest-impact movements toward resistance of mass surveillance, largely due to sheer numbers and accessibility.

Sure, there is room for improvement, but having 0.000001% of t he population using an ultra-secure messenger doesn't have the same impact.

And hopefully those improvements will happen in time.


The point is that metadata is more valuable for mass surveillance purposes than content. WhatsApp and FBM do nothing to protect metadata.


are you serious?

you're suggesting that the metadata of "alice messaged bob at 1:20am" is worth more than "hey bob, I'm looking to have $100,000 laundered, same methods as last time. I'll drop to the usual location. thanks, Alice."


Well, yeah, without meta-data, you only know that someone messaged someone about laundering money. You have no clue who it is, so it's ultimately pretty useless.

Whereas with just meta-data, you can still at least figure out who the guy is talking to, even if you cannot figure out over this way that the guy is laundering money.


But the situation being compared is 'metadata' vs 'metadata + content'


Er, no.

Mass surveillance wants both metadata and content. Metadata happens to be a bit easier to analyse, but often they are only analysing metadata to lead them to the content in the first place.


I think we're going to have to get there (wherever there is: Utopia is a different place for different people) incrementally. It may be unsatisfactory in the short/near term and arguably give people a false sense of security but if we can start educating those non-techies around us bit by bit we may stand a chance at driving mass adoption. Honestly, I'm in no way claiming I can see the future or have even some of the answers, this shit is hard - perhaps even impossible.


https://ricochet.im/ is a good option if you're looking to minimize the amount of metadata that gets leaked. Desktop only at the moment, though, due to the difficulties of running a Tor hidden service from a mobile device.


I'm still sticking with the website version, thanks

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.facebook.o...

Messenger, Facebook

This app has access to:

Identity

    find accounts on the device
    read your own contact card
    add or remove accounts
Contacts

    find accounts on the device
    read your contacts
    modify your contacts
Location

    precise location (GPS and network-based)
    approximate location (network-based)
SMS

    edit your text messages (SMS or MMS)
    receive text messages (SMS)
    send SMS messages
    read your text messages (SMS or MMS)
    receive text messages (MMS)
Phone

    read phone status and identity
    read call log
    directly call phone numbers
    reroute outgoing calls
Photos / Media / Files

    modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
    read the contents of your USB storage
Storage

    modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
    read the contents of your USB storage
Camera

    take pictures and videos
Microphone

    record audio
Wi-Fi connection information

    view Wi-Fi connections
Device ID & call information

    read phone status and identity
Other

    receive data from Internet
    download files without notification
    control vibration
    run at startup
    draw over other apps
    pair with Bluetooth devices
    send sticky broadcast
    create accounts and set passwords
    change network connectivity
    prevent device from sleeping
    install shortcuts
    read battery statistics
    read sync settings
    toggle sync on and off
    read Google service configuration
    view network connections
    change your audio settings
    full network access


The situation is considerably better on Marshmallow because the app only prompts for permission for the extra features right before they are used - and many of those never will be. The app covers a lot of functionality (too much?).


I use Swipe for Facebook ever since they got rid of messages. It needs no permission, and while the experience can't be as good as Messenger, it will at least let me reply to the occasional message I receive.

I don't want to be encouraging Facebook's user-hostile moves, so I'll stop using messages completely if they make my life hard enough, but Swipe is a nice stopgap.


Coupled with how buggy its been on the iPhone platform since i got my phone I don't use it at all


protip: setup a separate google account on your android which you only use for facebook messenger.


Why are you using Facebook in the first place? I thought the HN valued their privacy. Try https://hubzilla.site instead.


My hive mind is malfunctioning


Yep, it seems so. Every time there's a post about how bad Facebook, Chrome are everyone screams "It's the average user's fault!" And here you are...


Moxie and team, bravo. You've made the snoopers jobs a whole lot harder.

Your goal of making encryption easy to use by the masses is coming come true. It looks as if PGP's days are numbered.


> It looks as if PGP's days are numbered.

This seems gratuitously hostile (and, even worse, is irrelevant). PGP is a very useful piece of software, and it does something completely different from Signal, and I'm glad both exist.


>> It looks as if PGP's days are numbered

Comments like this are inevitable and represent Facebook's attempts to induce us to route all of our communications though its platform. For the quoted commenter, it's probably too late.


PGP has failed to provide "encryption for the masses".


PGP fills a niche that OTR and Axolotl do not. It provides a bunch of operations that are not supported by OTR (anything that requires signatures that are verifiable by third parties). PGP is used by the masses (package signatures and similar functions), it's just that they don't use PGP for communication.


