Crap. So what are the immediate countermeasures? Switch to elliptic curves cryptography?

 Don't use out-of-the-box Diffie Hellman params, I suppose. See, e.g., [1,2].
 Don't use out-of-the-box Diffie Hellman paramsWrong answer. Standard primes are fine; just avoid the small ones. If you try to select your own parameters you're probably going to pick wrong, either in the sense of breaking the crypto or making people wonder if you selected your parameters to hide a backdoor. The standard large primes (my preferred option is the "group #14" 2048-bit prime) were very obviously not selected maliciously, and there's no way anyone has done the precomputations necessary to index that group.
 > If you try to select your own parameters you're probably going to pick wrong, either in the sense of breaking the cryptoIs there any known situation in which generating parameters with 'openssl dhparam' will give you broken/weak parameters?> either in the sense of breaking the crypto or making people wonder if you selected your parameters to hide a backdoorThis is a concern if you're going to distribute your parameters with software, but it could make sense where a sysadmin controls both endpoints, such as a site-to-site VPN.
 This is a newbie question, but how are the standard primes created? How is it ensured that they are not selected maliciously, etc?(a link will suffice)
 The standard prime groups have their highest and lowest 64 bits set, and as many as possible of the rest taken from the binary expansion of pi. The group #14 prime for example isp = 2^2048 - 2^1984 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1918 pi] + 124476 }The value 124476 is the smallest non-negative value which results in p and (p-1)/2 both being prime and 2 being a quadratic residue mod p; this ensures that the subgroup {2^0, 2^1, 2^2, 2^3, ... } is cyclic.We assume that the binary expansion of Pi is not selected maliciously. ;-)
 And as an amusing tidbit, here is the actual value in hex:`````` FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AACAA68 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF `````` Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526#section-3
 > We assume that the binary expansion of Pi is not selected maliciously. ;-)Well, I suppose that we must assume that, as assuming otherwise is self-defeating: anyone running the simulation we're living in already has direct access to the plaintexts anyway.
 That somebody maliciously caused the circle's circumference to diameter ratio to be insecure in this application is indeed not an issue.However, a possible danger is that somebody maliciously suggested using π instead of e...
 True, but Pi is pretty much tradition now... enough so that when Decorrelated Fast Cipher used e instead, it raised some eyebrows.
 pretty good presentation on that by djb: https://projectbullrun.org/surveillance/2015/video-2015.html...
 Are there reasons other than speed/resource-usage for not using 15-18? Or put another way do you prefer group #14 above all others or is #14 the lowest level of security you are comfortable with?
 Speed is the main reason. Going bigger doesn't gain you anything; in some cases it may lose you something since slower arithmetic makes it possible to exploit lower-bandwidth side channel attacks.
 > > Don't use out-of-the-box Diffie Hellman params> Wrong answer. Standard primes are fine; just avoid the small ones.Sure, that's what I meant insofar as the out of the box params are apparently too small in many apps/libs. The links I gave cover it pretty well, I think, no?
 ECC just shifts the problem domain. Just change your curve/prime modulus often and don't use NSA-recommended parameters.
 That's a terrible idea, trading an extremely unlikely weakness (a problematic 2048 bit standard prime) for an extremely likely weakness (a mistake in the code you probably won't even think to write to check your constantly changing parameters).Do what Colin says upthread.
 First, to clarify: what I meant by "your" was an entity like a standards community, not an individual, and by "often" I meant within a timeframe that makes bruteforcing parameters infeasible (which itself changes over time wrt the size of the parameters). Key rotation for example is just good practice.Nothing that I said was wrong - nor does it contradict Colin's advice - and while simple systems are better, that's a tradeoff that should be made if you care about entities with lots of resources like e.g. the NSA. As history shows, bad parameters (or parameters that are feasibly bruteforced over a particular timeframe) are not an 'unlikely' weakness. Besides, being aware of potential vulnerabilities - especially those that you know pose real threats - and not addressing them is simply bad practice.
 Have you checked out http://www.cryptomove.com? The thesis is precisely that encryption is a losing game of cat and mouse, so instead continuous concealment is the last line of defense.
 More ciphertext to analyze, yay! - Every TLA cryptanalysist everI'd prefer Tahoe-LAFS
 Don't be a target the NSA is interested in.
 Not possible; they interpret their mandate as universal.
 By stating your intent to not be noticed, you have drawn their eyes.Why else would you want that if you aren't trying to hide something?
 It's a pretty safe bet that everyone here - a forum called "hacker news" which discusses, among other things, the several aspects of online security - is already on a watch list. The idea is to not promote yourself even further in their attention.
 What is the first non-interesting integer? If it's N, then N becomes interesting, as the first non-interesting integer.
 I was so uninteresting I became interesting.

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