When I saw this, I realized we would have to start over and choose different components able to tolerate the higher voltages. My managers disagreed, arguing that if we caused problems, we would be denied a follow-on contract for similar inverters to be deployed in the payload bay. The managers composed a reply to NASA in which there was no problem, things were fine, let's forge ahead.
I was a mere engineer, I had no management authority, and I hadn't been consulted about the reply. When I heard about it, I sat down and wrote a letter of resignation and pushed my letter into more hands than was absolutely necessary. I made some comparisons that at the time might have seemed over the top (like the Apollo file that killed three astronauts, a disaster resulting from lax oversight).
In my case, because of my having distributed the letter farther than was absolutely necessary, my managers were forced to reverse themselves, I was able to redesign my inverters in a safe way, and we got the follow-on contract in spite of not being seen as "team players".
Many years later, at the time of the Challenger disaster, it finally dawned on me that, had I disregarded the overvoltage issue as my managers had wanted me to, and if something had gone wrong, I would have been held personally responsible, because I was the only person with the level of technical knowledge required to make the call, and my managers could disavow any responsibility. At the time, I made the right decision, but for reasons that I hadn't fully thought out -- if my equipment had failed in-flight, I would have been held responsible, and that would have been a perfectly just outcome.