PGP while a decent technology is very cumbersome. Worse, it's easy to shoot yourself in the foot if you aren't an advanced level user. I've used it for years on a regular basis with various implementations. It's just never been user friendly or easy to use. If it was more user friendly it might have had better adoption rates. As moxie has pointed out, we need something better for the masses, it looks like we are finally seeing progress towards that goal now.




I'm not immediately seeing any insight into whether this covers conversations initiated in-browser. If this does exist, it'd be interesting to see how they've tackled the security of crypto logic in-browser and compare it to what Cyph has in place for in-browser code signing.

Reading the technical docs now (https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/secret_conv...).

Edit: Yep, this seems device-to-device; there doesn't seem to be a web component here. Still useful given how many people use messenger primarily via phone, and I suspect implementation wasn't hard given WhatsApp did it first. It would be neat to see if Messenger and WhatsApp are ever bridged through this.


Device to device. As you are aware, doing this in a browser in a manner that is not begging for failure is next to impossible.


Could you elaborate on why applying signal protocal in a browser is next to impossible?


Because if you serve the library responsible for the encryption from the server, an attacker can perform a man in the middle attack and change that library. This will change when browsers will start implementing the web crypto api. https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/


The concern is less MITM and more a compromise of the server, but close enough. Check my parallel response to Omnipresent's comment.


Fair enough, whatever is the easiest for the attacker :). I'm checking Cyph and its "Trust On First Use" concept. Very interesting.


If you're dropping by defcon, you should catch the talk. There'll be very little focus on this mechanism specifically since we want to share a bunch of things people can actually freely use (and this isn't one of them), but you can catch Ryan afterwards and spark a conversation to find out more.


Well, the keywords there are next to. Like @remy_ implied, you need a mechanism for guaranteeing that the logic you're executing in-browser is protected from server compromise. That's where the Cyph example came in, since as far as I can tell, Cyph is the team to have hacked together a solution to that dilemma, though Cyph also is not using the Signal Protocol right now.

Anyway, there's an upcoming defcon talk which'll lightly touch on how web standards were mangled and viciously abused to make that happen, but since the talk is deliberately not vendor-specific, the focus on it will be brief. Disclaimer on my end is that I was involved in the initial review of their code-signing implementation. https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-24/dc-24-speakers.html#Za...


Cyph's solution for this, last I saw it, is a Rube Goldberg machine of rolling HPKP pins used in attempt to keep the application from reloading itself from its own servers. It's incredibly complicated. And no matter how much asm.js you use, it's still crypto running in a browser instance. There are other very significant problems with browser crypto --- problems that even affect Chrome Applications.


You and I+Cure53+others will probably always disagree on this topic since you've always been the primary catalyst for dissent on this, but it's not at all complicated nor deserving of the analogy to a Rube Goldberg machine.

It's been well vetted enough. It might be a hack, but it's a sufficiently effective hack. We can agree to disagree :)

You coming to either Black Hat or DEF CON? Let me at least connect the two of you after the AppSec Glory talk.


I can't tell if you're talking about browser crypto (in which case my perspective is shared by a large number of crypto engineers) or Cyph's weird caching scheme, in which case a couple people from Cure53 are the only ones who have ever tried to evaluate it.


I think he was only (or mostly) talking about the latter, which I would agree isn't very complicated at all (it's just deleting and regenerating keys/certs on an interval).

As to the former, are you referring to specific known side channel attacks against asm.js/wasm, or just the usual XSS risk?


One would hope that the founder of the company trying to bring that weird secure caching attempt to market would believe that it wasn't very complicated. :)

Of course, if you've filed for patents on this, as was suggested upthread, that somewhat cuts against that argument, doesn't it?


lol, I'm definitely biased given that I'm long since familiar with the idea and wrote the implementation, but I think it's more conceptually counterintuitive/clever/weird than it is actually complicated in terms of having many moving parts.

WebSign does have a patent pending on it (I think it's fair enough to say that the whole system of accomplishing in-browser code signing this way was non-obvious), but HPKP Suicide itself doesn't. Bryant (eganist) and I are actually disclosing and open sourcing implementations of a few non-code-signing applications of HPKP Suicide at Black Hat and DEF CON next month.


> WebSign does have a patent pending on it (I think it's fair enough to say that the whole system of accomplishing in-browser code signing this way was non-obvious),

Yay, another technology to boycott entirely.


What is the difference between compromising a web server that serves js library vs the one that serves device-native app binary?

This always s gets brought up when discussing in-browser crypto and could never get a satisfactory answer.


For one, device-native binaries have to be signed in order to actually run on the phone (well, without introducing some other tweak such as explicitly permitting unsigned applications).

Implementing this with JS is far, far, far more difficult, and the only solution known (touched on in my other comments) still pisses people off because it's running in a web context that, if improperly mitigated, can still facilitate disruption via code injection i.e. XSS.

That said, we're all conveniently ignoring the fact that all of this assumes that the devices themselves haven't been owned. If you think you're a target of entities capable of getting into a fully patched phone, you've got bigger problems.


So this is "whomever is signing the app gets compromised" vs "whomever is hosting js gets compromised". Right?

Facebook could afford a security team just as capable as Apples security team, and make sure the js server remains secure. And if they can't, their own signing procedure can get compromised before the app is uploaded to Apple for review.

I'm still not seeing the difference. Anyone?


Because the binary is served from a marketplace that works with an app that you trust and that will verify the package signature. Or, the web browser does not behave like a package manager.


So it would need a browser plug-in instead of just a web page? That seems fair enough. Extra kudos if they manage to use a standard plug-in for several websites. Maybe we can even get some kind of standard for this.


I made the comparison to Cyph for a reason. Every time Cyph comes up, there's some amount of lively debate about whether they've actually got working in-browser code signing (which they filed a patent on). I'd argue they do, but I'm also one of the guys who reviewed the implementation.


Even if they have been able to successfully get in-browser code signing working, how can they possibly gaurantee no leakage of data? I mean, there are so many inroads, from mitm to rogue browser plugins... It seems (near) impossible to secure them all.


Rogue browser plugins can be discounted as that's tantamount to a compromised device in the context of a downloaded E2EE app. MITM, well it's E2EE with trust-on-first-use for the crypto logic and implements the works when it comes to web security protocols, such as HPKP. There's enough mitigation there. TOFU in this context would mean once you visit once, the logic that's pinned in the browser then performs signature validation on crypto logic from then on.

No one's gonna get it perfectly right. Signal's probably the closest in terms of the cleanness of the protocol. It'd be neat to see Cyph implement the Signal Protocol in-browser as well, but that's neither here nor there. Ultimately, all of this will shift an attacker's focus away from owning the messaging application (or any component of it, be it the servers, the connection, etc.) to owning the devices and the users directly.

Your next technical battles will be in device security and user-friendly secure authentication. Your existing wars against your users (think phishing) will continue to heat up.


This is a weird response. The comment you replied to suggested (very accurately) that there are lots of different ways that browsers leak information, and gave the example of rogue plugins. You (accurately) dismiss rogue plugins, and then go on to write as if that were the only, or even the most important, vector for leaks. But, obviously, no.

Can you cite some other ways browsers leak information besides browser plugins? It's you who are making the extraordinary claim, that Cyph has come up with a way to make browser crypto reliably secure. I think the onus should be on you to demonstrate how carefully you've thought this out.

I'll make you a deal: if you name all the ones I know about, I'll tell you so. :)


Why not. Replying via email.


If the messenger is not open sourced, it's trivial for Facebook to add something to the client binary (now, with a flag or at some later date) before the Signal libraries are hit. I'm not saying they are doing so, but without a clear way to verify continually, this is just short of security theater. Then there's Facebook facilitating the key exchange which of course is another blind trust as well as all the juicy meta data. Maybe this will quiet some of the nerves of privacy conscious individuals already on the network, but it seems to me more like a marketing label.

I still find it hard to believe so many people trust what they believe to be private communication with close-lipped advertisement companies.


Now that the Signal Protocol is deployed in so many different places, is there a proper specification of the (current) protocol? (The old axolotl spec and the GPL implementation don't qualify)

What are the licensing conditions / restrictions for using the protocol?



Sorry, but an implementation is not a specification. It is not only much harder to read, but it is also a moving target. It is borderline impossible to make an independent implementation of the protocol this way.

Besides, the fact that it is licensed under the GPL might mean that somebody porting the protocol to a different platform / language might be creating a "derived work" which also must be licensed under the GPL.


While this is a great step, let's not forget that all FB has to do is track who chooses to use encryption and it can easily use that metadata to aid law enforcement.


Genuinely thrilled to see the Signal protocol adopted for Facebook and Google stuff (albeit optionally). Now if we can just get Microsoft and Amazon to hop on-board, we might actually have a shot at getting this standard to be pervasive.


Last I heard, didn't their messenger app pull a ton of not required permissions on Android?


Well, no, the permissions are required for Facebook to sift through all of your private data.


The Messenger app has Android M permissions model now. you can say no to all of the prompts if you want. I have all of Camera, Contacts, Location, Microphone, Phone, SMS, and Storage permissions disabled.


Except my phone does not have the update yet (note 3). I really need to root this sucker.


As much as this is a step in the right direction, you have to specifically enable encryption for individual conversations in Messenger. This implementation seems a little sketchy to me. They really should just encrypt every conversation automatically. Otherwise, encryption only encourages scrutiny.


Til they have cross-device key sharing, that default would frustrate most of their user base. I'm not sure why they haven't implemented cross-device key share though, maybe it's hard for web?


If they end-to-end encryption all the conversations then they won't be able to mine all that data for advertising purposes...


True, however my point would be that when you have to selectively enable encryption, it only allows the government to more quickly find out who they consider suspect.


I've been wondering about this for a while.

Now both whatsapp and Facebook have this, but surely they have the encryption keys too, or how else would they seamlessly fetch your messages and decrypt them when you get a new phone?

If they do, then what's the point?


I don't know about either anything factual, but I believe it was said that WhatsApp crux in the e2e is the iCloud backup. I believe that's where your old message get restored from.

I believe you can also disable that iCloud backup and thus the ability to retrieve those messages with a new phone.

End-to-End means encrypted in transport and not saved (in any form that is decryptable) on their servers. To that, I believe whatsapp fulfills their end of the bargain.


WhatsApp for Android doesn't seamlessly fetch and decrypt messages on new installations; you have to set up Google Drive backups from your old phone, and then set up restore from those backups on your new phone.


Last time I switched phones, Whatsapp did not restore my old message history. Facebook did, but that was before E2E.


When it was still possible to use the Facebook chat via XMPP I used to use Pidgin as client, and chat securely using the Pidgin OTR plugin.

Message appeared in the Facebook page as "encrypted message".

I guess you hardly can get better than this.


I'll use if could communicate with non-Facebook programs implementing Signal protocol.


I've found the blog post where moxie argues against federation:

https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/

"One of the controversial things we did with Signal early on was to build it as an unfederated service. Nothing about any of the protocols we've developed requires centralization; it's entirely possible to build a federated Signal Protocol based messenger, but I no longer believe that it is possible to build a competitive federated messenger at all."


How can I verify my device is indeed running the signal protocol? Messenger is a proprietary app.


If you need to ask this question then you don't have the skills to verify that your device is running a secure protocol even if I handed you the source code. There are people out there who do have the skills, and you can be certain that they will be reverse-engineering the distributed binaries as soon as possible. I would be extremely surprised if there was not a lightning talks or two at DefCon or BH this year going over the actual on-device code and how closely it hews to the known protocol.


We've verified that FBM is using the unmodified open source Signal Protocol libraries we distribute at open whisper systems. Hopefully others will verify the same!


Can you share the steps so that more people can do this? What exactly should we look for?


OK, I'll wait for independent verification, thanks!


I'd pretty much call the creator of the Signal protocol an independent verification. It's not like he's employed by Facebook.


dumb question: how do we (know|prove) a message is encrypted with signal when we use facebook, google allo etc. etc.


I'd be very glad. I keep facebook for the people who don't have any proper IM (and for the in my view much more legit micro blogging on FB).

I'm scared of what will be possible to extract from my chat logs in a few years, but the benefit of being able to IM people that only have FB feels greater right now.

Biggest problem I see so far is the multiple devices issue, but for most it will be just Desktop and Mobile, so why can't you send each message twice, encrypted separately for each device (automatically, not manually)? Does OTR3 have this feature?


A user complained that the title was misleading compared to https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/07/messenger-starts-testin..., so we replaced "deploys" with "begins testing" above. If someone suggests a better (i.e. more accurate and neutral) title, we can change it again.


I would still use other means of communication for something really private until this becomes the default, because by opting-in I would essentially mark myself as suspicious.


I wonder by "end-to-end" do they mean they will be implementing Signal Protocol, that would be a pretty awesome increase in security (for most peoples threat models)...WhisperSystems are genuinely amazing at what they do, they have like less than 5 staff and very little budget but they are literally saving hundreds if not thousands of lives. Any chance some rich HN member will recognise this and open up the chequebook to OWS?



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